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Au t hor ' s no t e :  this is t he d ra f t  o f  a p a p e r t o  a p p e a r  
in Volume I of my C o l l e c t e d  Es says ( f or t hcomin g from 
Rowman a nd L i t t l e f i e l d ) .  S ince  t he i n t ended r ead e r s h ip 
inc lud es peop l e  unfamil ia r w i t h  t he c o nc e p t s  o f  s oc i a l
c h o i c e  t he o ry ,  t he pap e r  e x p l a in s  some p o i nts t ha t  would 
normally be taken fo r  gr ant ed in t h is se ries . 
Was ted Vo tes  and Other Mar es ' Nes t s: A View o f  E l e c t o r a l  Refo rm 
Brian Barry 
I THE RELEVANCE OF SOCIAL CHOICE THEORY 
The convent ional wisdom among those who have ab s o r b e d  t h e  p r incip a l  
theorems o f  so c i a l  choic e theo r y  i s  t h a t  i t  i s  fruitless to talk 
abou t the in t r in s i c  fairness of al t ernat ive v o t ing p r o c e d u re s . The 
earnes t effo r t s  of ele c t oral reforme rs  to advance the superior c l a ims
of some s y s t em fo r coun t ing votes wi thout  men t io n ing that it stan ds 
to favor their own side are regarded w i t h  the s ame k ind o f  amused 
contemp t as ma thema t ic ians in the pas t reserved for c laims by ama te urs 
to have succeeded in squaring the circ l e. This disenchan ted  v i ew o f 
vo t ing p rocedures makes for d i f f icult ies , o f  cou rs e , when s o c i a l
cho ice theo r i s t s  argue about the bes t me thod o f  de cid ing some thing 
among thems elves. A few years ago , at a c o n f e rence on the theory 
o f  democracy , a group o f  five eminent social choice theorists were 
trying to d e c id e  wh ich o f  seve r a l  r e s t auran t s  t o  d ine a t .  Since 
each knew the p re f e renc e s  of t he 
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o thers and cou ld iuune d ia tely compu te  the outcome to be expected 
from any propos ed procedure, it was impossible to find any 
agreeme n t  on a me thod o f  vo t ing. ( The impasse was in the end
resolved by one of their number se t ting .,ff in the dire c tion of
the res tauran t he favored; af ter  he had gone abou t thirty yards
the others fell in behind. ) 
Such a ruthle s s l y  ins trumen tal a t t itude to vo ting procedures 
grates  on the sens ib il i ties o f  many h igh-minded people. When 
they cons u l t  a soc ial choice theor is t for advice abou t the bes t 
procedure for some impor tan t  decis ion or election they are q u i t e  
put  o u t  to ge t t h e  answe r:"Tell me wha t o u tcome you wan t and 
wha t  the pre ferenc�s o f  the vo ters  are and I ' ll t e l l  you wha t  
procedure t o  suppor t." But i f  that  i s  i n  fac t the only pos s ib l e  
answer then anyone who r e f u s e s  to accep t i t  is s imply wa i ting to  
b e  taken advan tage p f  by someone who is prepared  to act on it. 
A response that w i ll naturally occur to anyone inf luenc ed
by contemporary con tractarianism is to suggest that the difficulty
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a r ises from our taking the preferences of the parties as known. 
I t  may be recalled that · this was Rawls' s response in A Theory of 
Justice to the idea that j ustice should correspond to the outcome 
of r a t ional bargaining . 1  Rawls assented to the general idea but 
ins is ted tha t  the bargaining must take place behind a veil o f  
ignorance tha t denied t he  par ties knowledge of their own (and 
o the r s ' ) pre f e rences. Somewhat analogous ly, we might hope that
agreeme n t  on a fair voting procedure would be possible if we 
forced people to pick one without knowing about par t icular pr ef-
e r ences and therefore wi thout knowing how any given procedure 
would a f fe c t  their  chances of ge t ting the outcomes they wa n ted . 
Wha t can be said defini tely is that when we push the question 
up a level by asking abou t procedures wi thout a par t i cu l a r  
d e c i s io n  in mind we c a n  ge t away from t h e  rather c r a s s  answer 
"Tell me what o u tcome you wan t and I ' ll tell you what procedure 
to suppor t . "  Ins tead o f  tying our evaluat ion to spec if ic outcomes 
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we can ( indeed must) t i e  it to ge neric featu r e s  o f  o utcomes --
for exam p l e  th eir tende ncy to bring about decis ions in acco rdance 
with Rawl s ' s  two princi p le s  of  j ustice o r  i n  acco rd ance with 
u t i l i t a r ian p r e s c riptions. t�reove r, when we pu r s ue o u r  question 
abo u t  v o t ing procedures at the consti t u tio na l  level,  we can ask 
questions abo u t  the e f f e c t s  of a p rocedure o v e r  t ime that a r e  no t 
r e d u c i b l e  to ques t ions abo u t  t he dec i sions tha t come o u t  o f  i t .  
Fo r examp l e , we can ask i f  a p rocedure s timu l a tes inno v a t ive 
t h inking abo u t  alte rnat ive c o u r s e s  o f  ac t ion, o r  encourages 
coo p e r a t ive r e l a t ions among t he d e c i s io n-make r s . 
Bu t all o f  t h i s  s t i l l  means , o f  course, t h a t  we are tal king 
abo u t  var ious kinds of cons equences of hav ing o ne vo t ing p rocedure 
ra ther  t han ano t he r .  Doe s  the sh i f t  t o  the cons t i t u t ional leve l 
give any ho p e  t o tho s e  -- the grea t  maj o r ity o f  enthus ias ts  
for p a r t ic u l a r  v o t ing s cheme s -- who want t o  c laim tha t it makes 
sense t o  t a lk abou t the inhe rent supe rio r ity o f one voting s c heme 
s 
t o  o thers? I do no t t h i nk tha t  there is any gain in thi s  quar t e r  
excep t a heur i s t i c  o ne. _That i s  t o  say, w e  can ask wha t wou l d  
be a f air w a y  o f  making a s ingle  decis ion j us t  as w e ll as we can 
ask wha t would be a f a i r  rule for making a who l e  s e ries of d e cisions. 
Wha t can be s a id is tha t, whe re  the p r e f e rences are known in a 
par t i c u lar case , thoug h t s  abou t f a i rn e s s  may be swayed by con-
side r a t ions abou t the  way a l t e rna t ive proced u r e s  can be expected 
to t u r n  ou t, whe reas t h i s  confounding e ffect wil l  be absent if we 
ask abo u t  vo t i ng procedures  w i thout any d efinite context in mind. 
But the shif t in level s  does no t h ing to mee t f undame nta l obj ections 
to the who l e  p rojec t o f  recommend ing vo t ing procedur e s  w itho ut 
making any a p peal to t h e  cons equenc e s  o f  ado p t ing one rath e r  than 
ano ther .
We should no t ove r s t ate the  g r av i ty o f  t h e  problems p o s ed 
by t he p roo f s  t h a t  so c i a l  choice theo r i sts have p r o duced in the 
pas t f o u r  decade s . B u t  we should a l s o  not und e r e stimate how deep 
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they cut. Thus , if there are two a l t erna t ives be tween wh ich a 
cho i c e  is to be mad e , and i t  is agreed that the appro p r i a t e  
me thod b y  wh ich to make the d e c ision i s  vo t ing w i t h  e a c h  memb e r  
of some gro up having one· vo t e , then mos t  p e o p le w o u l d  fee l that 
an intrinsically f a ir p r(Jc e d u r e  sho uld hav e  t he charac t e r ist ic 
that the al t e rna t ive p r e f  e rred by a majo r i ty of t h e  vo t ers sho uld 
be chosen. \�1e re t h e r e  are mo r e  than two a l t e rnat ives, an ext en-
sion o f  t h i s  cri te r ion would suggest that, if the r e  is one outcome 
t h a t  would be pre f erred by a majo r i ty to e a c h  o f  the o t he rs in a 
p airwise compa riso n , t h a t  outcome should eme r g e  f rom the vo t ing 
p r o c e d u re. (Su c h  a n  out come is usu a l l y  c a l l e d  a Cond o rce t  w inne r . )  
No thing i n  the l i t era t ure o f  social cho i c e  t h e o ry impugns such 
conclusions. Bu t there are two m a i n  l i nes o f  analys i s  that a p p e ar 
t o  show t h a t wha t  has been sa id so fa r is o f  limi ted com f o r t  to 
those who wan t to make genera l c laims f o r  t h e  intrins i c  f airness 
o f vo t i n g  s cheme s . The first is t h a t  whe r e v e r  there ls no 
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Cond o rc e t  w inner (and t here may w e l l  no t be) the  tra i l  runs 
co ld. 2 The wel l - known r esult proved by Kenne th Arrow and a 
hos t o f  s u p p l emen tary theorems show tha t there is no way of
aggre g a t ing prefe r e nces tha t is c a p able of sa t i s fy ing any el emen-
t a r y  l i s t  o f  prima facie a t trac t ive re q u irements . 
The o th e r  l ine is e qually impor t an t .  I t  may have been 
no t i c e d  t h a t  I h av e  no t wri t ten, as mig h t  na t u ra lly have been 
expecte d , of t h e  r e l a tion b e twee n  vo t es and ou t come s bu t r ath e r  
o f  t h e  r ela t io n  b e t we e n  p r e f erences and o u t comes. The reason
f o r  t h is is th a t  we c anno t assume tha t vo t es wi l l  correspond t o  
preferences b e c a u s e  a vo t e r  may b e  ab l e  to advanc e t h e  prosp e c ts
of his favo r e d  o u t c omes b y  depar ting from a p o l i c y  of always 
voting f o r  t h e  a l t e rn a t ive t h a t  he mos t pre f e rs. If we are
looking fo r cri t e r i a  o f  intrinsic f a irn e s s  it s e ems inevitable 
tha t we sha ll· want to def ine them o v e r  the r e l a tion between 
preferenc e s  and o u t c omes. But then we a r e  left wi th a gap between 
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cri t e r ia f o r  aggre g a t ing p r e f e r e nces and methods o f  aggre gating 
vote s , t h a t  i s  to say actual vo t ing s c heme s . The implication 
is tha t ,  even if we co u l d  d e fine an ide a l  re l a t io n  between 
p r e f er e nces and o u tcome s,  there is stil l a p roblem of turning 
t h a t  into a p r ac t ical vo t ing sys t em .  And it has in f act been 
proved tha t , as soon as  the re a r e  mo re than two al terna tive s in
3 the f ield , any vo t ing scheme is s ubject to s t ra tegic voting . 
I t  is the comb ina t ion o f  t h e s e  two l in e s  o f  analysis tha t  leads  
t o  t he negat ive view social  cho ice theo r i s t s  norma l l y t ake to 
t he eve r-recurren t a t t empts to p r o p o s e  vo ting p roced u r e s  as 
having i n t r ins ic me r i t s. 
a... 
In llft intezesdt'* recent book, the Oxford philosopher  
Michael Dumme t t , b e s t  known f or h is work o n  the ph ilo s o p hy of  
Frege , ha s t a ke n  up the cha l l enge .
4 
Unl ike most writers  on
vo ting p roced u r e s , howeve r ,  he is f u l l y  awar e  of  t he two lines 
of social  cho ice theory that I have jus t s ketched. (lie wa s , in 
9 
fac t ,  co-au thor o f  one o f  the e ar l ies t articles on strategic 
voting. 5) Indeed , he scolds other writer s  for not taking o n
board t h e  find ings o f  socia l cho ice theory (pp. 11-12). Never-
thele s s , he c l a ims t hat i t  is pos s i b l e  to go on talking a b o ut the 
fa irne s s  o f  vo t ing procedures even a f t e r  ass imi l ating what social 
cho ice  theory has to say . As he explains his inte nti o n s  in the 
Ep ilo gue to the book , his a im is to b ring to b e a r  the insights 
a t tajnable f r om soc ial cho ice theory upon thP. question o f  finding 
an " equ i table " vo ting p rocedure ( p . 295). 
Dumme t t ' s  book is flawed in a numbe r of ways . It is ill-
o rgan ized . I t  is o ften unnece s s a rily  arcane and comp licated fo r any 
purposes that  a r e  served by it. The index -- a noto rio u s  Ach i l l e s  
heel  wi t h  D umme t t  - - is inadequate . (the e n t r y  on "admissibility", 
for  example , g ives no r e f e rences to the chapte r d evoted to the 
topic . )  It  is a l s o , I be l ieve , gene r a l l y  misguided in its sub-
s tan t ive conclu s ions . Fo r a l l  that, it.constitute s a valuable 
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end eavo r. It is the right sort of thing, for all its faults. 
For that reason, I intend to organize my discussion in the 
rest o f  this extended essay around Dununett's book. I shall not, 
however, f ollow it ve ry closely either in order of topics or in 
relative emphasis on different topics. Dununett devotes fourteen 
chapters to method s  of vot ing in conunittee s  on altern ative pro-
posal s  and two chap�er s  to method s  of voting for representatives. 
��t�� 
In contrast, I shall give �l as much space to the se cond topic . 
The first top i c  has a certain inherent interest, but I shall 
discuss it primarily for two other reasons. One is that it 
enables  me (as it does DuDD11ett ) to get some analytic points made 
in a rel a tiv e ly simple context . The other is that DuDD11ett make s  
an important and inte resting claim, namely that the rationale
f o r  voting procedures  is qu ite di f f e r ent in the cases of voting 
f o r  repre s entatives and vot ing on other matter s. In orde r to 
addr e s s  this I shall have to give a cr it ica l account of what 
II 
Dummett takes the rationale of voting procedures to be in cases 
other than the election of representatives. 
I shall take up the question of voting in conunittees in 
s e c t ions II to V and then that of voting for representatives 
in s e c t ions VI to XIII. 
Il THE RATIONALE OF THE PREFERENCE SCORE METHOD 
Fortunately, it is not necessary for the present purpose to 
go through the various procedures that Dummett discusses for making 
de c is ions in conunittees . For there is a guiding thread that w ill
lead us to DuDD11ett's own recommendations. This leading idea is 
introd uced in, the chapter entitled "Fundamental Notions. " (This 
is chapter 2 -- the book begins strangely with a chapter on 
"Successive Votes.") Dummett imagines the members of a family 
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o f  f i�e trying to d e cide whe t h e r  to go to a play by Be cke t t  o r
one b y  Ayckb o ur n .  
I f  w e  know only that thr e e  memb e r s  of the family prefer Beckett 
and two Ayckb o u rn, we shall  th ink that Becke t t  is the fa irest 
cho ice: b u t  i f  we are to l d  that the th ree  have on l y  a sl ight 
prefe rence for Becke t t , while the two eno rmous l y  prefer Ayckbourn, 
we sha l l  al ter out opinion. In a f ami l y , this wil l  be expr e s s e d  
ve r bal ly: i t  i s  such feelings  t h a t  w e  do no t d i r e c tly r e p r e s e n t  
i f  we  res t r ict o u t s e l v e s  t o  t h e  u s e  o f  pr e f e r enc e s c a l e s .  Suppo se
now ,  howeve r ,  tha t o ther po s s ib i l it i e s  are cons idered: p l ays by
Stoppard , P i n t e r , and Iones co. The thr e e  memb e rs of the fami ly
who pre f e r  Becke t t  rank t he f ive  o p tio ns in  the order: Be cke t t, 
Ay ckbourn , S t op pard , P in ter , Ion e s c o . The two who p r e f e r 
Ayckbourn rank t hem in the o rde r: Ayckb o u r n, P inte r, Sto p pard, 
Ionesco , Becke t t. I t  is now o b vio u s  f rom the p r e fe re n c e  s cale s  
a l o n e  tha t  Ayckbo urn i s  the f a i r e s t  cho ice.  The f act t h a t  the 
I ?I 
ma j o ri ty on ly s ligh tly p r e f e r  Becke t t  to Ayckbourn is s uffi-
cien tly shown by Ayckb o u r n's b eing their second choice .  The 
fact  that the mino ri ty pref er Ayckbourn by a w ide margin is 
s hown by the ir also preferr ing thr e e  o t her  playwright s  t o  
Becke t t . (Pp . 38-39. ) 
No t ice that i t  does not make any d iffe rence whe t he r  o r  no t p lays 
by S toppard, Pin ter  or Ionesco are in fact ava i l a b l e  a l t e rna t ives 
(see pp . 56-7). Ei ther way, we have, acco rd ing to Dunune t t, addi-
t iona l in fo rma tion that is relevan t to the choic e b etween Becke t t
and Ayckbourn. 
Wi th this key to DUllDDett's book in our hands it is easy to 
unders t and Ounuue tt's hos ti l i ty to maj o r itar ian voting s c heme s .  
For , as we have  just  seen, the majo r i ty cho i c e  m a y  no t b e  the 
bes t by his imp l icit cr i terion even in the simp l e s t case  wher e  
the r e  a r e  o n l y  two a l te rnatives. W e  c a n  a l s o  s e e  why, whe r e  there 
are mo re than two alte rnatives , Dumme t t  o p poses any of the usual 
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s chemes for elimina ting op tions t h a t  are few people's firs t o n  any vo t e r ' s scale are at leas t comparable . • •  Indeed, t h e  
choice . For it  i s  qui te  possib le for an al te rna t iv e  that  is only general rul e  we can reasonably adop t is that all the gaps 
few people's f irs t choice to b e  selec ted by the imp lici t cri t e r ion are  no t me r el y  comparable ,  bu t equal" ( p. 132). This in fac t 
a t  work here if i t  is also few people's last choice and a number g r e a tl y  unde rs t a t e s  the s treng th of the assump tion h e  require s,  
of people put i t  in  the middle. the  implicit c ri te rion, which fo r we cannot ge t anywhere by a s s um ing only that the utility loss 
Dumme t t  l a t e r  makes exp l ici t , is that the ou tcome to be cho sen is re p r e s en ted  by one place in the rank o rde ring is the same for 
the one which mos t s a tisfies the preferences o f  the people choosing, any g iven person whe the r it occurs near the top or the bo t tom. 
when account is t aken o f  both the numbers in f avo r o f  the var ious Wha t we have to assume is that a one place drop r e p r e s e n t s  the 
al ternatives and the int�nsity o f  the i r  preferences. More pre- s ame u t il i ty lo s s  for eve ry vo t er  -- an in te rpe rsonal rather than 
c is e ly, DUDDDe t t ' s  cri terion tells us t o  maxim i z e  aggre g a t e  i n t r ap e rsonal compar ison . 
s a t isf action among the vo ters  wi th  the outcome cho s e n . If we make this  as sump tion then we can assent to DW11111e t t ' s 
Th e  p o s s ib il i ty of saying this  kind of th ing abo u t  vo ting nex t move: "These  cons ide r a t ions lead dire c tly to the formula tion 
pro cedures p r e s uppose�, of course, tha t we are e n t i tl e d  to a s s ume 
of a c r i t e r ion  f o r  the faires t  outcome • • •  giving equal weight to 
t h a t  r a nk o r derings of al ternatives are a rel iable surrog a t e  for  eve r y  pref erence of  eve ry vo ter , and thus aimed at  picking out tha t 
in tens i t ie s  of pref e rence. Dumme t t  s ta te s  his emp i r i cal as sump tion o u t come wh i c h  will g ive the grea t e s t  overall s a t isf ac tion to the 
abou t  p r eference int ens i t ies  as follows: "we can only as sume, as vo t e r s . We shall call this the preference score of an o u t come " 
a general principle, that the gaps be tween consecutive outcomes ( p. 1 3 3 ) . This is not very lucidly p u t , bu t  wha t Dumme tt actually 
I(. 
means is that  we can assoc i a te wi th e a c h  o u t c ome a p r efe rence s co re, 
and the o u tcome w i t h  the h i g he s t  p r eference s c o r e  can be taken 
( if we make the very st rong assump tions re qu ired) t o  g iv e  t h e
g r ea t e s t ove rall  s a t i s f a c t ion to the  vo ters . T h e  me t hod is t he 
after i t s  o r i g i na to r  the chevalie r d e Bor d a . 
one usua lly called the Borda coun t� " I f  there  are 5 outcoces, 
a vo t e r  w i th the s t r on g  p reference s c a l e  abcde is . • •  t a ken to
allo t 4 points to .!• 3 po i n ts  to E_, 2 poin ts to .£_, 1 po i n t t o  .!!_, 
and 0 to e· " 
_, 
and so o n  ( p . 133). The po i n ts for  ea c h o u t c ome 
are then added up and t he one w i th the highe s t scor e de c lar ed the 
winne r .  
The p r e f e rence sco r e s  • • •  trea t the  d i s tanc e o n  a vote r ' s 
pre f erence scale be tween two o u tcome s as a rough meas ure of t he 
s tr en g th o f  his ·p r e f e r ence for the higher ove r the lower . His
con tr ibu t io n  to the  p re ference score of a n y  ou t c ome c an t here-
fo r e  be v iewed as roughly re p r e s e n t ing t he de g r ee of s a tis fac-
t ion he  would o b tain i f  it we r e  succes s f ul . One who bel ieve s 
the  f a i re s t  outcome to b e  t h a t wh ic h  wou l d  maximize the c o l l e c t ive 
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s a t i s f a c tion of t he vo t e r s  w ill t h e r efore adopt p refere n c e  s c o r e s  
as t he leadin g c ri ter ion ,  accord i n g  to the principle [that] i f  E_ 
has a lowe r p r eference  score than.!• b c annot be a fair ou t come . 
{Pp. 133-34.) 
I t  is obv iou s t ha t , if we are willing to as sume t h a t  one 
place down in a p reference ordering re?r e s e n t s  an equal utility 
l o s s  for each vo t e r , we w ill maxim ize aggrega te utility by making 
each in terva l equal in t he scor ing sys tem and choo s ing the outcome 
wi t h  the h ighest p reference s core . F r om t h is p e r s p e ctive , it i s  
equally plain that  o ther me thods o f  vo t ing ,  such as e l icina tive 
or  majo r i tar ian , a r e  to be regarded simp ly as bo t ched a ttemp ts 
a t  ac hieving t he same resul t .  
Dumme t t  adm i t s  tha t ,  whe r e  two o r  more ou t comes h ave i d e n t ic a l  
p re ference sco res , t h e  tie  should b e  b r oken b y  picking t h e  one 
tha t i s  a Co ndo r c e t winne r if i t  exis t s  (Pr i nci p l e  15 on p. 141): 
tha t i s  to s ay ,  if s eve ral out comes a r e  t ie d  for fir s t  place o n  
the prefe rence score c ri t e rion , a n d  one o f  t hese outcome s i s  
p re fer red b y  a major i ty of  t h e  vo te rs  to e a c h  of the others, that 
' "  I� 
is the one which s h o u ld be c ho s en . B u t  t h i s  is, o bv io usly , o nly wil l  s e c u r e  t h e  maximum to tal s a t i s fa c t io n: to accord it greater 
a small conces s ion. It is wo r t h  o b s erving, for one thing, that impor tance is to fall ·victim to the mystique of the majority, 
there could be an o u t come capable o f  bea t ing each of the o t he r s which is only a s upe r s i t i t ion engende red by familiarity wi t h
i n  p airwise vo t ing, ye t t h e r e  i s  no guarantee that i t  will get the use in practice o f  majority pro cedures . We h ave s e e n  in
the h ighe s t  pre f e rence sco r e . Thi s  illus t rates how far the logic t h i s  c hapter how inaccurate a test majority preferences may 
o f  max imizing pre fe rence s a t i s f ac t i o n  (on stringe nt assur.:ptions) provide fo r wh ich o u t come wo uld y ield the maximum overall 
is from any kind of maj o r i ta r ian a p p r o a c h. Dummett himself makes sa tisfa c t ion. Fail ing as a c r i t e r io n, t hey thus serve poorly 
this clea r: as a test: a concern f o r  j ust ic e  in g ene r a l ,  and f o r the rights 
Anyone see k i ng a criter io n t h a t  wil l s elect a unique fairest o f  mino r itie s  in pa r t i c u l a r , mus t validate the pref e r e nce 
o u t come in almo s t  every case mus t have reco urse bo th  to the score cri t erion . (Pp. 141-42 . ) 
cri t e r io n  o f  maj o r i t y  p re fe renc e and to the  p r e f e rence s co r e I t  sho uld be sa id that DWIDDe t t  goes o n  to add: "}{any w i ll 
cr i te r io n: t h e  ques t ion at issu e  is to whi c h  to g ive the pr iori ty . rema in unpe rsuaded of this • • • •  The me re f a c t  tha t many are
The q ues t io n  turns on whe the r it b e  though t mor e  impor tant to imbued w i th the mys t ique o f  the majo r i ty bears on wha t vo t ing 
p l ease as many people as possib l e  or to p lease everyone callee- p rocedures they will be d is p o s ed to a c c e p t as f a i r " (p. 142). 
tiv e l y  a s  much as po s s ib l e .  The la t t er is s u r e l y  more reasonable. B u t  t h is remar k  is p lainly o f fe red in an anthropolo gical spirit 
The rule to do as the majo r i ty w i s hes d o e s  no t appear to have (or perhaps mo re p r e c i s e ly a miss ionary s p irit ) as a repo r t  on the 
any b e t t e r  jus t i fica t io n  t han as a r o u g h-and -read y  tes t  for wha t unfo r tuna t e  p e r s i s t e nce o f  a wide spread s upers t i t ion. 
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When Dwmne t t  goes o n  to d iscuss p ractical (or allegedly 
practical) vo ting schemes, he says tha t  "those who beli eve the 
fairest o u tcome is tha t which gives the greatest ove r all sati s -
factio n will accep t pre f e rence scores as f urnish ing the le ading 
criterion for a f air o utcome" (p. 176). He then go e s  on to say: 
"If, among the members of a commi t tee o r  o ther decis ion -maki ng 
body, the r e  are people who, imbued wi th the mystique of the 
majo ri ty, insist on majo rity pre f erence as an overrid i ng cr iterion 
of fairness, they wil l  be unw il l ing to emplo y the pre f erence score 
procedure, but will demand one that conforms to [the princ i p l e that  
if  there is a Condorcet winner i t  should be the  outcome chosen ] 
wheneve r all vote since re ly " (p. 178). On the basis of t his he 
goe s  on to conside r  mixed schemes, but s imply as a way of ac commo-
dating those w i th irrational id e as about fairness in vo t i ng. I t 
i s  t here fore legi tima t e  to take the criterion of aggregate p r ef er-
ence sat isf act ion among the vo t e rs and the me thod of p r e f e rence 
sco res  as Dumme t t's own answe r to the quest ion tha t he set h imself : 
tha t  o f  f inding a fair voting procedure. 
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III A CRITIQUE OF THE PREFERENCE SCORE METHOD 
Wha t c an be said about this answer? The most interes t ing and 
impo r t an t is s u e s  ar e , I believe, rais ed by the criterion 
of aggre gate preference-satisfaction, but before addre ssing 
tho s e  I sho ul d say some thing about the appropriateness of 
the pro c edure a s  a way of imp lementing the crite rio n. I have 
a lready sa i d  that, i f  each ste p down the p r efe r ence o rde ring 
reall y  represen ts an equal ut ility loss for e ach voter , the r e  is 
no do ub t tha t the preference score method wi ll maximize the 
aggrega t e  u t ili t y  of the vo t e rs. B u t  how p l aus ibl e is that 
ass ump tion ? 
' 
In m.any 
Such a p rio ri psychology do e s  no t seem to me v e ry convinc ing . 
A 
k ind s of cho ice s i tua t ion we migh t we l l  estimate that wha t 
ma t t e r s  mos t to p eople is ge t t ing a h i ghl y - r anked o utcome and 
that they a r e  re l atively indi fferent b etwee n  low-ranking a ltern a -
tives. Dumme tt say s ( stating a p resuppos ition a s  if it were a 
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truth) that "we have no reason to t h ink t h a t  the f ac t  t h a t  one 
voter regards a candidate as the worst s hould coun t agains t 
him les s  than the fact that anot her regard s h im as the best 
counts in his favour" (p. 1 7 7 ). But in many situat ions I th ink 
that people looking at the workings of the p refe r ence score me thod 
will be quite disconcerted to realize that one person's ordering 
of two alt erna tives that makes one of them la s t  and the other 
ne.xt to last has exactl� as much influence on the outcome, inasfar
as it lie s b e tween the s e  two, as someone els e's decis ion to put . . 
one of them first and the other second. 
A· second difficulty stems from strategic voting. Suppose that 
we waive the first objection entirely and accept that it is 
reasonable to regard one step down in anyone's p reference orde r ing 
as an equal utility loss wherever it comes, the preference score 
method can be counted oq to p roduce a u til i t y-maximiz ing out come 
only if everyone ac t ua l l y  fills in the voting paper in a c cordanc e 
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with his true pre ference ordering. But, as D unune tt acknowledges, 
"a well-informed vot er has cons iderable incen t ive to vote strate-
g ically" (p . 234) in order to improve the chance s of h i s  f avored 
policy or candidate. 
As Dummet� 
�notes (p. 236),the way to vot e  s tr a te g i c ally is to pu t the mos t 
de sired candida t e  or op tion tha t one thinks has a c hance first,
then fill in the next places with candid ates one b e lieve s have no
chance, and p ut the serious rivals at the bottom of the lis t. 
The trouble with this is , howeve r , tha t if everybo d y  f o l lows the 
same strategy the most likely resul t is tha t an ou t come tha t  a lmost 
all the voters actually rate very low will emerge as.  the winne r . 
Say there are three candidates that have real suppor t and two 
with almost none. Then the three strong c andidates will come 
at the top of some list s  and at the bottom of the o t hers, wh i l e  
the two weak candidates will come i n  second and third place, 
and this  should be enough, provided sup port for the st rong 
Z'i 
c andid ates is f airly evenly d ivid e d , to give o n e  of th e se weak 
c andid ates the highest score. (If we have f o u r  equally st r ong 
c andidates and one weak one, we c an say t hat the suc cess of t h e  
w e a k  candidate i s  p r actically assured wi t h  any s u b s t a n t i a l  amoun t 
of strategic voting.) 
Dwmnett a cknowledges this possibil i t y  (p. 235) but argues 
that voters should realize what may happen and play it safe by 
voting in accordanc e with their true p re ferences (pp. 236-7). 
Thus, pa radoxically, the radical instability of the pr oced ur e in
t h e  fac e  of stra t egic vo ting is claim e d  to make it re latively 
immune to it. This is an ingen i o us a t t empt to salvage a procedure 
tha t is usually rejected for p ract ic al use by s t u d e nts o f  t h e  
t h eory o f  vo t ing systems precisely b e c a use o f  its ext r eme suscep-
tibility t o  strategic voting. There are, however, sev e ral 
power ful points to be mad e in rebuttal of Dummett's defense . 
The most obvious obje ction is that, although it is fairly 
easy to see how to vo t e  strategically if yo u know t h e  p r e f e r enc e s  
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o f  the o t her voters and e xpec t them to vote t h e i r  p r e f e r e n c e s , 
t h e  analysis requi r e d  to despair of hoping to outguess t h e  o t h e r s  
and henc e vot e  sinc e rely a f ter all 
"is a good d eal more so phisticated and s c a r c e l y  t h e  kind o f  thing 
to be counted on. I would in fact be inclined to p r ed i c t  t hat 
whe r e  we have intelligent peop l e  who a r e  no t soph i s t i c a t ed about 
vot ing analysis making decisiorsunder c o nd i t ions whe r e  t h e r e  is 
good knowle dge o f  one anothe r ' s p r e f e re n c e s , the r e s u l t  of us i n g  
t h e  preferenc e score method is quite likely t o  b e  the p e rve r s e  
kind of outcome sketched above. (Elections for t h e  heads hip of 
an Oxbridge college come to mind as c a s e s  whe re  the cond i tions 
are met.) 
has 
Wha t I have said so far
A
implicitly c o n c e d e d  Dumme t t's cla i m  
chat a sophisticated voter would vote sin c e rely unle ss he tho ught 
t hat he were unique ly well-placed to predict how t h e  o t he r s  we r e  
going t o  vote. But I question the universal validity o f  this 
analys is. It may well be, I conj ectur e, that t h e  p r e f e r ence
score procedu r e  is liable to induc e a n  n-p e r s o n  p r isoners' d ilemma , 
.p] 
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where everyone thinks that the best de cision for himself is to vot e  
strategically even though all would prefer a regime of sincere 
vo t ing if it could somehow be guaranteed tha t everyone would vote 
in accordance with h i s  t r u e  pre f erenc e s .1lsupp o s e  that we have a 
si tuat ion (no .t I th ink uncmmno n  in sma l l  voting bodie s ) where people 
have a good idea abo u t  the prefe r e n c e s  of o t h e r s  bu t l i t tle infor-
mation about their actual voting intentions. Then the case for 
v o t ing s t ra t egically a long the lines already ment ioned is qu i t e  
s t rong. If few o t hers vo te s tr a t e g i c a l l y , Dunune t t  hims e lf 
acknowl edg e s  tha t i t  i� mo r e  advan t age o u s  to vo t e  s t r a t egically
o n e s elf: the chance of ge t t ing one's pre f e rred cand idate is 
inc r e a s ed a n d  t h e r e  is s t ill no chance of ele c t ing someone t h a t  
nobody (including o n e s e lf) wan t s. If many o t he r s  vo t e  s t r a t egical ly , 
i t  become s po s sibl e  t h a t  one will by vo ting s t r a t egical ly oneself 
tip t h e  bal a nce and t u rn a weak candida t e  from a l o s e r  to a winner. 
B u t  t h e r e  is also no doubt that s tr a t egic v o t ing wil l  produce a 
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definite improveme n t  over sincer e vo t ing in t h e  relative chanc es 
of one's own preferred candidate winning .  To put the point in 
the terminolo gy of collective goods: keeping out weak candidates 
is a co l lective good -- everyone benefi t s  from it -- bu t the re 
is a s t rong temp tation for everyon e  to leave i t s  provision to
the o t her s  and to think that if t he o ther s  do not con t rib u t e t o
it there i s  n o  re ason fo r be ing the onl y  publ ic-spir i ted vo t er. 
A fur t h e r  point wh ic h seems to me of great iDportance is 
that, when I s a id t h a t  the p re ference score procedure is especially 
susceptible to s t ra tegic vo ting , I did no t simply mean t h a t  i t
gave la r ge numbe rs o f  opportuni tie s for i t. That would be true  
also for any bina ry p rocedure , fo r example. A binary pro c e d ure 
is one such as the standard Anglo -American conuni t t e e  vo t ing 
procedure where a t  each s t age a l t erna t iv e s  are pa rtit ioned in t o
two sets. If we s t ipu l a t e  tha t a sincer e  vo t e r  would be one who 
always voted for t h e  branch con taining the most favored outcome 
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fur the r along it, we can easily show that it would frequently be 
i rrational to vote sincere ly. 
Bu t it would b e  very hard to come u p  with any plausible 
s tory of strategic voting und er a binary choice system wher eby the 
unive rsal last cho ice could f in ish up as the group decis ion. 
When we consider the mos t familiar methods use d to elect pe ople 
to  s ingle positions in English-speak ing countr ies, we reach the 
same conclusion. Thus, the system of awar d ing the pos ition to the 
(a plurality or relat ive majority) 
candidate w i th the mos t vote s�obv io usly lends itse lf to stra t egi c 
vo t ing whe r e  the re are more than two c and idates , but it is hard to 
come up w i th a scena r io of s t ra t e g ic vote -sw i t ch ing in wh ich a 
candid a t e  who is ranked las t  by almos t eve ry body fin ishes up w i th a 
plura l i t y  of vo t es. The same can be said of the var ian t on the 
plurali ty system known as the alternative vote or sometimes 
"majo r i ty preferential voting ." Und er this the quota of votes
�'t 
needed fo r elec t ion is set at one h alf of the total votes cast 
plus one. Any cand idate·reach ing th is quota on f irst preferences 
alone is de clared elected. Fa iling this the candidate w ith the 
fewes t  first preferences is eliminated and his votes redistributed 
to his supporters' second preference. If this still does not pro-
duce a cand ida t e  who me ets the quota, the process is repeated. 
Eventually eithe r  some cand idate gets the quota or only two candi-
dates �re lef t in and the one w ith mor e votes is declared a winner. 
(A cand idate can win w ithout meeting the quota if not all electors 
include a pref e r ence fo r all cand id ates on the ir ballots. ) Contr ary 
to a common misappre hension, strategic voting can be advantageous 
unde r  this procedure -- a po int I shall return to in section VII. 
B u t  i t  would aga in call for an extraord inary ser ies of miscalcu-
lat ions for strateg ic voting to result in the election of a candi-
date whom scarcely anybody wanted. The peculiar propensity of 
the prefe r ence scor e method to produce re ally perverse r esults - -
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b y  anyone ' s s tandards of pervers i ty -- seems to me an excellen t 
reason all by i tself for ruling it out as a p r o ced ure to be used 
in any s i tuat ions excep t those where s incere vo t ing can somehow 
be coun t e d  on. 
Dunune t t  is  aware , as  we have seen, of the pro blem of s t ra tegic 
vo t i ng , though I have argued that he is too sanguine abo u t  i t. 
Bu t he s hows no comparab le awarene s s  anywhe re in his  book of the 
equally impo r tan t problem -- one which has much  exerc ised soc ial
c ho i ce theo r i s t s  in the las t fif teen years -- of agenda man ipula tion . 
This is a real  prob lem for the p referenc e  s core p r o c edure becau se
of the particularly comp rehens ive way in which i t  v iola tes the 
criterion for a dec is ion procedure of the independence of irre-
levant alternatives . DuUDUett recognizes this feature of i t 
and ap plauds it. Thus, he wri tes tha t t he c r i te r ion of the inde-
pendence of irrelevant a l terna tives 
�I lacks complete i n tu i tive ju s tifica tion, since it c on flicts with
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the mo re compe l l ing p r inciple t h a t  whe ther  x wo uld b e  a fair er 
outcome t han z depends not only on how many (or wh ich) vo t ers
prefer � t o  y, and how many prefer Y. to  �· but on how s tron g 
[saw?] 
the ir p references are . We say�from the examp le of the family 
going t o  the t heatre that, even when the p references are n o t 
e..'< p l i ci t ly we i gh ted , the spec ific  posi t ions of x and yo n  a 
vo t e r's pre ference scale g ive a p a rt ial ind i ca t ion  of  t h e  
s treng t h  o f  h i s  preference f o r  one over the o t her:  t o  take
t his in t o  ac coun t is to rejec t  the p r inc ip le of i ndependence 
of ir relevan t al terna t ives. (P. 54.) 
<(-The s implest way of explain ing what t he independence o f
irrelevant alternatives amoun ts  to is t o  apply i t  to  Dwmne t t ' s 
example of the,family deciding which play to a t tend . Wha t 
i t  say s is, roughly speaking , tha t if Bec ke t t  beats Ayckbourn
when t h e s e  are the only al terna t iv e s  cons idered then Becket t 
should also beat Ayckbourn when other alternatives are added. 
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Now all voting schemes are open t o  agenda manipulation, but the 
pr eference score me t hod is especially vulnerable to it. Because 
i t  make s  t he plac ing of an alternative depend on the rank ings o f 
all a l ternative s , the addition and subtraction of al te r nat ives 
makes  a particularl y big difference. Thus, in the case given by 
Dummett, three o u t  o f  five vo t ers put Beckett first when the choice 
i s  made over five p laywrights. A clear major ity that puts one 
exc e p t  t he p r e f erence s c o r e  procedure , 
o p t ion in f ir s t place w i l l  win under just about any procedur� 
however many or few other alternatives there are. But with the 
p r e f erence score pro cedure this  is not so and wi t h  the  preferences 
se t  out by Dumme t t the dec i s ion w i l l  change to Ayckbourn. Obviously, 
whoever de t e rmine s  t h e  list of a l t erna t ives to be voted on can 
go a lon g  way towards con trolling the outcome -- espec ial ly, be i t
noted, if t h e  vo t ers do no t vo t e  s tra teg ically. The tr i c k  i s  to
f ind several v arian t s  on  one ' s  own favored alternative t hat 
everyone f inds s li ghtly less attractive. These w ill follow it i n 
t he vo ting o r der t hus  g iv ing the outcome one favors an artificial 
boost in t he scoring relative to the other real alternatives. 
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IV THE CRITERION OF AGGREGATE-PREFERENCE SATISFACTION 
If what I have s aid here is persuasive, Dummett's cas e for 
the preference score procedure as a practi cal way of taking votes 
will have to be dismissed. But he could still �aintain that 
aggregate preference-satisfaction among the voters is the criterion 
for  t he ideal relation between preferences and outcomes . What can 
be said about this? 
The f irst and most o bvious th i ng to be said is that Dunnnett 
is no t competing in the intrinsic fairness stakes when he proposes 
this  c r i terion, even though he talks the language o f  "fairne s s "  
hi s c r i t e r ion 
and t r ea t s  � as if i t  were s imply a r ival o f  a l o gi c a l ly similar 
k ind to maj oritarian c r i teria t h a t  are  at temp ts to appea l to 
intu i t ive no t ions of in trinsic fairness. I t  i s  plain that what 
Dumme t t  is pu tting  forward is an external criterion for assess ing 
t h e  working o f  vo ting p roced ures , namely (although he never as 
f ar as I can see says so explicitly) utilitarianism. 
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We can see that wha t he offers 
is an ext ernal criterion by noticing that it is an entirely 
contingent matter whe t her or no t in some case a vo ting proc edure 
is the best means of meeting the cri terion . Perhaps no voting 
procedure would be as efficient a s  h aving one person (either a 
member of t he fa�ily or a well- in formed impartial outsider) make 
a dec is ion with the cons c ious  obj e c tive o f  maximizing the aggre-
gate u tility of the five members o f  the fam i ly. It remains open 
that advanc e s  in psychome try might make vo t ing in comm i ttees
o b s o le te . Perhaps some comb ina t ion o f  ga lva n i c  s kin r e s ponse
measur emen t s  and reading s  f rom e lec tro de s  a t t ached to the  commi t tee 
memb e r s ' heads would ind icate s t reng t h s  o f  p r e f e r e n c e  w ith enough 
reliab il i ty to.enab l e  vo ting to b e  r e placed by t h e  s ununa t ion o f
indi c e s  o f  p r e f e rence st r eng t h. 
Clearly , someone who is attached to the no t ion tha t some
relations b etween pre f erenc e s  and o utcomes are in t rinsica l l y fa i r 
.3� 
is no t go ing to be impressed by Dummett's way of proceeding. Such 
a p erson is likely to adhere to what Dummett calls "the mystique 
o f  the majori t y , "  and reasonably enough, it seems to me, if the 
o bj ec t is to come up with a criterion that gives everyone an 
equal inpu t into the decision. It is, I believe, this idea 
howevP.r chimerical it may turn out  to be on close analysis -- that 
(I sha l l  re tu rn to this point in the context of elections in sect ion IX.) 
animates appe a ls to the intrinsic fairne ss of procedures.J.. And 
wh e r e  a maj ority pr e fers 2. to E._, such a person is liable to con -
elude that counting everyone for one implies that .'.!_ should be the 
collective decision. Giving the supp o r t e r s  o f  b the victory 
becaus e the y have mo re in tense preferences will , on this v iew, 
amo unt to a llowing them extra vo tes. 
Sup p o s e , however , t ha t  we accept the irrelevance of Dummett's 
cr i t er ion to the traditional argumen ts about the intrinsic fairness 
o f  vot ing procedures. Is it p lausib l e  as an ex t e rnal crit erion ? 
It seems to me tha t Dummett sets things up to favor himself by 
ma king the examp l e  one o f  a family ma king a decision. For it is 
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a t  any rate no t too  unreasona b l e  t hat the memb e r s  should ac cept 
aggregate utility as a crite r ion,  e s p ecially if o v e r  a who l e  s e r i e s  
of dec i s ions t h i s  seems t o  work o ut rough l y  equita b l y . Even in
such a conte.� t ,  however , i t  i s  by no me ans o b v ious that i t  i s the
r i g h t  one. Thus , in the era  when f ilms we r e  c onstruc t ed a s  
vehic les  fo r stars , the studios d is c o ve r ed t hat gr oup d e c is io ns
were made by ve to , so tha t the p r ime attribute o f  a box o f f ic e  
suc c e s s  w a s  an ac t o r  or actre s s  who wa s n o t  subj ect to v i o l ent 
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di s l ike from any l arge segment o f  the f i lmgo ing audienc e . The d i s -
tributive c r i t e r ion that one sho u l d  not go to a f ilm or p l ay tha t 
any member of the party violently obj ects to i s  apparently more 
p o p ula r in practice tha n  the alte rnative of maximiz ing aggre gate 
u t il i ty end o r sed by DWllDle tt. 
When we move from a fam i ly to a un it w ith l e s s  so l ida r ity ,  
the c a s e  agains t u t il i ty maxim i z ing is strong e r .  T h i s  i s  fami l ia r
g round a nd I sha l l  no t spend any time expanding o n  i t  h e r e . The 
po in t I want to emp h a s i ze abo ut the p ecul iarity o f  the family 
3 1  
example is a dif ferent o ne. When the membe r s  o f  the family vo t e , 
the peopl e  making the decis ion a r e  iden t ic a l  w i t h  t h e  p e o p l e  
a f fe cted by i t .  But Dumme tt tells  u s  tha t  h i s  boo k i s  de s igned
to apply to the de l i berations o f  " a l l  who a r e  invo lved in any
corpor a te dec ision-making pro c e s s: memb e r s  o f  b o a r d s  o f  g o v e r no r s  
and o f  direc t o r s  as we l l  as o f  the House o f  Conu::io n s "  ( p . 1 3 ) . 
�ow it is surely an important fact a b o u t  s u c h  c o r p o r a t e  b o d i e s  
that , although they w i l l  o c c a s iona l ly take d e c i s i o n s  t h a t  a f f e c t 
theme l ve s  alone (whether to serve oo ffee o r  tea at t he ir me e t in g s , 
whe ther to b an smoking, and so o n )  the i r  r a i s o n  d ' � t r e is to t a ke 
dec is ions whose pr ima ry e ffect i s  on other peo p l e. w"hy sho uld we
suppos e  t h a t  maximiz ing the aggregate pre ference-satis faction o f  
the  commi ttee members with the outcome s hould b e  the obj e ctive o f  
the ir vo ting procedure ? 
I t  may , o f  course, be s a id that we do no t have to as sume 
that the memb e r s  of the commi ttee a re p urs uing their own p riva te 
g r a t i f ic a t io n s . The i r  preferences may refl e c t  p ub l ic - sp i r i t ed 
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inten t ions . Qui te so . But the question r emain s : why sho uld we 
think tha t an ideal voting procedur e would be  one that max imized 
aggregate satis fac t ion with the  out come amon g  t ho s e  charged w i t h  
making the d e cis ion1 
To break the hold of t hi s mo d e l  in t h e  s h arp e st po s s ib l e way , 
cons ider a j ury in a cr iminal tr i a l . The o b j ec t o f  t h e  p r oc ed u r e 
is to f ind gu i l t y  only those who are ac tua l l y  gu i l ty , and t h e  
p ro c edure o f  t h e  t r ial , t he form o f  t h e  que st io n t h e  j u r y  i s
r equi r ed to answer , and the de c is ion- rule for  the j ur :1 ' s ve rdic t , 
are a l l  supposed to b e  s e t  up to tha t end . I t  is su rely c lear 
tha t the  aggregate preferenc e-sa t isfac t ion  of the jurors is 
ne i ther here nor there . Nor , i t  seems to me , is there any
a pr io ri reason for expe c t ing the r e  t o  be any co rr e la t ion be twe en 
the s t reng th of a juror ' s  prefe rence for a c e r t a in ou t come and the
l ike l ihood t ha t  that juror has reached a good d e c is ion . if any-
t h ing , we might speculate that prej ud iced and ill-balanced j urors  
a r e  more l ike ly to fe e l  in t ens e ly o n  one s id e  o r  the o t h e r  and
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those w i t h  a mo re impar t ial  and d ispa s s iona t e at t i tude ar e  mor e 
l ikely to f e e l  less  s tr ongly . 
I su gges t that  the case  of o rd inary corpora t e  bodies  i s
mo re analo gous t o  t h a t  o f  a jury than i t  i s  to tha t o f  a f amily . 
Tha t is to say , the memb e r s  o f  the connni t t e e  ar e supposed to be  
as king thems e lves  t he " r i g h t  quo? s t ion " ( to p u t  i t  in  Rous s e a uan 
t erms ) and there  i s  no reason for antic ipa t ing a correlat ion
b e tween s tren g t h  of p r e f e rence and l ikel ihood of be ing on the 
r ight s id e . 
It is interes t ing to obs erve in this  con t e x t  t h a t  t he 
Marqu i s  d e  Condo rc e t ,  the p ioneer of vo t ing  ana ly s i s , wa s imbued 
w i t h  Rous s e auan ideas and carried on his who l e  d iscuss ion on 
the a s sump t ion tha t the membe rs of a l e g i s l a t u r e  ar e g iving 
the ir o p i n ions  on the " truth , "  and that the obj ec t o f  aggregat ing 
votes is to come up wi th the d e c i s io n tha t is mo s t  like l y to b e
true g i v e n  the  v o t e s  ca s t .  Thus , a s  Condorce t ' s  b io g r a p he r , 
Ke i t h  Bake r ,  p u t s  i t : 
t,o 
The purpos e  of t h e  Essai s ur l ' ap p l ication de l ' ana lv s e a la 
probabilit' des d' cisions rend ues � l a  p l ura l it 4 d e vo ix was 
to answer the following problem . Under wh a t co ndit i o ns w ill 
t h e  pro b ab ility that the maj or ity d e c i s i o n  o f  a n  a s s emb l y  o r  
t r i b unal is t r u e  b e  h i g h  enough t o  j us t i f y t h e  obl i g a t i on o r  
the r e s t o f  s o c i e ty t o  a c c e p t tha t d e c i s ion ? 
R o u s s e a u  and Co nd orc e t  a g r eed , have th e r i g h t  to f o llow t h e i r
own o p i n i o n . Bu t reason d i c t a t e s  t h a t  on e n t e r in g  po l i t i c a l  
s o c i e ty , t he y  cons e n t  to subm i t  t o  t h e  gene r a l  w i l l  -- o r ,  i n  
Co ndo r c e t ' s pha r s e , " t he co11UDon reason" -- t ho s e  o f  t he i r 
ac t ions tha t mus t  be governed f o r  a l l  a c c o r d ing to t he same 
p r in c ip le s . In s ubmi t t ing h ims e l f  to a law con t r a r y  to h i s  
own o p i n i o n
·
, t h e  d is s e n t ing c i t i z e n  o f  Ro us seau and the 
r e p r e s e n t ed c i t i z e n  of Condorcet are bo t h  f o l lowing t h e  same 
r e a s o n in g :  " I t  is no t a que s t ion o f  myself alone , but o f  
e v e r y o ne .  Th u s I must no t ac t a c c o r d i n g  to what I myse l f
b e l ieve t o  b e  r ea s o n a b l e , b u t  a c c o r d i ng t o  t ha t wh i c h eve ryone 
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like me , s e t t i n g  a s ide h i s  own o p inio n -- mus t r e gar d as in
confo rmity w ith reason and truth . "  T his quotation is taken 
from t h e  E s s a i  s u  l ' app l i c a t ion d e l ' an a l v s e , b u t  i t  w o u l d  
no t come s t r a ngely f r om the pa ges o f  D u  c o n t r a t so c ia l . 7  
We a s s i g n  to e a c h  person ' s  vote o n  some d e c i s ion tha t i s  to b e
taken a c e r t a i n  p r o ba b il i t y  o f  its being t ru e . U s i n g  B e r n o u i l l i ' s
t he o r em we can then calcu l a t e  f o r  any pa r t i cu l ar p a t t e r n  o f  vo t e s
wha t i s  t h e  p roba b i l i t y o f  e a c h  o f  the a l t e r n a t iv e s  be i ng tr ue . 
I t  was in t h i s  c o n t ex t t ha t  Condorcet came up w i t h  t h e  c r i t e r io n
t ha t  b e a r s  h i s  name today , t hough i t  i s  wor t h  o b s e rv i n g  t h a t  he 
r e c o gn i z e d  t h e  po s s ib i l i t y  o f  the Condorcet winner f ai l ing t o  b e
t h e  t r �e s t  o u t c ome . 8 This shows h o w  far Condorcet was f ro m  any 
no t io n  o f  in t r i n s i c a l l y  f a ir pro cedures . 
Bake r i s  incl i ned to be apo l o g e t ic f o r  Condorce t ' s  ap p roa c h , 
sugge s t i ng t ha t  he wo uld have b e e n  much bet t e r o f f  i f he h ad s t uc k 
to t a l k i n g  abo u t t he agg r e ga t ion o f  p r e f e renc e s .
9 
I n  t h i s  he  
f o l lows t he e a r l i e r  a c c o u n t  g i v e n  by D uncan B l a c k , w h o  s a y s  t ha t
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s e ems to be no t h in g  in f avo u r o f  a t h e o r y  o f  e l e c t i o n s  t h a t  
ado p ts t h is approach , When a j ud g e , s a y , d e c l a r e s  an a c c u s e d
person to be e i t h e r g u i l ty o r  innocen t , it wo u l d  be p o s s i b l e  to
c o n c e ive of  a te s t which , in p r in c i p le a t  l e a s t , wou l d  b e  c a p a b l e  
o f  t e l l ing us whe ther h i s  j udgeme n t  h a d  b e e n  r i gh t o r  ·..rr on g . 
B u t  in the case o f  e le c t io n s  no s u c h  te s t  i s  c o n c e iva b l e ; and 
t he p h r ase " t h e  p ro ba b i l i t y  of t h e  c o r r e c t n e s s  of a vo t e r ' s
op in io n " seems to be w i tho u t  d e f ini t e  mean ing . 1
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In j ud g in g  these remarks we should bea r  in m ind that mo s t
soc ial c h o i c e  theo ry has been wr i t ten b y  e c onom i s t s  (s uch a s
Duncan Black)  and that e c onomics  has been the l a s t  re f u ge o f  
logical  p os i t iv ism . When Condo r c e t  cla imed that  a vo te r i n  a 
legis l a t ur e  who v o te s  f o r  A ove r B " a f f i rms t h e  p r o p os i t ion t h a t
· 1 1  
A i s  be t te r  (vaut mieux quc ) B , " he wa s o f c o u r s e  p r e s u p po s i n g  
t ha t i t  make s sense to say one thing is b e t te r t h a n  ano t h e r , 
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and no t merely tha t one p r efers i t .  I n  saying tha t the p ro p o s i -
t ion has n o  "def in i te me an in g" becaus e the re is no conce ivable
" te s t "  for i ts truth , B lack is do ing no mo r e  than t ro t t ing o u t
s tandard lo g i c a l  po s i t iv i s t p r ej ud ice s . 
In the eve n t ,so c ia l cho ice theory -- wh ich in i t s  o r thodox
form i s  abou t the aggr e ga t io n  o f  p re ferences -- has turned o u t  to 
be incapable o f  o f fer ing no r::ia t ive gu idance . The a p p roach o f  
the Marquis d e  Cond o r c e t ,  s o  f a r  f rom be i n g  a d e a d  end , a s  tho se
who have wr i t ten about h im  sugges t , is , I bel ieve , the o ne tha t 
ought to be pursued . 
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V HOW T O  ASSESS VOTING PROCEDURES 
My conclus ion i s , then , tha t Dumme t t  is r i g h t  to go for  an 
e..� t e rnal c r i t e r ion for vo t ing procedur es . B u t  his cho i c e  o f
maximum aggrega t e  p r e f e rence-satis f a c t ion amo ng t h e  d e c i s ion-
makers d epend s  on an overgene r a liz a t io n  f r om the exam p l e  of  the 
family d e c iding which p l ay to go t o  -- and is  qu i t e con t r ove rsia l 
even for tha t . Wha t then sho uld we loo k for in vo t ing proc ed u r e s  
i n  commit t e e s ? M y  answer  i s  tha t t h e  mo s t  impo r t a n t  thing i s  no t 
to wo r ry too much abo u t  the d e tai l s  o f  al t e rna tive vo t ing p r o c e -
<l u r es . The main cri terion i s  that  any procedure  sho u l d  b e  easy 
to o p e r a t e  and easy to und e r s tan d .  I n  par t i c ular , i t  should b e  
easy t o  s e e  what effec t  on  the  � u t come vo ting one way o r  ano t h e r  
w il l  hav e . Bu t what sho uld be emphas i zed i s  that t h e  d i f f e r en c e  
b e tween a g o o d  commi t t e e  and a bad o n e  l ies in t h e  qual i t y  o f  
its d e l i b e ra tions and i s  r e l a t iv e l y  una f f ec t ed  b y  i t s  vo t ing 
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procedures . A g o od  comm i t t e e  is o n e  in wh ich innova t ive s ugge s t i o n s  
are enc oura ged and t a k e n  s e r iously , argumen t s ar e  scr u t inized 
rather than tr eated as the obligatory t ime- f i l l e r  b e f o r e  a vo t e  
i s  t a ken , and so on . An exc e s s ively f us s y  vo t ing p ro c ed ur e can 
ge t in the way of t h i s , bu t no thing can save a conuni t t e e  who s e  
members have b a d  p r e f e r ences f rom reach ing a bad d e c i s io n . The 
comp u t e r  ada ge "Ga r b age i n ,  garbage o u t "  ap p l ie s t o  vo t in g  p ro c e -
<lures too . In my exp e r i ence t he commi t te e s  t ha t  make good d ec i s i o n s  
are  tho s e  on wh i c h  the dynam i c s  a r e  such t ha t  j us t  abo u t  a n y  p r o -
c e d u r e  wou ld in t h e  e n d  produce the same d e c i s io n .  Conve r s e l y , 
I have n ever seen any t hing good come o u t  o f  a comm i t t e e  who s e
memb e r s  a r e  cons tan t ly appea l ing t o  Rob e r t ' s  Rules  o f  O r d e r 
and deba t ing p rocedural  n i c e t ies . 
I t  is an imp l ic a t ion o f  wha t I have s a i d  t ha t  i t i s  no t 
n e c e s sarily a good f e a t u r e  in a vo t ing p r o c e d u r e  t ha t  i t s ho u l d
s t reaml ine t he p r o c e s s  o f  reach ing a d e c i s ion . Whe re t h e r e  i s
'11P 
very f ar from a consen s u s  -- so tha t , for examp le , there is no t 
a c lear m aj o r i t y  for any a l terna t ive -- i t  may be be t t er i f  the
members of the coDDDi t tee are forced to s p end more t ime canva s s ing 
other a l ternatives and a r g u ing about the mer i t s  of t hese and t he 
exi s t ing ones . A good example is the e lec t ion o f  the head o f  an 
Oxbridge col lege . The stand ard st a t utes are , I bel ieve , o f  t he 
form found in C .  P .  Snow ' s  novel The �ta s t e r s . Tha t is to say , 
t hey simply sta t e  tha t there has to be a maj o r i t y  of t h e  Fel l ows 
vo t ing in favor o f  a singl e  cand i d a te and tha t cand i d a t e  i s  
thereby e l ected . Where there a r e  t w o  cand id a tes t h is norm a l l y  
presents no prob lems . ( In The M a s ter s  it d id so only because 
ther e  was a conven t ion that the two Fel lows who were cand ida tes 
shou ld a b s ta in from vo t ing . ) Bu t where there are mo re than two 
cand id a t e s  it may o bviou�ly happen tha t no cand ida t e  ge t s  a 
maj ori ty . The procedure env i s aged by the st a t u tes is tha t the 
F e l lows shoul d  go on mee t ing unt i l  they do ge t a maj o r i t y  for
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one cand id a t e .  B u t  in recen t years t here h a s  app ar en t ly b e e n
a tend ency t o  p a n i c  a t  the thought o f  dead l o c k  a n d  t herefore to 
replace the pro cedure laid down w i t h  one guaran teed to p roduce 
a winner ; the s ta t utes are t hen compl ied w i t h  by the F e l l ows
vo t ing for the w inner under this proced u re . 
Du11U11e t t  h imse l f  is w idely rumored to have been r e s pons ib l e
f o r  one such procedure , based on h i s  f avor i t e  prefer e n c e  s core 
me t h 9 d , and a sub tex t of his book is , I wo u ld ha zard a guess , 
an a t tem p t  to res pond to those who have c l a imed tha t such a 
proce d u r e  t e nd s  to resu l t in the e lect ion of med ioc r i t ies . (To 
provide a contex t , i t  should perha ps be sa id tha t i t  is w idely
be l ieved tha t in this elec t ion a wel l-known phi losopher who ha s  
some t ime s  be en d escr i b e d  a s  "the cleveres t m a n  in Eng l and " h a d  a 
maj ori ty o f  f irst pre f erences but lost because t he cand id a t e  who wo n 
had a ·  lot o f  second preferences . In h i s  book D umme t t  on seve r a l  
occas ions takes u p  t he compla int tha t t he preference s core sys t em 
d iscrim inates in f avor of med ioc r i t ies . H i s  rema rks , howeve r ,
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embody t h e  charac t e r is t ic faul t o f  s o c i a l  cho i c e  t heo r i s t s , 
name ly taking some asse r t io n  t h a t  has no lo g i c a l  conne c t io n 
w i th p r e f e rences and t re a t ing i t  as i f  i t  we r e  equ iv a le n t to one 
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t h a t  refers  only to pref erence s .  The charge he answe r s  i s  no t 
t h e r e f o r e  t he real  one b u t  one o f  h is own inve n t ion . Th is  he  
can d e a l  w i th e a s i l y  enough , b u t  i t  has no b e a r ing on  the is s ue . 
Wha t  D unune t t  wr i te s  is as f o l lows . The p r e f e rence  sc o re 
p r o c e d u r e , he says , 
is s ome t imes accused o f  f av o u r i n g  me d io c r i ty ;  b u t  the  accus a t ion
i s  f a l s e . A mediocre cand id a t e  is one o n  whom v e r y  f ew v o t e r s  
a r e  k e e n , b u t  t o  whom v e r y  f ew a r e  s t ro n g l y  op po sed ; a c o n trover-
s i a l  one i s  a candid a t e  o n  whom many a r e  keen b u t  t o  whom many
are o p p o sed . The procedure f avour s ne i t he r . An u t t e r l y  med io c r e 
cand ida t e  wo uld be one who was ranked in m i d d l e  p l ace  by eve ry 
vo t e r , f o r  ins t ance f o u r t h  out of seven : h e  wou l d  t he n  re c e ive 
an average s core , namely 1 / 2.!!.C!. - 1 )  p o i n t s , whe n t h e r e  are  .!!. 
vo t e r s  and !. cand id a t e s , and c o u l d  no t w i n  un l e s s  by some 
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ex t r ao r d inary chance every o ther cand i d a t e  rece ived exac t ly 
t h e  s ame s c o re . An u t t e r ly con trove r s i a l  cand ida t e  would  b e
one who w a s  r anked h ighes t b y  j us t hal f  the vo ters  and lowe s t
b y  the o t he r ha l f : he , too , would rece ive the average  s core , 
1 / 2.!!.(!. - 1) po i n t s . The procedure g ives no advan t a ge to the
me d io c r e  cand ida t e , no r any to the cont rovers i a l  one : i t  me as u r e s
h o w  f a r  t h e  suppo r t  for  a cand ida te ou twe i ghs the oppo s i t i o n  to 
h i m . In t h e  ex t r eme c a s e , a cand ida t e  who s e  suppo r t  ma rgina l l y  
ou twe ig hs t he o p p o s i t ion to h im  can win , i f  the  suppo r t  f o r  
and o p p o s i t io n  t o  every o t he r cand ida t e  b u t  o n e  a r e  equ a lly  
b a l anced : b u t  i t  make s no d i f f e rence whe ther the winning cand i -
d a t e  i n  s u c h  a case i s  h i ghly med iocre  or h ighly con t rove r s ia l . 
Tho s e  who c r i t i c i z e  the pr e f e rence sco re procedure for  g iv ing 
an advan tage to a med i o c r e  cand ida t e  really mean to charge i t  
w i t h  f a i l ing t o  g ive a n  advan tage t o  a con t rover s i a l  one . 
( P p . 176-77 . )  
The s hi f t in gro und here i s  b l a t an t . Wi thou t o f f e r ing a s h r e d  o f  
j us t i f i ca t io n , D unune t t  s t ip u l a tes  that "a me d iocre c and i d a t e  i s
So 
o n e  o n  whom v e r y  f ew vo t e r s  are keen , b u t  t o  whom very f ew are
s trongly o p p o s e d , "  and g o e s  on to a s s ume t ha t  the oppos i t e  of 
"me d i o c r e "  i s  " c o n t rover s ial . "  G iven t h i s  d e f in i t io n  of "med iocre , "  
i t  i s  o f  c o u r s e  easy to p r ove t ha t , i f  eve ryone vo t e s  s ince re ly 
( a  p r o v i s o  which Dumme t t  r e q µ i r e s  h e r e  b u t  do e s no t make exp l ic i t ) , 
a cand i d a t e  who comes exac t l y  in the m i d d l e  o f  eve ryone ' s  p re fe r -
e n c e s  w i l l  g a r n e r  an average score  and can w in onl y �hen s uppo r t 
f o r  mo re con t ro ve r s ial candida t e s  is even l y d iv ided . By t he s ame 
t o ken , he wo uld , I t ake i t , a c c e p t tha t  if  t he r e  are four cand i d a t e s
t h r e e  o f  whom a r e  c o n t r o ve r s ia l  and o n e  o f  whom i s  everyone ' s  
s e c o nd c h o i c e , t h is cand ida t e  ( t he "med i o c r e "  one in Dumme t t ' s  
own t e rmino logy ) w i l l  w in so long a s t h e  o ther cand id a t e s have 
roughly equal s u p p o r t . Bu t h i s  argume n t  wo uld be , as we can s e e , 
tha t the suppor t  in t h i s  c a s e  outwe i ghs t he o p p o s i t io n  so t h i s  
"med i o c r e "  cand ida t e  should w i n , accord ing to the c r i t e r io n  o f  
p r e p o n d e r a n c e  o f  p r e f e r e nc es . (Such  a cand idate wil l a lso , 
i n c iden t a l l y , b e  a Condo r c e t w inne r in the case  as s t a t ed . )
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All t h i s  i s , howeve r ,  s t r ic tly bes ide t h e  p o in t . Fo r a 
mome n t ' s though t w i l l  remind us t h a t  med i o c r i ty is a p e r s o n a l  
qual i ty , no t a func t ion o f  p re f e rences in some vo t ing body . 
On t h e  au tho r i t y  o f  the Ox ford Eng l is h  D i c tonarv , med io c r i ty i s 
"a mod e r a t e  o r  ave rage degree o f  men t a l  ab i l i ty , t a l e n t s , s ki l l , 
and th e  l i ke ;  m i d d l ing capac i ty ,  endowmen t ,  o r  accomp l is hmen t .  
.�ow c h ie f ly w i t h  d i s pa ra g ing imp l i c a t io n , i n  co n t ras t w i t h  
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ex c e i l e n c e  o r  s u pe r io r i ty . "  I t  obv ious ly makes no s e n s e  t o  t r y  
t o  c a s h  o u t  t h e  no t io n  o f  med io c r i t y  i n  t e rms o f  p re f erence 
p r o f il e s . I f  a l l  th e  memb e r s  o f  some e l e c t o r a l  body wan t a 
me d io c r i t y , he w i l l  be unanimous f i r s t cho ic e ; i f  some a r e  very 
ke e n  o n  g e t t ing a m e d io c r i ty and the res t are s t rongly o p p o sed , 
t h e  med i oc r i t y  w i l l  be a con trove r s ial cand ida t e ; and s o  o n . The
c l a im  (made b y  J ame s Bryce a long t ime ago ) t h a t  g r e a t  men rarely 
become p r e s id e n t s  of  the USA is t o  b e  assessed by  looking at  t h e  
human q u a l i t i e s  o f  t he p e o p l e  who ge t e l e c t ed , no t by examining 
the p re f er en c e  p r o f i l e s  o f  Amer ican c i t izens . S im ilar l y , whe the r 
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o r  no t t he p r e f e re n c e  s co r e  proced ur e has a tendency to resu l t  in
t h e  e l e c t io n  o f  med i o c r i t i e s  i s  something that must ultima t e l y  be 
s tud i e d  emp i r i c a l l y  b y  s e e ing how i t  a ctua l l y  o p e r ates . 
We c a n  push the ana l y t i c a l  q u e s t ion a b i t  f u r t h e r  by no t ing 
t h a t  o th e r  p r o c e d u r e s  { t he a l t e rnative vo t e  is a good exampl e )
w i l l  e l im i n a t e  i n  the f i r s t  ro und a cand id a t e  w i t h  no f i r s t  
p r e f e r en c e s . { T h i s  is a t  any r a t e  t r ue wi th " iJH" "' r e  voting , 
w .  
a p o i n t  I s ha l l  r e t u rn to i n  sec t ion � But a cand idate w i t h no 
f i r s t  p r e f e r e n c e s  can q u i t e  pos s ib l y come ou t top und er t h e
a s  we have j u s t  s e e n . 
p r e f e re n c e  s c o r e  p ro c e d u r e ,� We can t he r e f o r e  r e f o rmu l a t e  o u r
ques t io n  s o  as t o  a s k  i f  t h e r e  is  s o m e  c o r re l a t i o n  b e tween be i n g  
med i o c r e  a n d  b e ing nobody ' s { o r few p e o p l e ' s )  f ir s t  c ho i c e , s i nce 
i t  i s  i n  g iv ing s u c h  people a real chance of  w i nn ing that the 
pr e f e r e n c e  s c o r e  p r o c e d u r e  is d i stinctive . This is aga i n  an 
emp i r i c a l  q u e s t ion , b u t  my own observations s u ggest to me th a t i t
i s  i n  f a c t r a t h e r  commo n , a t  any r ate among academ i c s , for 
those with grea ter ab i l i ty to a t t rac t a h ig h e r  d e g r e e  of
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pa r t i s a n s h i p , b o t h  f o r  and aga inst , with mediocre candid ates 
t a k i n g  up an inte rmediate position . 
To c o n c l u d e  this d iscussion of the preference score s y s tem 
and med io c r i t y I should add that ever ything I have said is pred i -
c a t ed upon t h e  assumption o f  sincere voting .  Once we a l low for 
s t r a t e g i c  voting , we can immediate l y  see ano ther way in which t he 
c l a im  tha t the p re f e r ence score system tends to f avor med iocr ities
can be s u p po r t e d . Suppose we give voters the bene f i t  o f  the 
doub t and a s s ume tha t t hey do not ac t ua l l y  want to put a mediocrity 
in t h e  po s i t io n  t h a t  is to be f i l l e d . Th e n we might h a z ar d  the 
emp i r ic a l  a s s e r t ion tha t  a cand id a t e  who i s  low o n  a lmost everyone ' s  
p r e f e r e n c e  o rd e r ing w i l l  tend t o  b e  a med io crity . { It sho u l d  be
borne i n  m i nd tha t "med io c r e "  d o e s  no t mean " in the mid d l e "  b u t  
" po o r . " ) Bu t , as we saw ear l ier , the preference score system can 
r a t h e r e a s i l y  make a cand i d a t e  who i s  perceived by  everyone as 
we a k  i n t o  a winner under s trategic voting .  S ince  t h i s  is  no t 
t r u e  o f  o t h e r  p ro ced u res , th is is a good reason for conne cting 
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the p r e f e rence s c o r e  sy s t em with  th e e l e c t io n  o f  med io c r i t ie s . 
I s u s pe c t  tha t some su ch t ho ugh t ,  even i f  i t  is no t very p r e -
c i se l y  formula t e d , qu i t e  o f t e n  l i e s  b e h ind t h e  charge . Whe t he r  
o r  no t t h i s  i s  s o , t h e  argume n t  g re a t ly s t rengt hens t h e  one
a l ready g iven wh ich .wa s  �ased on s inc e r e  v o t ing .
I t  w i l l  be apparent  tha t I have been i l l u s t r a t ing f o r  j us t  
one vo t ing p ro c e d u r e  ( the p re fe renc e score  sys t em )  and j u s t  one 
charac t e r i s t i c  ( tendency t o  e lec t med io cr i t ie s )  the k ind of s t udy 
that I th ink should be devo ted to  procedures for t a k ing vo t e s  --
and , I sho uld aga in emp h�s i z e , to  the who l e  d e c i s io n  p r o c e s s  in
which vo t ing  i s  embedded . Th i s  c l a im will , of course , be den ied
by tho s e  who lay a heavy s tress  on  the impor tance of at temp t ing
to demons t r a t e  the int r ins i c  fairness  o f  c e r t ain vo t ing p rocedures . 
They w i l l  say tha t I am p re sup po s ing ,wh a t  may b e  lacking , name l y  
some agreeme n t  abou t  wha t cons t i tu te s  a d e s ir a b l e  p r o p e r t y  i n  
a de c is ion proc edu re . T h e  a rgumen t t h e y  w i l l  make i s  t ha t  i t  i s
precise ly wher e  any s u c h  a g reeme n t  is  no t fo r t h coming t ha t  we need 
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some neu t ral crite rion f o r  the intr ins ic f a i rn e s s  o f  vo t ing
p roc edure s . My answer is two fold . F i r s t , t h e  que s t  i s  ch ime r ica l .
As soon as we ge t beyond the �apy case s  f o r  t h e  maj o r i ty p r inc i p l e
i t  is  inhe r e n t ly con t rove rsial  wha t is  a n  in t r ins ica l ly f a i r  p r o -
cedure f o r  aggrega t ing vo tes . My seco nd rep l y  is t h is . S u p po s e
tha t there is  r e a l l y  s o  l i t t l e  agreeme n t  abo u t  t h e  d e s i r a b l e
prop e r t ies  o f  a dec is io n  p ro c e d u r e  tha t there is  no t h in g  for  i t
but resor t ing t o  a cr it er ion o f  intr ins ic fairness such  a s  an
extens ion of the maj o r i ty p r incip le  to p roduce a d e c i s io n  in a l l  
ca ses. I c an see no reason why those who re gard t he p red i c t ab le 
ou tcomes ar i s ing under this  procedure as ho r rendou s  should have
such an exaggerated respect  for th is one procedural value as t o
let i t  overr ide eve ry substan t ive value that th e y  ho ld  dear . 
In any case , i t  is p lain tha t in prac t ice people  do no t a c ce p t  
argumen t s  about  t h e  in t r ins i c  fairness o f , say , maj o r i t y  vo t ing , 
as ove rr id ing when they d i s s e n t  p r o f o undly  f rom the who l e  run
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of dec i s ions und e r  i t .  
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VI VOTING FOR REPRESENTATIVES 
I said at the end of sec t ion I of this  es say tha t Dumme t t  
devotes  only two o f  his s L�teen  chap t e r s  t o  vo t ing p ro cedures  f o r  
e l e c t ing represent a t ives a n d  t h e  o ther four teen  to vo t ing p rocedures  
for all  o t he r  purposes . These  include ( a s  w i l l  b e  c lear  from the  
d iscussion so far ) elec t ions where  the ra t iona l e  is no t supposed to 
be  tha t  the pe rson o r  per sons e le c ted are represen tat ive of the 
vo ters  but  are the be s t  ones to f il l , say , academic pos i t ions o f  
some kind . 
Al t hough this  is Duuune t t ' s  o f f icial  pos i t ion , he in f a c t  spend s  
p a r t  o f  these fourteen chapters  d iscussing two me thods tha t a r e  used 
for  e l e c t ing representa t ives . One of  these  i s  the  f ami l ia r  me thod --
the so-called  " f ir s t  pas t the pos t "  sys t em -- used for na t ional 
e l e c t ions in  America , Br itain , and mos t  o ther coun t r i e s  in the B r i t ish  
Commonwe a l th . Unde r th is  procedure , the c and i d a t e  w i t h  the large s t  
number  o f  vo tes  (a  plural ity  o r , as  Du11UDe t t  c a l l s  i t ,  a r e l a t ive  
maj o r i ty )  wins even if  h e  has less  than ha l f  the vo t e s . Du11UDe t t
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gives this me thod sho r t  shr i f t  but  he devo tes  two chap ters  to an  
analys i s  o f  the s imp l e s t  variant on i t , t he al terna t ive  vo t e . 
Under  this , i f  no cand ida te  has a maj o r i ty o f  vo tes , the c and id a t e
wi th t h e  fewe s t  f i r s t  vo tes is el iminat e d  and h i s  vo tes  r ed i s t r ib u t e d 
to the second preferences  o f  his suppo r t e r s . I f  necessary the  p r o c e s s
is  repea ted un t i l  some cand ida te h a s  a maj o r i ty of  the t o t a l  vo t e s  
cas t o r  un t il o n l y  two cand id a tes  a r e  l e f t  i n  wh ich c a s e  t h e  o n e
with .mo re votes is  declared e l ec ted . ( I f  a l l  vo t e r s  l i s t  a l l  cand i-
dates  in ord e r , this  cand ida t e  will  neces s a r i l y  also h a v e  mo re  than 
hal f  the total . But if  some bal lots  are  un trans f e r ab l e  because the  
vo t e r s  did  no t l i s t  enough cand idates  in orde r , the  winning c and i ­
date may have less than half  the  total . )�his sys t em i s  in use  in
Aus tral ian parl iamentary e l e c t ions for  the lower house and  has been 
advocated  for  many decades in Bri tain b y  tho s e  who are  s a t i s f ied 
with the sys tem of single-membe r  cons t i tuenc ies but  obj e c t  to the  way 
in which  a cand ida t e  can win in a three-way con t e s t  on  a l i t t l e ove r 
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a t h ird of t h e  v o t e s  when i t  may be (bu t ne ed no t b e , o f  c ou r s e )
t h a t  a maj or i t y  o f  t h e  vo ters wo uld have pre f err ed o ne ( or bo t h ) 
o f  t h e  o t h er cand idat e s . The a l t e r na t ive vo t e was in fac t s uppo r t ed 
by a narrow maj or i t y  of the House o f  Commons in 1 9 1 8  o n a f r e e  vo t e , 
and in 1 9 3 1  wa s pas sed as par t of a d e a l  be twee n  t h e  La bour and 
Liberal part i e s . In bo th cases i t  wa s rej ec ted by t he H o u s e  o f  
Lords , bu t in the second case i t  wou l d  p r o bably have been enac t ed 
unde r t he ex i s t ing p ro v i s i o n s  fo r ove rr id ing o p po s i t ion f r om t h e
Hou se o f Lo rds bu t f o r  the f al l o f  the Labour gove rnme n t  i n  Augu s t
15 19 3 1 .  I t  i s  wo r th observing t ha t , a l though t he al t erna t ive vo t e  
i s  s uppo sed to b e  anal y s e d  i n  t he c o n t ex t  o f  de c is ions o c her than
the choo s i ng o f  represen tatives , D unnne t t ' s d i s c u s s i o n  of s t r a t e g i c
v o t ing a n d  "was t ed vo tes " under t h i s  s y s t em i s  c a r r i ed o u t  almo s t 
en t i r e l y  in terms of par l iamen t ary e l e c t io n s  o r  ( a s  in t h e  examp le
o n  pp . 214-5)  elec t i ons for a c i t y co u nc i l . 
When we o b s e rv e  t h a t t h e  l a s t  t wo c ha p t e r s , w h i c h  a r e  o f f i -
c ia l l y  abo u t  vo t i ng f o r  r e p r e s e n t a t iv e s , a r e  a b o u t v o t i n g  i n
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mul t i-member cons t i t uenc ies , w e  migh t be temp ted t o  t h ink that t h e
true 
be tween t he f i r s t  
d ivi s ion�i s  be tween 
four teen chap t e r s  and the las t two 
vo t ing for one o u t come (be i t  a p e rson or 
a po l i c y )  and vo ting fo r mo re than one per son . ( There is no p recis e 
equ ivalen t of vo t ing fo r more than one po l icy , s in c e  po l icy � p l u s  
pol icy £. is treated as vo t ing f o r  p o l icy "!!. p lus �- " ) Thi s , howeve r ,
tha t come s 
wo uld no t be c o r r e c t  e i t her . In fac t t h e  chap te rAb e f o r e  the las t 
two con tains some ma ter ial on elec t ions ( e . g .  to p riz e f e l lowsh ip s )  
whe r e  mor e  than one appo i n t men t may be made ( s e e  pages 24 7-54 ) . 
I f  we a s k  why then t he las t two chap t e r s , wh i c h  are abo u t  
ele ct ing rep r e s en t ative s , a r e  conf i ned t o  the dis c u s s io n  o f  sys t ems
of e lec t ing more than one rep resen ta tive f rom a given cons t i tuency , 
the an swe r is this . Dumme t t  as ser t s  do gma t ic ally t ha t  any s ys t em 
for elec t ing represen ta tives mus t
make room for the represen t a t ion of mino r i t ies . B u t  obvious ly 
if we ins i s t  that a mino r i t y w i t h in a cons t i t uency mus t b e  r epre-
sen ted by a s u c c e s s f ul cand i da t e  (as wel l  as t he maj o r i ty ' s  b e i n g
represen ted , o f  cours e )  we mus t conc lude tha t  only mul t i-member 
to o  
cons t i t uencie s can mee t the r e q u i r emen t s  o f  r e p r e s e n t a t ion . " S i n c e  
what p r inc ipally d i s t ingu ishes e l e c t o r a l  p ro c ed u r e s f rom o t h e r  
uses o f  vo t ing p roc edur e s , f rom a the o r e t i c a l  s t andpo i n t , i s  t he 
n e e d  to ens u r e  r e p r e s en t a t ion f o r  m in o r i t ie s , t h e  me t ho d  to be 
used b y  a s in g l e  body of  vo t e r s  to  e le c t  a f ixed nwnb e r  of  cand i -
d a t e s , g r e a t e r  than one , i s  central to t h e  top i c "  ( p . 2 5 6 ) . 
Th i s  ins is t anc e that vo ting f o r  r e p r e s e n t a t ive s  mu s t  e n t a i l vo t in� 
f o r  mo r e  than one r e p re s en ta t ive f rom any g iven co ns t i t uenc y has
a ve ry unfor t unate e f f e c t  on t h e  o r gan i z a t io n  of t h e  boo k .  
D umme t t  ma inta ins tha t the c r i teria  that are r e leva n t  f o r  as s e ss ing 
vo t in g  sys t ems used to el e c t r e p re s en t a t ives are d i f f e r e n t  f rom
those  t ha t  are re levan t for as s e s s ing vo t ing s y s tems u s e d  f o r  
t he r p u r p o s e s . But t h i s  then e n t a i l s  that  no par t o f  h is dis -
cuss ion o f  t he k in d s  o f  vo t ing sys t ems tha t a r e  in f ac t u s e d  f o r  
e l e c t i ons o f  s i ngl e r e p r e s e n t a t ive s , s u c h  as the a l t e rna t ive vo t e , 
is in f a c t ge rmane to t h e  d is c u s s ion o f  re p r e s en ta t io n . A c t ua l l y , 
howeve r ,  as I have p o in t ed o u r- . D wnme t t  h imse l f  v i o l a t e s  h i s  own 
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res t r ic t ions by carrying o u t  1111c h  o f h i s  d i s c us s io n  o f  
t h e  a l t e rna t ive  vo te  method ( s e e  e s p e c i a l ly p p . 2 1 1- 1 7  
a n d  2 2 8 - 3 0 )  i n  t e rms o f  vo t ing f o r  r e p r e s e n t a t iv e s . 
I f  the cons e quence ap p e a r s  to be t ha t t h e  d is c u s s i o n  o f  vo t i n g 
f o r  r e p r e s e n t a t iv e s  in the boo k is a b i t  o f  a mes s , t h i s  i s  I am 
a f ra id no mo r e  than the t r u t h . Wha t make s f o r  a p a r t i c u l a r  o r g a n i -
z a t iona l weakne s s  in t h e  boo k i s  tha t O Uillllle t t ' s  d i s c u s s i o n  o f  t h e  
al terna t ive vo te  ge ts  se pa r a ted f rom h i s  d i s cus s i o n  o f  t h e  s i n g l e  
trans f e r a b l e  vo te  ( STV) . Ye t i t  is c l ear  tha t t h e  t w o  a r e  l o g i c a l l y  
r e l a t e d  ( a s  Du11DDe t t  h imse l f  no t e s  on  page 2 6 8 ) , and t h a t  much o f  
what can b e  s a id abo u t  one can be  sa id about the o t he r .  
I n  f ac t  DullDDe t t  has d iscuss ions o f  the no t ion o f  s t r a t e g i c  vo t ing 
and o f  a "wa s t ed v o t e" in relation to b o t h , but much would hav e
been g a ined i f  t h e s e  d i s cuss ions h a d  b e e n  i n t e g r a t e d . I s h a l l
t a k e  the  o p po r t unity o f  dea l ing w i t h  t hem t o ge t h e r  i n  t h i s  e s s a y . 
In t h i s  d i s cu s s ion o f  e l e c t o r a l  s y s t ems I s hall m a ke u s e  o f
l b  
a recent  c o l le c t io n  o f  e s s ays e n t i t l e d  Cho o s ing an E l e c t o r a l  S v s t em .  
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Thi s  b r ings toge ther th e  two scho ol s o f  thou gh t t h a t  go in t o 
Dunnne t t ' s  book -- the na ive en t hu s i as t s  fo r " fa i rn e s s "  and t h e
skep t ical soc ial cho i c e  theo ris t s  -- b u t al s o  inc lud e s co n t r ib u t ion s 
f r om a t h ird s choo l , the po l i t i c a l  s c i en t i s t s  who have ana ly s ed 
t h e  ac tual tend en c i e s  o f  a l t e rn a t ive vo t in g s y s t ems . A who l e  sub-
f ie ld o f  comparat ive pol i t ic s  has  d eve loped ou t o f  a t temp t s  to 
conne c t  typ e s  o f  pa r ty sys tem w i t h  types of e l e c ::o r a l sys t em on 
the bas is of  comp a r isons b e tween coun t r ie s and a l so d i scus s ions 
of t he way in which d i f f e re n t change s in the p a r t y  sys t em of a 
c e r t a in coun t ry are re la t ed to c hange s  in i t s  e l e c toral sy s t e m .  
( Th e  re la t io nsh ip s go b o t h  way s , o f  cour se . )
Dumme t t  c l a ims in 
his b o o k  to have b u i l t a b r id ge b e twee n the so c i a l cho ice t heo r is ts 
and t he po l i t i ca l s c i e n t i s t s  ( p . 2 9 5 )  b u t I have to say tha t this
c laim s e ems t o  me to be w i thou t fo unda t ion . The e s sence of  the
p o l i t i cal  s c ience trad i t ion is tha t one canno t e va l ua t e e l e c t o r a l
s y s t ems w i t ho u t  d i s c u s s i n g  t h e ir consequen c e s  f o r  s u c h  t h i n g s  a s
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the kind s and numbers o f  p ar t ies  they a r e  l ike ly to r e s u l t  i n , 
s t ar t ing from a g iven social and p o l i t i c a l  conf igura t io n .  And 
the s e ph enomena are themselves t o  be eva l u a t e d  by mor e  gener a l
cons iderat ions such as  the capac i ty o f  t h e  s y s t em to main tain 
s ta b l e  and e f f e c t ive gove rnme nt .  Dunnne t t  a t  no p o i n t  mak e s  any 
contra c t  w i t h  this  trad i t ion and i t s  charac t e r i s t i c  se t o f  ques t ions . 
Ina s f a r  as he bu i ld s a br idge to p e o p l e  ou t s i de the s o c ia l
choice t r ad i t io n  i t  is no t  t o  t h is s choo l o f  wr i ters in compara-
t ive po l i t ics , b u t  to tho se who are as a pr io r i a s  the s o c ial
cho ice theo r i s t s  b u t  less wel l-equ ip ped : the p e o p l e  �ho_t alk
abou t "was ted v o t e s " and s imilar arcana o f  in t r in s i c  f a i rn e s s . 
Dumme t t  excor i a t e s  the s tandard rhe t o r i c  o f  the Ele c t o r a l  Re f orm 
So c i e ty f o r  its sl op p ine s s a n d  tenden t i o u s ne s s . B u t  I b e l ieve
tha t h is own p o s i t ive arguments  abou t e l e c toral  sy s t ems a r e  s ub j e c t
to  wh a t  i s  i n  f a c t the mos t  impor t an t  ch a rge a g a in s t t h o s e  who
t a lk t he lan guage of in t r ins ic f a irne s s : tha t t he ir p r o p o s ed p ro -
ced ure , a l t ho u gh advo c a ted on a pr i o r i  g round s , h a s  a q u i t e evident
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tendency to favor some kinds o f  p o l i t ical  o u t comes over o thers and 
is  in  f a c t  f avored for p r e c is e ly that  reaso n .  But this  real  reason 
i s  no t p ub licly  advanced , and the des i re d  o u tcome s  are no t there-
f o r e  s ubj e c ted to o p e n  d i s cu s s ion . 
I s h a l l  d ivid e  my d i scus s ion o f  e l ec toral  s y s t ems into two 
p ar t s . The next three s e c t ions take o f f  f rom Dumme t t ' s  c r i t i c ism 
of the s tandard arguments  of an a p r i o r i  kind agains t t h e  r e l a t ive 
maj o r i t y  sys tem and in favor of the s ingle t rans ferable vo te . In 
s e c t ion VII I s ha l l  take up , and in some ways ex tend , Dumme t t ' s 
a t tack o n  the claims o f  t e n  made for the a l t e r na t ive vo te and the 
s ingle t r an s ferable vo te to the e f fe c t  that  they are v i r tually 
imroune t o  prob lems of s t r a tegic vot ing . Then in sec t io n V I I I  I 
shall expound and cr i t ic i z e  his  account o f  wha t  the par t isans o f  
STV me an b y  saying t ha t  the re la t ive maj o r i ty me thod "wa s t e s "
vo t e s  whe reas S TV  do es no t . Af t e r  t h a t  I sha l l  ( in section I X )  
p u t  f o rward m y  o wn  a l tern a t ive exp lan a t ion a n d  t r y  t o  show both  
why  i t  a t t r a c t s  and  why it  is ul t imat e l y  mis t aken . 
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In the  rema inder o f  this es say , I shall  cons ider  Dumme t t ' s 
and advance  a few of my own . 
......, ideas about rep re sen t a t ionA S e c t ion X will  be devo ted to an
examina tion of Dumme t t ' s  claim ,  already ment ioned , that  the 
c r i te r ia approp r iate  to the assessment o f  procedures for  e l e c t ing 
re p resen t a t ives  are d i f f e re n t f rom those approp r i a t e  t o  the
assessmen t o f  p rocedures for all o th e r  purposes  o f  c o l l e c t iv e  
d e c i s i o n-making . Sec tion XI will  d i s cuss  Dumme t t ' s spe c i f i c  
c l a im abou t e l e c t ion procedures , namely t h a t  r e p r e s e n t a t ion 
enta i l s  r e p r e s e n t a t ion of minorit ies . S e c t ion XII looks c r i t ically 
a t  Dwmne t t ' s sugges t ion tha t e l ec t ions in B r i t ain should b e  carr ied 
out  under a p r ocedure  tha t he has invented . F inally  in S ec t ion X I I I
I s hall  p u t  forward some thoughts o f  m y  own abou t e l e c t or a l  r ef o rm . 
"' lo  
VII STRATEGIC VOTING AND THE SINGLE TRANSFERABLE VOTE
S ince t here  is a gene ral proo f ( o f  which Duuune t t  g ives his own 
version in his chap t e r  11) that there is  no " procedur e  that  a f fords
every vo t e r  a st ra ightf o rward s tr a t e g y , wha tever h i s  p r e f e rence
scal e , g iven tha t there are more  than two pos s ib l e  o u t come s "  ( p . 204 ) , 
we know in advance tha t the
alternat ive vote and its n-cand id a te ex t ens ion the s ingle t rans f e r -
able vot e  will not be s t rategy - p roo f . Neve r the l e s s , the advo c a t e s
o f  s u c h  vo t ing schemes coDDDonly g ive the imp re s s ion tha t t he i r p e t
proposal manages t o  d o  t h e  impossib l e . 
Thus , Dumme t t  quotes the extraord inary reco111111endat ion of a 
cou p l e  of the e a r l iest enthusiasts , Hoag and Ha l le t t , tha t in elec-
t ions using a preferen t ia l  el imin a t ion p rocedure the words "You 
cannot hur t the chances of any candidate  you p r e f  er by making lowe r 
cho i c es for o the rs" should b e p r in t ed on the b a ll o t  papers  ( p . 2 1 6 ) . rt 
B u t ,  as h e  poin ts out , " the only hones t ins t r u c t ion to the  vo ter
would invo lve add ing ' bu t  you can in some cases hur t the  chan c e s
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of the cand idat e you prefer by l is t ing h im f ir s t "' ( p . 2 2 2 ) . 
The a l terna t ive vo t e , as Dumme t t  po ints out , violates a condition 
that other vot ing sys tems such as t
.
he r e l a t ive maj or i ty sy s t em and 
the p r e ference-s core sys tem mee t , namely the requireme n t  t hat
" l ist ing !!_ h ighe s t  always maximizes !!_' s chances of  succes s "  ( p . 2 15 ) . 
Th i s  cond i tion is called "mono tonici ty " by S teven Brams and Pe te r
Fishburn , two s o c ial cho ice theo ris ts , i n  a n  ar t icle i n  Choo s ing an 
Elec toral S v s tem . They
" exp ress i t  by say ing that it  is me t " i f  more f irs t -p lac e  vo tes can 
11 d? never hur t  a cand id a te . "  ll Having p o in t ed o u t  (as Dumme t t  does not 
do exp l ic i t ly ) that STV f a i ls this tes t in the same way as does the
a l t e rn a t iv e  vote , t h e y  wr ite : "The f a c t  t h a t  more f irst - p lace vo tes 
can hur t , r a t her than help , a cand id a te und e r  STV viol at es wha t , 
in our op inion , is a fundamental d emocra t ic ethic . •.• 1 q  I a m  f a r
more doub t ful than are these authors o f  t h e  exis t e n c e  o f  a "d emo-
c r a t i c  e t hic" capable of such p recise  d e l iveranc e s . Wha t can b e
said w i t h  comp l e t e  conf idence is , however ,  t h a t  i t  shows how hollow
are the cla ims of those who tou t  STV by sugges t in g  that i t  leaves
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vo ters with an easy d e c i s ion about how to  vote once  they have 
d e termined thei r  actual p re f e rence o r de r . O t h e r  vo t ing p ro cedures 
in use do no t have the d e f e c t  j us t  des cribed . I n  o th e r  vot ing 
s cheme s you canno t actua lly make you r  mos t  p r e f e r r ed cand idate ' s 
chan c e s  less  by l is t ing him f ir s t ,  o r  ( in non-pre f e r e n t i a l  sys tems ) 
vo t ing for  h im  ra ther than for some o th e r  cand ida t e . 
I t  may seem bizarre that ranking a cand i d a t e  f i r s t  can ac tua l l y  
p revent t h a t  candidate f rom ge t t ing e l e c t e d , s o  i t  i s  pe rhaps wo r t h  
showing how i t  happens . I shall , howeve r ,  spare  t h e  reader any 
fully worked out  examp les involving STV because ( a s  Dwmne t t ' s  book 
illus t r a t e s ) they go on for pages . I am concerned here with  pr in-
c i p le s , no t with enabling anybody to become a t e l l e r  in 
an e le c t io n  conducted under STV . I shall there f o r e  cap i ta l i z e  on 
the logical relat ion b e tween the a l t e rna t ive vote (wh e r e  one place
is to  b e  f il led)  and STV (where seve ral are ) by wo rking t hrough 
examp l e s  for the al ternat ive vo t e  and ex tend ing them t o  STV v ia the
t ime-hono red me thod o f  arm-wav ing . 
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Suppo s e , then , that we have three blocs of vo ters , whose  
p r e f e rences over three cand idates are as shown . 
I I I  I I I  
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!! £. !!. 
£. .!. l!. 
( 8 )  ( 4 )  ( 5 )  
a t  the b o t toms o f  the c o l umns 
If the numbers  o f  membe rs in each bloc are as shown�and everyone
vo t e s  in acco rdance w i t h  his t rue pre ferences , £. wi l l  be  e l imina t e d  
a n d  t h e  vo t e s  of  b l o c  II  trans ferred to the ir  se cond p r e f e rence c . 
This will g ive .£. a maj o r i ty (nine vo tes ) so c is e l e c ted . Now
suppose tha t two member s of bloc I depar t f rom s incere vo t ing and 
put k f i rs t .  ( I t  does no t ma tter how they l i s t the o t her  two can-
didates . )  The resul t is that .! and k now have six f irs t pre f erences
to .£,' s f ive ; .£. i s  therefore elimina ted and the vo tes of  bloc  III
trans f e r red to their second preference , who is  �· Th is  g ives .! 
an easy win , wi t h  eleven votes -- s ix f rom the memb e r s  o f  b l o c  I 
who vo ted s incerely and f ive f rom the memb e r s  o f  b l o c  I I I . 
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The upsho t is tha t � wins with s ix f i r s t  p r e f e rence vo tes
b u t  no t wi t h  e i gh t , because the  shif t in  the two f i r s t  p r e f e rence 
vo t e s  f r om � to .J!. changes the order of e l im ina t ion . The cand id a t e  
who g e t s  e l imina ted is now c ins tead o f  �.  and this  releases
second cho ice vo tes from e ' s  suppo r t e r s  s u f f i c i e n t  in number to 
push � ove r  t he quo ta .  In contras t ,  w i tho u t  the ex t r a  two vo t e s
b is  e l iminated . and h is suppo r t e r s ' transfe rred vo t e s  go t o £ • 
g iv ing h im  a maj o r i ty .  
I shall no t a t temp t , the read e r  will  b e  r e l i eved t o  hear , to 
e."Cp l a in in d e tail the mechanics of the s ingle trans f erable vo te . 
DUllll!le t t  spends several pages (pp . 268-72 )  e."Cpound ing i t , end ing
w i t h  the remark tha t ,  al though " tho s e  who essay popular accoun t s
o f  S TV  assur [ e ]  their readers tha t i t  is no t really comp lica ted , "
the truth i s  that " i t  i s  comp lica ted" (p . 272 ) . ( It is , f o r  one 
thing , the only vo t ing sys tem in ac tual use tha t requires dealing
in frac t ions of v o t e s . )  However ,  b u i ld ing o n  the account  of the
a l t erna t iv e  vo t e  already g iven , it is  p o s s i b l e  to give t he general 
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idea .  I f  we s tar t from the alternat ive v o t e  and think o f  i t  b e ing 
used to  f ill two or mo re po s i t ions , there is a na tural ex t ens ion 
to g iv e  us the quo t a . With one pos i t ion to f il l  i t  was 1 / 2!!. + i, 
where !!. is  the number of vo ters . With  two pos i t ions to f i ll i t  i s
1/ 3!!_ + 1 ,  and s o  on . The gene ral �nd s l ightly more precise°)ro rmula
is that the quo ta  is " the smalles t who l e  number  larger than !!_(� + 1 ) , "
where k i s  the number o f  pos i t ions t o  b e  f illed ( p . 2 6 9 ) .�As before , 
cand �da te s  who reach the quo ta are dec lared elec t ed , and cand id a t e s  
are i n  the s am e  way elimina ted and the ir vo tes red i s trib u t e d . The
process  s to p s  when enough c andidates are over the quo t a  o r  t he numbe r  
lef t i n  is  equal to the number o f  places s t i l l  to b e  f i l led . The 
on ly new fea tur e ,  which makes the system comp l ica ted i n  p r a c t ic e , 
is tha t if a cand idate goes ove r the quo ta af ter some round w i t h
vo tes  t o  spare , h is "surp lus" is  redis tributed . This means ( i n  mos t  
vers ions o f  STV) tha t his vo tes are trans f e rred b u t  w i t h  a f rac-
t ional  value , the f raction be ing smaller the narrower the margin o f
succes s .  I t  may b e  seen , however ,  tha t the basic idea is s t i l l  one 
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o f e l imina t ing cand idates and trans f e r r ing the ir vo tes  t o  the nex t-
p r e f e rr e d  cand idate s t il l  in the r unning . 
To s e e  how a group o f  vo ters  can ge t the  c and ida t e  they l ike 
bes t  e le c t e d  on ly if some rank ano t he r cand id a t e  f ir s t , cons ider
an e l e c t io n  u n d e r  STV for three sea ts  in wh i c h  the vo ters  are 
requ ir e d  to l is t  all the cand ida t e s . (This prov is o is no t 
n e c e s s a r y  b u t  i t  s impl i f ie s  the ana lys is . ) The quo ta is one- four th
o f  t h e  nlDDb e r  o f  vo ters . Now imag ine a b l o c  o f  j u s t  und e r  a qua r t e r
o f  t h e  t o t a l  number o f  vo ters who s e  f i r s t  pre ference is  fo r a 
cer tain cand ida te !.• I t  may be tha t if a l l t h e  memb e r s  o f  t h i s
bloc vo te for c and idate !. he w i l l  no t p ick up enough t rans f erred
vo t e s  f ro m  c and i d a t e s  who are e l imin a t ed to push h im ove r  t he 
quo t a .  B u t  there ma y  neve r theless be  some cand idates who we re
even tua l ly e l e c t e d  who s e  lower p r e f e r e�c e s , if t hey had become
ava i l a b l e  by e l im ina t ion ,  would have g iven � a quo t a . I f  some
membe r s  o f  the b l o c  who l ike � the b e s t we r e  t o  l i s t  s ome o ther
candida t e  f i r s t ,  they migh t , by chang ing the order  in wh i c h  the
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cand id a t e s  were e l imina t e d , be able to  kno c k  o u t  a cand ida t e  (o r 
mo r e  t han one ) who se trans f erred pre f erences would e l e c t  a .  
The an a lo gue w i t h  the al t erna t ive vo t e  examp le is , I ho p e , c lear 
enough t o  sugge s t  tha t this mus t ,  w i t h  some vo t ing pa t t e rns , be
a real po s s ib i l i t y . 
P ropagand i s t s  for the s ingle t rans fe rable vo te  are  b y t h i s
t ime qu i t e  hardened in s in . (More cha r i tably , one might  t ake t he 
view t ha t  s ince they onl y t a l k  to one ano the r the y know no t wha t 
they do . ) Thus ,  George Hal le t t , wr i t ing f if ty-e igh t years af ter  
co-au t ho red 
the�pub l ic a t io n quo ted by DUDDlle t t , said  the  f o l lowing in an ar ti c le
f o r  Choos i ng an El e c toral S v s t e m .
. 
� 
vri t ten J... Under the s ingle t rans ferable vo t e  sys t em t h e  vo ter , he cla ims , 
can sa fe ly vo t e his  real order of choice as far a s  he has any , 
and no l a t e r  cho ice will ever hur t an ear l ie r  c ho i c e . This is 
t r u e  b e c a u s e  no later cho ic e is eve r coun ted unl e s s  and unt i l
all  ear l ie r  choices a r e  e lec ted o r  de fea ted . 
If you have a favo r i t e  candida t e  b u t  don ' t  think he has much 
chance of e l ec t ion , you can simply g iv e  h im your f ir s t c h o i c e
- _]_ __ anyway , with l a t e r  cho i c e s  to f a l l  back on . 
20 
is a lway s  coun ted . 
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Your f i r s t  c ho i c e  
Hal l e t t  j us t  s tays sho r t  o f  a s s e r t in g  f l a t l y  t h a t  y o u  canno t 
hur t the chances o f  the cand id a t e  you mo s t  p r e f e r  by p u t t ing him 
firs t , b u t  h e  surely sug ge s t s s trongly t h a t  it can nev e r  hur t the 
c h a n c e s  o f  a lowe r - r anking cand ida t e i f  the one you put f i r s t  is 
no t e l e c te d , b e cause you r  vo t e  f o r  h im w i l l  be r ed i s t r ibu ted to 
help a lower -ranked candida t e . Th i s  is no t ,  howeve r , the cas e . 
I t  s hou l d also be said that t here  i s no way in wh i c h  i t  is t rue 
under STV that "your vo t e  is alwa y s  coun t e d " in which it is no t 
equally true in any hone s t ly-�ond u c t e d  e l e c t ion . Thus , und e r  the 
p l u r a l i t y  or " f ir s t  pas t the pos t s y s t em" everybody ' s vo te is , 
obvio u s l y) coun ted , and t h a t  is a l l  t h a t  is true f o r  STV . 
The c l a im t ha t  a lower p r e f erence canno t a f f e c t  a h i gher one
the lowe r cho ic e  
i s  n e c e s s a r ily t r u e  s ince A canno t come i n t o  play unl e s s  the 
h ighe r p r e fe r e n c e  candidate has a l r eady b e e n  e i t h e r  e l imina t e d  
o r  e l ec te d w i t h  a sur p lus over t h e  quo ta .  Bu t i t  amo un t s  to a 
to s a y  th i s  
s ugges t io f a l s i�wi thou t the balanc i n g  s t a t e me n t  t h a t  it may b e
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pos s ib l e  by l is t ing a mor e  p r e f erred cand ida t e  lower t han one 
which is l e s s  p r e f e rr e d  �o s h i f t t h e  o u t come in a d i re c t io n 
tha t one l ikes . As Brams and F i s hburn p u t  i t  for  the a l t erna t ive 
vo t e  ( to accommoda t e  STV we have to add the words in b racke t s ) : 
" I t  is t r ue t h a t  a f ir s t cho i c e  can never b e  h u r t  by r anking a 
s e co nd c ho ic e , a s e cond c h o i c e  by ranking a t hird cho i c e , e t c . ,
because t h e  h i gher cho i c e s  are e l imina t ed [ o r  e le c t ed ] b e for e 
the lowe r cho i c e s  can a f f ec t  them . Howeve r , lowe r  choic e s  can 
a f fe c t  the o r d e r  o f  e l imina t ion [ an d  e l e c t ion ] , and henc e 
t rans f e r  o f  v o t e s , so t h a t  • • •  a h ig h e r  c ho i c e  ( e . g .  se c ond )  
can influence whe ther a lower cho ice ( e . g .  t h ird o r  f o u r t h )  i s  
ll 
elec ted . " 
Le t me ag a in illus tra te  the p o i n t s  a t  issue b y  ana l ys ing the 
a l t e r na t ive vo t e  and then ex tend t he discuss ion at STV by
a rm-wav ing . S up po s e  tha t the r e  is no way in which t h e  mos t 
p r e f e r r e d  c and id a t e  o f  a cer t a in bloc  o f  vo t e r s  c o u l d  be el ec t ed 
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by the ir vo t ing e i ther s inc e r e ly or  s t r a t e g ic a l l y . Hal le t t  sugge s t s
t h a t  they canno t l o s e  by p u t t in g  t h e  cand ida t e  they l i ke mo s t  top , 
b ecause i f  he doesn ' t  have enough vo t e s  to win , the  ballo t s  o f  
h i s  suppor t e r s  wi l l  be  r ed i s t r ib u t e d  a n d  w i l l  h e l p  t o  elec t some-
body e l s e . Hence "yo ur vo t e  i s  nev e r  was ted . "  I s  t h i s  tr ue ?  
T o  s e e  t ha t  i t  is no t ,  cons ider t h e  f o l lowing examp l e , where 
there  are three blocs each of wh ich  ranks one of the three cand ida t es  
to p .  
I I I  I I I  
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Sup p o s e  tha t none o f  the blocs  numbe r s  as muc h as h a l f  the to tal  
numb e r  of  voters , ·  so that  any cand ida t e  who  is  e l e c ted wil l depend 
on the f ir s t  p r e f e rence s  of one b l o c  and the t rans f e r r ed second 
p r e f e rences o f  ano ther b lo c . W i th s incere vo t ing , the o u t come is 
de t e rm ina t e  once we know whic h i s  the smal l e s t  b loc . Wh i cheve r 
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cand ida t e  
b loc i t  is  will  have i t s  f ir s t  cho i c e  e l imina ted , and wh icheverA 
o f  this  sma l l e s t b l o c
ge t s  the red is t r ib u ted second cho i c e  vo t e sAw i l l  have a maj or i ty 
and thus be elected . (Thus , if b l o c  I is the small e s t , � is 
e l imina t e d  and b is elec ted . ) In each case there w i l l  b e  some 
o ther  bloc for  wh ich th i s  out come is the  wo r s t  pos s ib l e . ( I n  t h e
case where b is  e lec t ed , t h i s  is the  wor s t  o u t come o f  b l o c  I I . )  
But in each case  the bloc  tha t s t ands t o  g e t  i t s  l e a s t p r e f  e r r e d  
cand idate  e lec ted w i t h  s incere vo t in g  can change the o u t c ome b y  
vo t ing s tr a t e g ically s o  tha t i t s  sec ond p re f e renc e w ins . 
The s imp l e s t  solut ion for the members o f  bloc  I I ,  to avo id 
f inish ing up wi th the cand idate  they l ike the leas t ,  is  for a l l
o f  them to put  the ir s econd -ranked c and ida t e � f irs t . Then � 
w i l l  ge t a maj o r i t y  stra i gh t  o f f . B u t  a f a r  sma l l e r  amount  o f  
s t ra te g i c  vo t ing than t h i s  wi l l  s u f f ice . S o  long a s  enough o f
the members o f  b loc I I  swi tch their  vo t e s  .. a s  t o  l eave c w i t h  
t h e  f ewe s t  f i r s t  p r e f e r ence vo t e s , a w i l l  win . Fo r c wil l now 
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be e l im ina ted and w i th the help o f  h i s  red i s t r ibu ted vo t e s  a wil l 
be elected . ( I t  may be no ted , in c id en tal l y , t h a t  the r e s u l t  i s
invar iably the elec t ion of t h e  c and ida t e  w i t h  the  f ewe s t  f i rs t 
pr e f erences . )
Le t me in pas s ing show how this examp l e  i l lu s t r a t e s  some thing
I s a i d  in sec t ion -J_ abou t  the case o f  the cand i d a t e  who was 
c ho ic e . 
nobody ' s  firs t c ho i c e  but everybody ' s  s e condJ.. I po in ted ou t  that
the al t erna t ive vo t e  would wipe o u t  th i s cand ida t e  in the f i r s t
round . I added t h e  qua l i f i c a t ion , howeve r , t h a t  t h i s  was true 
only wi th s incere vo ting. Le t me now exp lain thi s . Suppo se that
o f  the three con trovers ial cand ida t e s  one is s ignif ican t l y  s t ronger 
than the o ther two , though fall ing short o f  a maj o r i t y  o f  firs t 
p re ferences. Then the s upporters o f  the o ther two con troversial 
cand ida tes may be able t o  f oresee that w ith s incere vo t ing the 
of the three co� trovers ial cand i d a t e s  wins . 
res u l t  w i l l  be tha t the stronge s t  A S ince ( ex hvpo th� s i )  
they also d i s l ike one ano ther ' s  cand ida t e s , there  i s  n o  room f o r
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a deal among the support ers of the two weaker con t rove r s ial  cand i-
d a t e s  to vo te  for one of  · them . B u t  they can _ gain by vo t ing for t he 
cand idate they rank second . Thus, pu t t ing their second p r e f er e n c e  
f irst in the ballo t helps them ge t a cand idate as the  w i n n e r  t h a t  
they l ike be t te r  than the o n e  they would have f inished  u p  w i t h  b y
vo t ing sincere ly . 
Dwmnet t remarks curtly in his  d i s c u s s ion of STV tha t "mo s t o f 
t he ad.van tage s advertised fo r STV are i lluso ry ;  -i t i s , f o r  examp l e , 
even fur t he r  from the truth  than und e r  the a l terna t iv e  vo t e  that  
a vo ter cannot lessen J!'s chance s  as agains t tho s e  of f. by l i s t ing
! f irs t .  " (p . 2 83 ) . To see  how thi s  i s  so , cons id er again o u r
case w ith t hree places to b e  f i l led and a bloc of a l i t t l e  l e s s  
than a quarter o f  the to tal nwnber o f  vo ters . 
suppo s e  
Le t u s/,. the wors t case 1 in which al l the vo t e r s  o ther than
tho s e  who rank a f irst  rank h im las t .  Then the r e  i s  no way in
which t he supporters of .!!_ can po s s ibly ge t him elec t e d . Bu t by
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vo t in g  s t r a t e g ically i t  would c e r t a inly b e  p o s s ible f o r  t hem to
have some inf luence on who else ge t s  e l e c t ed . 
Provided enough s up p o r t er s  o f  
.!. d e f e c t  to ensur e h i s  e l imina t io n  in a n  ea r l y  round , al l  t he
vo t e s  o f  .!. sup p o r t er s (whe t he r  they : i s t e d  hie f i r s t  or no t )  w i l l
g o  to some o ther cand ida t e , and t h i s  p r e s uma b l y  g ives t he sup p o r t e r s  
o f  a a c hance t o  imp rove t h e  o u t come o f  t h e  e l e c t ion f r om t he i r o wn
p o in t  o f  v iew . I f , howev e r , they vo t e  s in c e r e l y  t h e i r  cand i d a t e  
will no t be knoc ked o u t  un t i l the e n d  a n d  t hey w i l l  have no i n f  l u -
e n c e  on the outcome . T h e y  a r e  t hus in an analogous pos i t io n  t o
in my a l t e rna t ive vo t e  e xamp l e . 
bloc I I  when bloc I is the small e s tA '?h e i r  cand ida t e  s t ays in to
t h e  end s o  the i r  v o t e s  a r e  no t trans f e r r ed , b u t  their candida t e  i s  
no t a c tually elec t ed . T h e  w a y  in whi c h  to a n a l y s e  t h e  elec t ion i s
to s a y  tha t t h e  t h ree-qu a r t e r s  o f  t h e  vo t e r s  o t he r  t han t h e  
suppo r t e r s  o f  a have b e twe e n  t hem de t e rmined wh i c h  cand ida t es
s h a l l  b e  e l e c t ed . 
8 1  
The vo t e s  o f  the suppo r t e r s  o f  !. i n  the STV examp l e , l ike
t h e  vo t e s  of t h e  membe r s  o f b lo c  II in the  a l t erna t ive vo t e  
examp le , a r e  counted in jus t t h e  s am e  w a y  as the vo t e s  o f  t ho s e  
who vo t e  f o r  unsucce s s f u l  cand ida tes  unde r  t h e  r e la t iv e  maj o r i t y  
sys t em .  We can say o f  a l l  o f  them t ha t , i f  there had been e nough 
mo r e  o f  them , t h e ir cand ida te would have been elec ted . Bu t we 
c anno t hone s t ly say tha t there is any sense in wh i c h  everyone ' s
no t 
vo t e  coun t s  und e r  the a l t e rna t ive vo t e  or STV t h a t  wo u l dAbe equa l l y
a p p l ic a b l e  to t h e  r e la t ive maj o r i ty sys t em .  
The s e  e l imina t ive sys tems , the al t erna t ive vo t e  and STV , have 
a fur t h e r  d e f e c t  tha t is no t shared by aggrega t ive sys t ems such as 
t h e  p r e f e r e n c e  s c o r e  sys t em or t he rela t ive maj o r i t y  s y s t em .  I am
no t awa r e  that the p o in t  has been made i n  the l i t e ra t u r e  ( i t  is 
no t men t ioned in the ir d iscus s io n  of these s y s t ems b y  Dumme t t  or 
by Brams and F i s hburn) but i t  seems to me quite s igni f ican t . 
As we know , there i s  no vo t ing scheme unde r  which i t  may no t 
pay to d e pa r t  f r om a po l icy o f  s inc ere vo t ing . But  i t  wo uld a t  
ez. 
leas t b e  cheer ing t o  b e  a b l e  to assure s omeone tha t h e  would no t 
do b e t t e r , in terms o f ge t t ing an outcome he l ikes , to s t ay a t  
home ra th er t han t o  g o  o u t  and vo te s incerely . I t  would be nice
t o  b e  a b l e  to say " I f  you do vo t e  s i�c e r e l y  you m a y  no t change
change it you can be  sure i t  
the o u t come , bu t i f  you do /... w i l l  imp rove the o u t c ome . You can ' t 
make i t  wo r s e . " Such an �s sur anc e  canno t be g i v e n  f or the a l ter-
na t iv e  vo t e  and STV . 
This c a n  b e  s e e n  c l e� r l y in my examp l e  o f  the a l t e rn a t ive 
vo t e  whe r e  the candida te  l is ted f ir s t  b y  the sma l l e s t  of the three 
blocs i s  el iminated and i ts members ' vo t e s  ar e trans f e r r ed to the
s e cond p r e f e rence cand ida t e  o f  the bloc . Here we saw tha t , w i th 
s in c e r e  vo t ing , one o f  two larger b io c s  o f  vo t er s  ge t s  the o u tcome 
i t s  mem b e r s  l ike leas t .  Bu t if some o f  t h e  memb e r s  o f  t h i s  bloc 
s imp ly s t ayed at home so tha t i t  became the sma l l e s t b.loc , i t s  
h i g he s t -ranked c and ida te wo uld b e  e l im ina ted a nd the trans ferr ed 
vo t e s  would go to elec t the b loc ' s  second-ranked candida t e .  
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S im i l a r l y , in my STV examp le , le t us a s s ume tha t those  who put !!_ 
f ir s t  ·f o rm  a b lo c  w i t h  a coDDDon s e t  o f  lower p references . Then 
i f  some memb e r s  o f  t h i s  bloc s imp ly did no t vot e , a would b e  
vo te  
e l iminated  and the trans f e rred vo t e s  o f  . t hose  who d id� would play a
p a r t  in d e t e rm i n ing who e l s e  go t e l ec ted , thus presumably imp ro v in g
t he o u t come f r om t h e  p o i n t  o f  view o f  t he members o f  the b lo c . 
I t  is  impor tan t to ge t  clear j us t  wha t  is t he unique de f ect  
o f  S TV  h e r e . I t  is no t ,  o f  cour s e , tha t i t  is o p e n  to s t ra t e g ic 
vo t in g . Tha t , to repea t , is true o f  a l l  procedur e s . H u t  t h e r e  
for e l ec t ing representa tives , 
are no o th e r  vo t ing p r o c e d u r e s  in a c t u a l  useh I b e l ieve , wi t h  the
c h a r a c t er is t ic tha t vo t ing s in c e r e l y  can make the ou t come wor s e  
than i t  would o t herwise b e . Thus , the pr e f er e n c e  s c o r e  p r o c e d u r e  
f avo r e d  by DUDDDe t t  is , as w e  have seen , ser i o u s l y  d e f e c t iv e  in the
f a c e  o f  s t ra t eg i c  vo t in g , but  we have no need to  warn a po ten t ial
vo t e r  tha t he m i g h t  do b e t t e r  no t to vo te a t  a l l  than vo t e  s incerely . 
S ince the p r o s p e c t s  of a cand ida te depend on the size  o f  his  
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p r e ference score , i t  can never do an y t h ing but h e l p  to have a 
l arger score . Thus , ad d ing to t h e  s c o r e s  o f  the cand idates you
the  
f avor b y  vo t ing s inc e r e l y  mus t , i f  it  ha s  any  e f f e c t  at  a l l , imp rove A 
s t and ing o f  r e l a t iv e l y  t o  t h a t  o f 
/.. a cand ida t e  you p r e f e r  mo r e /... a cand i d a t e  you p r e f e r  les s . It
i s , of course , true tha t you could u s ua l l y  do even b e t t e r  by 
vo t ing s t ra t egical ly . Bu t t ha t  is no t now t he is sue . The p o i n t  
i s  t ha t  i t  is b e t ter  to vo te  s i n c e r e l y  t han no t a.t a l l . I t  i s  
easy to  see  t h a t  t h e  same c a n  be s a id o f  the muc h-ma l i gned r e l a t ive 
maj or i ty o r  " f ir s t  pas t the pos t "  s y s t em .  I f  y o u  f avo r  !_ you
might ge t a be t ter r e s u l t by vo t ing for .h_ ins t ead ; bu t you canno t 
ge t a b e t t e r  resul t by a b s t a in ing f rom vo t ing a l to g e t h e r  ra ther 
than vo t ing f o r  a .  
I t  i s  wor t h  emp ha s i z ing that  t h e  pecul iar i t ie s  o f  STV a r e  
no t a p r ic e  t h a t  has to be p a id f o r  hav ing a n  elec t o r a l  s y s t em o f  
so-ca l l e d  " p ro p o r t ional repr esentat io n , "  by w h i c h  i s  u s ua l l y  mea n t
a sys tem i n  wh ich a mino r i t y  party o f  mo r e  t han a c e r t a in s i z e  in
SS-
a cons t i tuency is guaranteed a s e a t . The par t y  l i s t  s y s t ems in 
use in  mos t  of  c o n t inen tal _ we ste r n  Eur o p e  are log i c a l l y  s im il a r
to  t h e  r e l a t iv e  maj o r i t y  o r " f ir s t  pa s t  the post" s ystem . Fo r 
l ike i t  these sys tems make u s e  only o f  f i r st p r e f e r enc e s . Tha t i s
to say , in bo t h  cases the vo t e r  s imp ly votes f o r  one p o l it ical
pa r t y . The seats  are t hen d iv ided in ac co rdance with some f o rmu l a
s o  t h a t  t h e  propo r t ion o f  sea t s  tha t each party w i n s  w ith in a 
cons t i tuency roughly corresponds w i t h  i t s  p r o p o rtion o f  vo t e s . 
In such a sys tem i t  can , obviously , never hur t the  c hances o f  a 
par ty to cas t a vo te  f o r  i t  as again s t  no t vo t ing a t  a l l . (A f o rt io r i, 
it would no t imp rove a pa r ty ' s  chances in such a s y s t em t o  vote f o r  
some o the r par t y  ins tead , s o  mono tonic i ty is no t v io l a t ed e i t h e r . )
Thu s , i t  would be easy enough to have " propo r t iona l r e p r e -
sen t a t ion" wi t ho u t t he comp l ex i t ies a n d  pec u l i ar i t ie s o f  STV - -
i f  tha t i s  wha t o n e  wan t s . W e  m i gh t  espec ially  e x p e c t  thos e  who 
a t t a c k  the rela t ive maj o r i ty sys t em in B r i t a i n  to sup po rt a par ty
l i s t  sys t em when we recogn i z e  tha t t he i r  standa r d  l ine of c r itic ism 
is to po i n t  o ut that it f a i l s  to p roduce a c o r r e spond e n c e  be tween 
6fo 
the p ro po r t ion o f  vo t e s  c a s t f o r  a g iven p a r ty and i t s  propo r t ion 
o f  s e a t s . Since i t  is no t d e s igned to d o  t h i s  b u t some t h ing e l s e
(name l y  e l e c t  the candida t e  in  each con s t i tuency w h o  ge t s  t he mo s t  
vo t e s ) this i s  no t i n  i t s e l f  a c r i t ic i sm o f  i t . I t  becomes one 
o n l y  i f  i t  is t ac i t l y  assumed that  the  obj e c t  of an e lec toral s y s t em 
should  be to produce a propo r t iona l i ty be tween vo t e s  c a s t  na t iona l l y  
f o r  a p a r t y  a n d  s e a t s  w o n  n a t iona l l y  b y a p a r t y , b u t  t h i s  is o f  
cou r s e  e q u iva l e n t  t o  a s s uming that the r i g h t  e le c t o r a l  sys tem i s  a 
party l i s t  sys t em w i t h  the  who l e  coun t r y  as one b ig cons t i tuency . 
Why do no t t ho s e  who make t h i s  a t t ack on t he exis t ing sys t em 
d raw t he l o g i c a l  con clus ion? The explana t ion o f  the  p u z z l e  is , I 
think , that  the s t ronge s t  advocacy o f  STV ha s  always come f rom 
tho se who e ither d i s l ike po l i t ica l p ar t ie s  or suppo r t  the L ibe ra l  
p ar ty ( in a s f a r  a s  these s t a tes  o f  mind c an b e  d i s t inguished ) .  The 
h id d e n  agenda o f  en thus ias t s  for STV i s , then , no t the p ropo r t iona l 
repre s e n t a t io n  o f  po l i t ic a l  p ar t ie s  b u t  a sys t em o f  p e r sona l 
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represen t a t ion tha t makes po l i t ical par t ies epiphenomena l . 
DullDDe t t  r e c o g n i z e s  t h a t  t h i s  i s  t h e  r e a l l y  d i s t inc t ive 
f e a ture of STV and commends it for p r e c i s e l y  this reason . In 
the end , he proposes an a l terna t ive to  i t ,  but his c l a im f or i t  
i s  tha t i t  does the same thing i n  t h i s  respec t as S TV  b u t  even 
mor e  e f f ec t ively and without some of  STV ' s  drawbacks . I shall  
take up Duoune t t ' s  v iews abo u t  t h e  r e p r e s en ta t ion of  mino r i t ie s
in sec t i o n  XI I .  Nex t , howeve r , I wan t  to take up Dumme t t ' s  
d is c u s s i on o f  the concep t o f  the wa s ted vo t e  which i s  so popular 
among s uppor t e r s  o f  STV . 
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VIII THE WASTED VOTE AS A STRATEG I C  CONCEPT
I be gan t h i s  e s say by  c o n tra s t in g  the a t t i t ud e s  towa r d s  vo t ing 
p ro c e d u r e s  o f  t he p r o f e s s iona l s  w i t h  t h o s e  of t h e  ama t e u r s . 
On no ma t te r  is t h i s  con t r a s t mo r e  p ronounc ed 
than tha t o f  the so-ca l l ed "was t e d  vo t e . "  I f  t h e y  eve r add r e s s ed 
i t , t h e  s o c i a l  cho ice t h eo r i s t s  would p r e s uma b l y  say , in t he wo rd s 
t ha t  Lap lace used when asked abou t t he r e l eva n c e  o f  God to phys i c s , 
"I have no nee d  o f  tha t hypo t he s i s . " Bu t a l a r g e  e l emen t  in the 
ama t eu r s ' c r i t ic i sms of the re la t iv e  maj o r i t y  procedure  and , even
mo r e , i n  t h e i r  advocacy of the s in g l e  t r an s f e ra b l e  vo t e , con s i s t s
o f  invo king a s  a c r i t e r io n  o f  an in t r ins i ca l l y  f a i r  p ro c ed ur e the
r e qu i r eme n t  t h a t i t  should no t wa s t e  v o t e s . 
As I sa id in s e c t ion V I , Dumme t t  c l a ims to be b u i ld ing a b r idge
b e twe e n  s o c ial c ho i c e  t h e o r y  and tho s e  who t r y t o g e ne r al ize abou t 
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the ac t ual conseque nce s  o f  el e c to r a l  sys t ems b u t  he d o e s  no t d e l iv e r
o n  t h i s  claim.  Wha t he  d·oes  do , howeve r , is  .b r ing the r e s o u r c e s  o f
soc ial cho i c e  theory to bear  on the  argumen t s  of  the  E l e c t o r a l  R e -
f o rm Soc i e ty a n d  o t h e r s  w h o  th ink i t  make s sense  to  t a l k  abo u t  t h e  
" f a i r n e s s " o f  e l ec tor a l sy s t ems a s  a ques t ion d e tachab l e  f ro m  t h a t  
o f th e i r p red ic t ab le po l i t ical e f f e c t s . This invo lves  h im h e av i l y
in an a t temp t to unde r s tand wha t e l e c t o r a l  re f o rmer s  o f  t h i s  kind 
m e a n  �he n  they say t ha t  und e r one s y s t em vo t e s  are  was t ed whi l e  
ano t h e r  t he y  a r e  no t .  (One m i g h t  exp e c t  the  oppos i t e  o f  "was t e d "  
to b e  " conse rved . " In f a c t  i t  tend s to  b e  "e f fec t ive . "  I s ha l l  
d iscuss t h e  s i g n i f icance o f  t h i s  i n  t h e  nex t s ec t ion . ) 
Like h i s  d is c u s s i o n  of s t r a te g ic vo t i ng (w i t h w h i c h  i t  i s  
c l o s e l y  l inked ) , Dumme t t ' s  ana l y s i s  o f  the  i d e a  o f  t h e  "wa s t e d  
v o t e" is ma rred by i t s  b e ing d ivided b e twe en a chap t er on t h e
a l te rna t ive vo t e  in one o f  the f i r s t  f o u r t e e n  chap t e r s  and a 
b r i e f  d iscuss ion o f  it in conne c t ion w i t h  STV in one o f  t h e  las t 
90 
two chap ters . But  this is  no t s imply , as i t  was wi th  s t r a t e g i c
vo t ing , a ma t ter o f  awkwardnes s .  I bel ieve t h a t i n  th i s ca s e 
deal ing wi th two sys tems s e p a r a t e l y  res u l t s  i n  Dumme t t ' s  go i n g
s e r ious ly  a s t r ay . 
The reason for  this  is t ha t ,  as I sha l l  t ry to show , those
w h o  talk abou t  "was ted votes" really have two en t i r e ly  d i f f e rent
concep tions o f wha t a was ted  vo t e  i s . One i s  employed to  a t tack
t h e  rela tive maj o r i ty sys tem wh ile  t h e  o t h e r  i s  used to  p u s h t h e 
case f o r  STV . 1rhe f i r s t  one does no t lead  par t icul a rly to STV . 
And t h e  second , when app l ied to re lat iv e  maj o r i ty vo t ing ,  does no t
produce the same imp l ic a t ions as the f i r s t  b u t  ones t h a t are rather  
b izarre : thus , on the f ir s t  concep t ion o f  a was ted vo te , vo tes  
unde r  � h e  r e l a t ive maj o r i ty p roc edur e 
c a n  be wa s tedJ..only when t h e r e  a r e  mo r e  than two cand ida tes  in a 
cons t i tuency ; but  on t h e  s e c ond concep t ion many votes  ( j u s t  how 
there a re only two cand i d a t e s . � 
many is no t qui te  clear , as we shall  see)  a r e  was t ed even wh e r e � 
Because the bulk o f  h i s  d iscus s ion o f  "was ted votes"  occurs  
in t h e  context  o f  t h e  a l t e r na t iv e  v o t e , Dumme t t ' s  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n
') l
o f  the concep t  p icks up only the f irs t concep t ion . He then notes 
tha t i t  does  no t suppor t  the case  fo r STV but this  does no t lead 
h im t o  a s k  i f  some o ther in terpre ta tion  would  do so . I shall 
try  to  show tha t there  is indeed a second conception o f  a was ted  
vo t e  tha t seems to be wha t those  who commend STV f o r  no t was t ing 
vo t e s  have in mind . 
Dunune t t  wr ites  tha t 
advo c a t e s  o f  the al terna t ive vo te  procedure i nva r i a b l y  make 
great p l ay with the concept  of a was ted vote , claiming it as 
t h e  gre a t  me ri t o f  the proc edure t h a t  i t  r educes the number
o f  vo t e r s  w h o  was t e  t h e i r  vo t e s . Unfor tuna te ly , they hardly
ev� r  at t emp t  to s p e c i fy what  i t  m e a n s  to  say tha t someone has
was t e d  h i s  vo te . The p r imary application o f  the concept  is
to t h e  re l a t ive maj or i ty procedure ; bu t  i t  needs  to  be  explained 
in general  t e rms i f  we are to  j udge that some o ther  procedure 
w i l l  i nvo lve fewer was ted votes . (P . 2 1 4 . )  
§Z.
I n  t h i s  s e c t ion I shal l fo l low t h rough Dunune t t ' s  d i s c u s s i o n  o f
was ted v o t e s  und e r  t h e  r e l a t iv e  maj o r i ty p r o c e d u r e , a nd h i s th re e 
s u c c e s s ive a t t emp t s  to ex t end the no t ion f rom par t i c u la r e x amp l e s
t o  c r e a t e  a general  c r i t e r ion o f  "wa s t e . "  T h e n i n  the n e x t  s e c t ion
I sha l l  work o u t  an a l t e rn a t ive concep t io n  of  a was t e d v o t e , d e r iv e d
f r om t h e  wr i t ings o f  those  who u s e  the no t io n  i n  t h e  c o u r s e  o f 
advo c a t in g  STV . 
D umme t t  b e g i n s  by a s s um i n g w i t hou t d i s c u s s i o n  t ha t , w h e n  i t  i s
s a i d  tha t vo t e s  a r e  was t e d  und e r  t h e  r e l a t ive maj o r i ty p ro c e d u r e , 
wha t i s  meant  is that , when there  a r e  three  ( o r  mo r e }  c and i d a t e s , 
a l l  v o t e s  cas t for cand ida t e s  o ther than t h e  one who c ame f i r s t  o r  
s e c ond a r e  was ted . He t he n  cons t ru e s  t h i s  ( a g a i n  w i thout  d i s c u s s i o n )  
as an a s se r t io n  abo u t  the w a y  in whi c h  the ou t c ome m i g h t  h a v e  be en 
change� if those who se f ir s t  p r e f e reni;:e was a c a n d i d a t e who d id no t 
come f i r s t  o r  second had swi t ched the i r  vo t e s  to the  c and id a t e  who
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came s e c o nd . 
I t  i s  e a s y  enough to show , as Duaone t t  does , t ha t ,  i f  this  i s  
r e a l l y  wh a t  p eo p l e  me an , t hey a r e  commi t t ed t o  a n  u t t e r ly a b s u r d  
\ 
way o f  t h i nking  abou t was t ed v o t e s . I shal l no t f o l low Dumme t t ' s 
own expo s i t i o n  b e c a u s e , as is h i s  a lmos t invariable
p r a c t ic e , he o b scu res t he po i n t s  by making  h i s  examp l e s  u n n e c e s s a r i l y
c omp l i ca t e d . ( H e  n e v e r  u s ed three b l o c s  o f  vo t e r s  whe r e  seven , o r
e l e ve n , o r  s eve n t een b l o c s  w i l l  d o  i n s t e a d . }  B u t  I s ha l l  make t h e
same p o i n t s . 
S u p p o s e , t hen , tha t there are t h r e e  cand id a t e s  in an e l e c t i o n
and tha t a l l those who suppo r t  t h e  cand id a t e  w h o  c a m e  t h i r d  (£_}
p r e f e r r e d  the one who c ame f i r s t (!!_) to t h e  one who c ame s econd (E) · 
The n  i t  i s , o f  course , s t i l l  t ru e  tha t t h o s e  who vo t ed f o r  c cou l d 
have c h an g e d  t h e  r e su l t by vo t ing f o r  �·  Bu t they wou ld have
chang e d  i t  i n  a way tha t mad e t h e  ou t come wo r s e , e l e c t in g  their
f in is h ing u p  w i t h
t h ird c ho i c e  c and i d a t e  i n s t e ad o fi t he i r  s e c o nd . I t  is o b v i o u s l y
94 
l u dic r o u s  t o  s a y , o n  t he s t r eng t h  o f  t h i s , t hat t hose who vo ted 
f o r  c wa s t e d  the i r  vo t e s . 
Dunnnett then points out t ha t  we m i ght r e f i n e  t h e  c r i t e r io n  to 
r ead a s  f o l lows : t h o s e  who d id not vote f o r  th e c andi d ate who wo n 
wasted the ir votes i f  they m i gh t , by vot in g  di f f e r e nt l y f r om t h e
way in w h i c h  they ac tua lly voted, have al t e red t he result to one
t h a t  t h e y  would have p re f  er red . to the actual res ult . Thu s , i n  
t h e  examp l e  a l r eady g iven , it could  b e  t ha t thos e w h o  vo t e d  f o r
b wo u ld have p re fer red £ to �· They cou l d  then have g o t  £ e l e c t ed 
if the y  had vo t ed f o r  £· Then , in t he c a s e  hypo thes i zed , in which
t h e  p e o p l e  w h o  vo t e d  f o r  £ had t h e  order .£ � .!!_, we w o u l d  h a v e  to
say that t h e r e  wer e  wa s t ed vo t e s  among those who vo t e d  f o r  .!!_ , t h e
candida t e  who came second , bu t t h e r e  we r e  no was t e d  v o t e s  among 
t h o s e  who v o t e d  for £• the c andida t e  who came t h i rd . 
I t  i s  p la i n t h a t  i f  th i s  is t h e  no t io n  o f  a was t e d  vote ,  t he n 
i t  h a s  an e s s e n t i a l  connect ion w i th s t ra teg ic vo t in g . Thus , i f
we reg ard the a nal y s is o f s t r a t e g i c  v o t i n g  a s  b e i n g  a t  t h e  c o r e  o f  
9 5'  
t h e  s o c i a l  cho i c e  cont r ibution to the analysis o f  voting, we can 
say tha t Dwmnett here b r i� gs to gether soc ial choice theory and the 
argumen t s  o f the na ive p roponents o f " f a irnes s " i n  voting p rocedures . 
Wha t e xactly is the c onnec tion between wa s t ed v o tes and p o s s i -
b i l i ti e s  o f  strateg i c  voting ?  Dummett ' s  at tempt t o  s t ate the 
cr i t e r io n  o f  a wa ste d vote on which the supporte r s  of b waste 
t h e i r  vo t e  by vot ing s ince r e l y , bu t the s upporters of c do not ,
is no t succe s s f u l . He says : "W11en the rel a t ive maj o r ity p r o cedure 
i s  u s e d , t h e r e f o r e , we may say that a vote r wastes his vo te if
he votes for a c andida te 
who had no chanc e  of winn ing , given t h e  p r e f e r enc e  s c ales o f  t h e  
vo t e r s , p r o v ided tha t they v o t e d  adm i s s ib l y " ( p . 2 15 ) . 
I have so f a r  avoided t echn ical t e rminology bu t I can exp la in 
adm i s s ib i l i t y  f a i rl y  e a s i l y  by s t ar t ing w ith non-adm iss ib i l i ty . 
A s t ra t egy (ca l l  i t  5 1 )  is non-admi s s i b l e  i f  there is some a l ter na-
t ive s t r a t egy (ca l l  i t  5 2 )  w h i c h , f o r  e ve r y  possible contin gen cy
(whe r e  a co ntingenc y is def i n ed by the way in wh i ch eve r y body e l s e
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vo t e s ) , would b e  be t t e r . Tha t i s  to s a y , for a n y  pos s ib l e  d i str i -
b u tion o f  vo tes, S 2  e i th e r  p r od u c e s  t h e  s a � e  outcome as S l  o r  i t  
p r oduc e s a mo r e  p re f e rr e d  o u t come . S 2  in th i s  c a s e  may b e  s a i d  to 
domina te S l. An admiss i ble s t ra te g y , then , i s  one that  is not 
domina ted by any o t h e r . The r e  may we l l  be many adm i s s i b l e  s t rate g i e s . 
Thus , whe r e  a re l a t ive maj or i t y  p r o c e d u r e  i s  i n  u s e , the o n l y  n o n -
adm i s s ib l e  s t r a tegy is  to  vo te fo r o n e ' s  l e a s t - p refe r red cand i -
d a t e .  For t h e r e  i s  some con t inge ncy und e r  w h i c h  i t  would imp rove 
t h e  o u t come to vo te f o r  one ' s  nex t - t o - l east-pre f e r r e d  candida t e , 
name l y  whe r e  wha t wo uld o t he rw i s e  h ap p e n is t h a t  t h e  l ea s t -p r e f e r red
cand i d a t e  would win . 
I t  i s , o f  cour s e , exceedingly un l i ke ly tha t a s in g l e  vo te 
wou l d  c hange the o u t come i n  an e l e c t i o n , though it does occas iona l l y  
happen . Dumme t t  sugge s t s , qu i t e  reas o na b ly I th ink ,  tha t w e  should 
th i n k  i n  t e rms o f  vo t ing b y  b l o c s  o f l i ke-minded e l ectors . An
ind i v i d u a l  vo t e r ' s  d e cis ion can then be s e e n  as fo l low i n g  f rom a 
ca l c u l a tion abo ut what those who have the same p r e f e r e n c e s  as
h ims e l f  oug h t  to do . 
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A vote r  who , in a Br i tis h or American e l e c t io n , vo t e s  f o r  t h e
cand id a te of h i s  second choice b e c a u s e  h e  b e l i e v e s  t hat the one 
he l ikes  b e s t is  un likely to  get  in c annot be p r e s umed to think 
it a t  all l i kely that  the c and ida t e  he votes f o r  w i l l  w i n  by one 
vo t e .  I f  he thought o f  the vo t e s  o f  the o t h e r  voters a s  some-
t h in g  una l t e r a b ly g iv e n , the o n l y r a t i o n a l  mo t iv e  f o r  h i s  vot ing 
as he d id would be the pos s ib i l i t y  tha t he might j ust t i p  the 
s c a l e : b u t  he does no t so t h ink o f  them . He vo t e s , r a t he r , 
as h e  hop e s  that o t h e r s  who share h i s  o p in ions and p r ef e r e n c e s  
w i l l  d e c i d e  to  vo te : h e  a c t s  a s  i f  h i s  d e ci s io n  wer e  a s i gn o f  
wha t t he d e c i s ions o f  a l l  who h a v e  the  s ame p r e f e r en c e s  as h e  
w i l l tu rn o u t  to hav e  been . I s  t h i s  a ra t ional  way t o  t h ink? 
It is , p rov ide d that  it is  how mo s t  p eop l e  th i n k , for then 
tho s e  w i th the same p refe rences are q u i te l ik e l y  to a rr ive at 
the  s ame d e c i s ion . I f  mo s t peop l e  d i d no t t h ink i n  this way , 
i t  wo u l d  no t be ra tional  for anyone to do so ; but i t  i s  i n  f act 
how mos t  p e o p l e  think when d e c i d ing how to vo t e , and , if i t were 
no t ,  it is doub t f u l  t h a t  parl i amen t ar y  d emoc rac y would wo r k  at a l l . 
( P . 2 1 J . )
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This is , I b e l ieve , an ex c e l l e n t  p i e c e  o f  ana l y s i s . Al t h o u g h
o th e r s  have s a id i t  b e f o r e , D unnne t t  s a y s  i t  ve r y we l l . We c an 
t h e r e f o r e  move b e twe e n  t a l k i n g  a bo u t  v o t i n g  by a n  ind i v i d u a l  and 
vo t i n g  by a b l o c  w i t ho u t  h a v i n g  t o  j u s t i f y  it on e a c h  o c c a s io n . 
Le t us now s e e  wh a t  Dumme t t ' s  p r o p o s e d  c r i t e r i o n  f o r  a w a s t e d 
vo t e  u nd e r  a r e l a t i ve maj o r i t y p r o c ed u r e  amo u n t s to . C o n s i d e r a � a i n
t h e  e x amp l e  I g a v e  o f � h r e e  b lo c s . T h e  l a r ge s t  p u t 3  � f i r s t  acrl 
vc t � s  fe r � ; t h e  n e x t  l a r ge s t  h a s  the o r d e r  k £  � an d vo t e s  f o r � :  
�n d  t he sma l l e s t h a s  t h e  o rd e r £  � k  an d vo t � s  f o r �· We o b v io us l y  
cann o t  s ay tha t � ha s  no chan c e , s in c e  � wa s  a c t u a l ly e l e c t ed and a l l
h i s  
t h e  vo t e s  c a s t w e r e  admi s s ib l e . (Nob o d y  vo t e d  f o r  A l e a s t p r e f e r r e d  
c a nd id a t e  -- i n  f a c t eve rybody vo t e d  f o r  h i s  mo s t  p re f e rr e d  c a n -
d id a t e . )  We canno t say t ha t  c had no c h a n c e , b e c a u s e  c wo u l d have
won if t ho s e  who put k f i r s t had vo t ed f o r  t h e i r  s e c o nd cho i c e  .£.•
a nd t h i s  wo uld o bv io u s l y  have been a d m i s s ib l e . C a n  we , t h en , _  say 
t ha t b had no c ha n c e , g iv e n  t h e  ac t u a l  p r e f e r e n c e  o r d e r i n g s  and 
t he c o n s t r a i n t  t h a t  a l l  vo t e s a r e  c a s t adm is s i b l y ? No t n e c e s s a r i l y . 
We have no t ye t h a d  any o c c a s i o n  t o men t io n t h e  lowe r p r e f e r -
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e n c e s  o f  t h o s e  who vo t e d  f o r  a .  B u t  su p po s e t h a t  enough o f  them
put Q se co nd to e l e c t k. when t h e i r  vo t e s  w e r e  add ed to t ho s e  o f
t he p e o p l e  who p u t  b f i r s t .  Then b c o u l d  have b e e n  e l e c t ed by
ad mi s s ib l e vo t in g c o mp a t i b l e  wi t h the a c t u a l  p r e f e r e n c e - o rd e r s . 
I t  m ig h t be a s ked wh y su p po r t e rs o f  � s ho u l d  vo t e f o r  b when a· 
h a s  a p lu ra l i t y ;  b u t  t hey cay no t know t ha t  a ha s a p l u r a l i t y 
and th i nk t h a t t h e  c h o i c e  is go i n g  to be b e twe en b an d  c .
I t  i s  p r e c i s e l y  b e c a u s e  t h e r e  i s  a po s s i b l e c o n t i n g e n c y  i n  
w h i c h  i t  wo u l d  imp rove ma t te r s  t o  vo t e f o r  a s e c o n d - c h o i c e  c a n d i -
d a t e  t ha t I s a id vo t ing f o r  a f i r s t - c h o i c e  o r  s e c o n d - c h o i c e  c a n d i -
d a t e  is  always adm i s s i b l e  i n  a t h r e e-cand id a t e  e le c t io n . Admi s s i-
b i l i ty is c o n c e r n e d , le t me remind t he re ad e r , w i t h  p o s s i b i l i t i e s
a n d  no t p r o b a b i l i t i e s . Thu s , i t  m a y  w e l l  b e t ha t in my examp l e  
none o f  the t h r e e  cand ida tes w a s  wi t ho u t  a chance , g i v e n  t h e
a c t u a l  p r e f e re n c e s  and t h e  con s t r a in t  o f  adm i s s i b l e vo t in g . B u t  
I t a ke i t  t h a t  nobody w h o  wa n t s  t o  t a l k  abo u t wa s t ed vo t e s  wo u l d
b e  h a p p y  wi th such a c o nc l u s i o n . 
D umme t t ' s a t t e mp t to g e n e r a l i z e  h i s  c r i t e r i o n  f o r  a was ted 
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vo t e  f rom the r e la t ive maj o r i ty p r o c e d u r e  t o  a l l  p r o c e d u r e s  d o e s  
not inc l u d e  the re f e r ence t o  cand i d a t e s ' c hanc e s . 
Bu t it is even l e s s s a t i s f a c t o r y . He c l a ims t h a t 
" t h e  wa y of genera l i z ing" the criterion i s  " t o s a y  t h a t , und e r  
any procedure , someone wa s t e s h i s  vo t e  i f he a d o p t s  a 2 - inad� i s s i b l �  
s t rate gy " ( p . 1 1 2 ) . The no t io n  o f  2- i nadm i s s i b i l ity i s  anothe r 
p i e c e  o f  j a rgo n t h a t I s ho u l d  e x p l a i n . A s t r a t e g y  is 2 - inadm i s s i b l e
( i . e . seconda r i l y inadm i s s i b l e )  i f  i t  i s  inadm i s s i b l e g iven the
o f  a l l  o t her vote r s  
actua l pre f e r ence�and i f  al l other vote r s u s e  ( p r imar i l y )  admi s -
s ib l e  s t ra t e g i e s. Dumme t t  says a l i t t l e  l a t e r  tha t t h i s  en t a i l s 
iden t i f y ing "a wasted vo t e  w ith t h e  a d o pt i on o f  a 2- inad mi s s ibl e 
s t ra t e gy ,  i . e .  a vote cast in a manne r t h a t  c ou ld not b e  adv a nta ge o us , 
g iv e n  t h e  p r e f e re nc e  s c a l e s  o f  t h e  o ther voters " ( p . 2 2 9 )  -- and ,
o n e  s ho u l d add , the ir voting adm i s s ib l y . 
Under s ome vo t ing p r o c e d u r e s , t h e  c ho i c e  o f  s t ra t e g i e s  w i l l
b e  s h a r p l y  reduced f o r  a vo t e r  who knows t h e  p re f e r enc e  o rde r s  o f
a l l  o t h e r  vo t e r s and a s s ume s (w h e t h e r  c o r r e c t l y o r  
J o t 
no t )  t h a t t h e y  w i l l  vote adm is s ib l y . Thus , Dumme t t ' s  ers twh i le 
co-au t h o r  o n  strategic voting , the l a t e  Rob in Far q u ha r s o n , s ho w e d  
that for b i n a r y  d e c i s io n  p r o c e d u r e s  s u c h  a s  t h e  s t a n d a r d  mo t io n -
and-amendme n t  s y s t em o f voting the sti pu l a t ion o f s e c ond ar y 
admi s s ib i l ity w i l l  o ften de t e rmine s tra t e g ie s  unique l y .
2 2  
Bu t t h e  
same c annot be s a i d o f vo t ing und er t he r e la t ive maj o r i t y pro c ed u r e . 
As we have s een , where there a r e  t h r e e  cand i d a t e s  i t  is p r i -
mar i l y  adm i s s ible f o r  anyone to vo t e f o r e i t he r  h i s  f i r s t or s e c o nd 
pre f erence. And , g iven t h i s  amount o f  l e eway in vo t i n g , i t  w i l l 
f o r  mo s t  po s s ibl e conf igurations o f  pre ference o rde r i ngs b e  s econ-
dar i l y  adm i s s ible f or a voter t o  vote f o r  e i t h e r  h i s  f i r s t o r  s econd 
cho i� e s . In other words , if we cons ider a l l  the ways in wh i c h
pe o p l e c ou ld vote cons i stently wi t h  t h e  r e q u i r emen t s  o f  p r imary 
admis s ib i l ity , it w i ll be h a r d  (though not impo s s i b l e ) t o  t h ink o f
pattern s  o f  pre f e r enc e among t h e  o th e r  vo t e r s  wh i c h  w i l l make t h e  
c r i t e r io n  o f  s e c ondary adm i s s ib i l i t y  a ny mo r e  r e s t r i c t iv e  than 
t h a t  of p r imary admis s i b i l i ty . All we have to f ind , for any g ive n 
pattern o f  pre f erences ,  is one set o f  a dm i s s i b l e v o t e s  on w h i c h  i t  
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wou l d  b e  b e s t  to vo te f o r  one ' s  mos t p re f e r re d c and id a t e , ano t he r 
on w h i c h  i t  wou ld  be b e s t to vo t e  f o r  o ne ' s  nex t -mo s t - p r e f e r r e d  
cand i d a t e , and s o  on down t o t he � - 1
t h  r a nk i n g  o u t  o f  � cand i -
d a t e s . (An examp l e  to t h e  c on t r a ry w i t h  t h r e e  cand i da t e s , who s e
pe c u l ia r i t i e s should sh ow why s u c h  c a s e s  a r e  r a r e , i s  as  f o l l ows . 
S u p p o s e t h a t  t h e r e  a r e t h re e b lo c s w i t h  p r e f e r e n c e o rd e r s .'.!. E_ £ •
£. � £• a n d  £ � E_. The n i t  i s  2 - inadm i s s ib l e  f o �  a n y  memb e r s  o f  t h e
f i r s t  b l o c  t o  vo t e  f o r  a n y  c a nd i d a t e  e x c e p t  .'.!_, unl e s s  the  f i r s c  
b l o c  i s  th e small e s t  and t h e  o t he r two b l o c s  a r e  o f  e q u a l  s i z e . )  
I t  i s , I t h ink , c l e a r  tha t Dumme t t ' s  i d e n t i f i c a t ion o f  a 
2- inadm i s s ib l e  vo t e  w i t h a was t e d  vo t e  i s  m i s g u i d e d  i f  i t  is r e a l l y  
s u p p o s e d  t o  b e  a n  a t t emp t to c a p t u r e  wha t t h o s e  who s a y  the  r e l a -
t iv e  maj o r i ty p r o c e d u r e  wa s t e s  vo t e s  n o r ma l l y  h a v e  in m i n d . 
Dumme t t  h im s e l f  s ays o f  t h e  k ind o f  examp l e I g av e a l i t t l e  e a r l ie r , 
whe r e  t h e  b v o t e r s  pu t � s e c ond a n d  t he £ vo t e r s  p u t  � s e cond  tha t 
" if we u s e  the no t ion  o f  a wa s t ed vo t e  a t  a l l , we mu s t  s a y  t h a t
those who voted  f o r  [�] was t ed t h e ir vo t e s , no t t ho s e  w h o  vo t ed 
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f o r  [£] " ( p . 2 1 5 ) . But his own pro po s ed c r i terion f a il s  t o
gene r a t e  t h i s  answer re l iably , as I have shown . 
I n  f ac t , the who l e  b u s i n e s s  o f  admis s ib i l i ty i s , I s u g g e s t ,  
a r e d  h e r r in g . S u p p o s e  t h a t  in my e a r l i e r  examp l e , pe rhap s b e c a u s e
t h e  t w o  c a n d i d a t e s  have t h e  s ame su rname , a l o t o f  the v o t e s  c a s t f o r
c r e a l l y  c a m e  f r om peop l e  �hose f i r s t  p re f e renc e wa s f o r  � and 
who s e  l a s t  p r e f e r enc e wa s fo r c .  I f  th e r e i s  an ar gume n t  f o r
s a y i ng t h a t  t ho s e who vo t e d  f o r  b wa s t ed t h e i r  v o t e s  b e c a u s e  they
wou l d  have done b e t t e r  t o  vo t e  f o r  £• i t  is  s u r e l y  
una f f e c t ed by t h e  re as o ns fo r £ ge t t i n g t he number o f
vo t e s  he d i d . The admi s s ib i l i t y  o f  o t her vo t e s  i s  no t ,  t he r e f o r e , 
a ne c e s s a r y  cond i t io n  f o r  t h e  c a s t i n g  o f  a wa s t ed v o t e . Bu t i t
c e r t a i n l y  i s  no t  a suf f i c ie n t  cond i t i o n  e i t h e r , a s  I ho p e I have
demons t r a t e d . Fo r it w i l l be common for a 2-adm i s s i b l e s tr a t e gy 
o th e r  
(o n e  a dm i s s i b l e  w h e n  a l lkvo t e s  h a v e  been  ca s t admi s s ib l y )  to  b e
wha t a bel i e v e r in was t ed vo t e s  wo uld ca l l  was t e d . 
Dumme t t  in the end adm i t s , when he s h i f t s  to d is c us s ing 
/O'i 
t h e  a l t e rn a t i v e  vo t e , t h a t  wha t ma t t e r s  is a c t u a l  vo t e s  and no t 
admis s ib l e  v o t e s . He s a y s  th a t ,  on h i s e a r l i e r  d e f i n i t ion , 
t h e r e  wo u l d  n e ve r  be a n y  was t e d  v o t e s  u n d e r  t h e  a l t e r n a t i v e  
vo t e p r o c ed u r e . Th i s  i s  b e c a u s e  each vo t e r  h a s  s o  m a n y
admi s s ib l e  s t r a t e � i e s t ha t a know l e d g e  o f  t he vo t e r s ' p r e f e r e n c e
s c a l e s , comb ined w i t h  t h e  p r e s ump t ion tha t t h e y  w i l l  a l l  v o t e
admi s s i b l y , w i l l  nev e r e v e n  res t r i c t  t h e  pos s ib l e  course  o f  
the  a s s e s smen t p ro c e s s : h e n c e  e v e r y  adm i s s i b l e  s t r a t e g y  l s
a l s o  2 -admis s ib le . Th i s  can hardly  b e  h e l d  t o  cap t u r e  wha t i s
mean t when ' wa s t ed vo t e s ' are d is cu s s e d : o u r  d e f in i t io n  wa s 
t o o  r e s t r ic t ive . (P . 2 2 9 . )
As I have already sugge s ted , t h e  s ame i s  v i r t u a l ly t rue e v e n
o f  t h e  r e l a t ive maj o r i t y  p rocedur e ,  s o  t h e  e a r l i e r  d e f i n i t io n  i s
i r r e levant  t he r e  too . Howeve r ,  Dumme t t ' s p r o p o s ed new d e f in i t io n 
wou l d , I think , wo r k  w e l l  e nough t o  ge t t h e  r i gh t answe r in the
r e l a t iv e  maj o r i ty case -- though no t i n  t h e  STV c a s e ! Dumme t t
now sugge s t s  t h a t  " i was t e s  h i s  vo t e i f  h e , t o g e t h e r w i t h c e r t a i n  
o t h e r  v o t e r s , c o u ld hav e o b t a ined a n  o u t c o m e  t h e y  a l l p r e f  e r r e d  b y
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vo t ing d i f f e re n t l y , th i s  t ime on t h e  a s sump t ion , no t m e re l y  tha t 
a l l  t h e  r e s t vo t e d  admi s s i b l y , b u t  t h a t  th e y vo t ed as in fac t t h e y
d i d . • • " ( p .  2 2 9 ) . Th i s wo u l d  o f  c o u r s e  imp ly tha t t h e r e  i s  a l o t 
o f  wa s t ed v o t i n g  und e r  the r e l a t iv e  ma j o r i t y p r o c e d u r e , whe r e h i s
e a r l i e r  d e f in i t ion wo u ld have p rod u c e d  t h e  a n s w e r  t h a t wa s t e d  vo t e s
s c a r c e l y e v e r  o c c u r . Thu s , s u p p o s e  f o r  e xamp l e tha t a h a s  a p l u r a l i t y 
and the suppo rters  o f  � r a n k  � s e cond , wh i l e t h e  s u p p o r t e r s  o f  £ r a n k
b s e c ond . On Dumme t t ' s  f i r s t  d e f in i t ion t he r e wo u l d  b e  no wa s t ed
vo t e s  h e r e ; on h i s  s econd de f i n i t io n  b o t h  t h o s e  who vo t e d  for b and 
tho s e  who vo ted for c have was t ed the i r  vo t e s , s in c e  e a c h  b loc  c o u l d
have done b e t t e r  by vo t ing d i f f e r e n t l y, g iv e n  t h e  a c t u a l  way i n  wh i c h
everyone e l s e  vo ted . 
D o e s  t h i s  rep resent accura t e l y  t h e  v iews o f  t h o s e  who
say tha t vo t e s  may be wa s t ed und e r  t h e  r e l a t iv e
maj o r i t y s y s t e m  wh e r e  t h e r e  a r e  t h r e e  o r  mo r e  cand i d a t e s  b u t  n o t 
whe re t h e r e  a r e  o n l y  two ? I have neve r , I mus t admi t ,  s e e n  i t
. ·/()fo 
a cknowle d ge d as an imp l i c a t io n  o f  the i r  v i ews tha t  in the h)·po-
t h e t ical s i tua t ion set  o u t  above the vo t e s  o f  t ho s e  w h o  s u p p o r t e d  
b o t h  l o s i ng c and i d a t e s w e r e  was t e d .  P e r h a p s  i t  s e ems too p a r a -
doxical to s a y  t h a t  two s e t s  o f  wa s ted vo t e s  c o u l d  t o g e t h e r h a v e  
e l ec t ed a cand i d a t e . Bu t I b e l ieve tha t  a c l e a r - h e a d e d  expone n t  
o f  t h i s v e r s i o n  o f  t h e  "wa s t e d  vo t e "  co nc e p t , i f  one ex i s t ed , woul d 
b e  b o u n d  to adm i t  t h a t  t h i s  is i n d e e d  t h e  im p l i c a t ion o f  h i s  i d e a s  
o n  t h e  sub j e c t . 
Duoune t t  po i n t s  ou t ,  qui t e  c o r r e c t l y , t h a t i f  we d e f i n e  a 
was t e d  v o t e  a c c o r d ing to t h i s  new p ro p o s a l , i t  � i l l  be ha r d t o  say
t h a t  the  a l ternat ive vo t e  ( o r , we may a d d , its  mu l t i p l e - s e a t c o u s i n  
STV )  i s  p i c ke d  out a s  an especia l �y  d e s i r ab l e  p r o c e d u r e  b y  the
cr i t e r io n  of avo id ing wa s t ing vo t e s . Dumme t t ' s  d e f i n i t i o n  s a y s , 
i n  e f f e c t , t h a t  t h e  memb e r s  o f  a bloc  wa s t e the i r  vo t e s  i f  they
cou ld h ave p rod u c ed a b e t t e r r e s u l t  ( j u d g e d  by the i r  own s y s t e m of
p r e f e r en c e s ) i f  they had vo ted d i f f e r e n t l y  f r om t h e  way i n  w h i c h
t h ey d i d . I th ink we s hou ld add a fur the r p o i n t  h e r e . The par-
t i c u l a r  c r i t ic i sm of the r e l a t i v e  ma j o r i t y  s y s t em i s  t h a t  vo t e s  a r e 
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was t e d  by s in c e r e  vo t i n g  ( i . e . vo t ing f o r o ne ' s mo s t  p r e f e r r e d  c an-
d id a t e ) . I f  t h e  c l a im we r e to b e  made tha t STV d o e s  no t was t e  v o t e s , 
t he pa r a l l e l c l a i m  wou l d b e  tha t a p er s on ' s  vo t e  i s  no t was t ed i f  
he l is t s  a l l  th e cand id a t e s  i n  the or d e r o f  h i s  t r u e  p r e f e r en c e s
o v e r t hem . 
As we s aw in s e c t ion  V I I , enthu s i a s t s  f o r  STV a r e  f o nd o f
making this  c l a im ,  o r  a t  any r a t e  o n e  t h a t  s o un d s l i ke i t  i f  one
does  no t p a y  enough a t t en t io n  to  t h e  weas e l l y  qual i f y ing  adve� b s . 
But we a l so s aw there tha t a l l  s u c h  claims a r e  f a l s e . G i ven the 
a c t u a l  vo t e s  of the o the rs , it c an ve ry e a s ily be the c a s e  tha t 
t h e  memb e r s  o f  a bloc might have imp r ove d the o u t come f rom t h e i r  
own po i n t  o f  v iew b y  d ep a r t ing from a s in c e r e  vo t e . 
As an a s i d e , I migh t add tha t i t  wou l d  no t help if a p a r t i s a n
o f  STV we r e t o  s a y t ha t , und e r  the r e l a t iv e  maj o r i t y  p ro c ed ur e , 
peo p l e may a t t emp t to vo te s t ra t e g i c ally b u t  s t il l  ( o n  this  c r i t e r ion
o f  was t ing a vo t e )  wa s t e  t h e i r  vo t e s . T h i s  i s  und e n i a b l y  t r u e  --
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f o r  examp l e  we m i gh t ima g i n e  t h a t  d u e  t o  l a c k o f  c o o r d i n a t i o n  t h e
s u p p o r t e r s  o f  £ vo t e f o r  .£. and t h e  supp o r t e r s o f  .£. v o t e f o r  £,  
t hu s  l eav ing th e  e l e c t io n  r e s u l t  e x a c t l y  wha t i t wou l d  h a v e  b e e n
w i t h  a rec e i v i n g  a p l u ra l i t y .  
b e f o r e , � B u t  ;ha t eve r c a n  b e  s a i d  o f  t h e  re l a t iv e ma j o r i t y  p r o c e d u r e
o n  t h i s  s c o r e  c a n  be sa i d  e q u a l l y  o f  STV. l f  t h e r e i s  o n e  o p t i ma l 
s t r a t egy f o r  a b l o c , g i v e n  t he a c t u a l  v o t e s  o f  a l l  o t h e r  e l ec t o r s , 
a n y  a t t em p t a t  s t ra t e g i c  vo t i ng o t he r t han o n e  c o n s i s t i n i;  o f  t h a t 
s t ra t e gy w i l l co ns t i t u t e a wa s t ed vo t e .  The 3 p r i u r i. odd !! a ga l n !i t
c a s t in g  a vo t e  t h a t  i s  no t wa s t e d  u nd e r  STV a r e  t hu s  q u i t e  sma l l , 
g iv e n  t h e  l a r g e  numb e r  o f  p e rmu t a t i o n s  o f , s a y , t e n  c a nd i d a t e s . 
L e t  us go b a c k  to t h e  mo r e  s e n s i b l e  c l ;1 l m  t ha t  a vo t e  l s  
w a s t ed i f  i t  i s  a s in c e r e  vo t e  and c o u l d  h av e b e e n  i mp r o v ed u p o n , 
g iv e n  how t h e  r e s t  o f  t he e l e c t o r a t e  vo t ed . W i t h  t h i s  und e r s t a nd i n g , 
Dwnne t t ' s f ina l l y  rev i s e d  d e f i n i t i o n  o f  wa s t ed vo t i n g i mp l i e s  t ha t
a vo t ing p ro c e d u r e  i s  l ia b l e  t o  w a s t e  v o t e s  u n l e s s  i t  o f f e r s  e v e r y 
v o t e r  a s t r a igh t f o rwa r d s t ra t e g y  -- t ha t  i s  to s a y  u n l e s s  i t  i s
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s t r a t e g y - p roo f . The n ,  s in c e  t h e r e  i s  no s u c h  pr o c ed u r �  i t  i s
t r iv ia l  t h a t  no me t ho d  o f  vo t ing avo i d s  t h e  p ro b l em o f  wa s t ing
vo t e s . 
I f  we say i t  is a q u e s t i o n  o f  the numb e r  o f  wa s t ed 
vo t e s , no c o mp a r i s o n  c a n  b e  mad e  in g e n e r a l  t e rms . Whe r e  t h e r e
a r e  o n l y  t w o  ca nd id a t e s  o r  w h e r e  t h e r e  a r e  mo r e  t han t w o  b u t  o ne
g e t s  a maj o r i t y ,  there are d e f in i t e l y  no wa s t ed v o t e s  und e r  the
r e l ;i t i v e  ma j o r i t y p r oce d u r e . E v e n  whe r e  t he w i nn i n g  c a nd ida t e  
o b t ;i i n s  l e s s  t h ;i n  a maj o r i t y , w e  c a nno t say  w i t h o u t  f u r t he r  i nf o r -
ma t io n  whe t h e r  o r  no t vo t e s  we r e  wa s t e d . A s  f a r  a s  S TV  i s c o n c e r n e d , 
t h e  r ema r k  
all  I c a n  o f f e r  i sl t h a t  i t  s e ems v e r y  ha rd t o  g e ne r a l i z e abou t t h e
t o  
co nd i t i o n s  u nd e r  wh i c h  s i n c e r e  vo t ing c o u l d  b e  b e t t e r e d  andigue s s 
a bo u t  t h e  f r e quency o f  t h e i r  a r i s ing . Bu t i t  c a n  a t any ra te  b e
sa id t ha t , i f  t h i s  i s  wha t t he r e l e van t c r i t e r ion o f  was t e d  vo t e s 
i s , i t d o e s  no t l e a d  n a t u r a l l y  a n d  d ir e c t l y  towa r d s  SlV . 
l s  i t  p l au s ib l e , howeve r ,  tha t t h o s e  who argue in favo r o f  STV
b y  s a y i n g  t h a t  " y o u r  vo t e  i s  n ev e r wa s t ed , "  mean by  this no mo r e  
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t han t ha t  STV is un iq u e l y s t ra t e g y - p r o o f 7  I d o no t t h i n k so ; 
I t  is  t r u e , I think , t ha t  the r e  is s o me c o nn e c t io n b e t w e e n  t h e
bogus c l a im s  a b o u t  t h e  s t ra t e gy- p ro o f n e s s  o f  STV and t h e  c l a im  
tha t i t  avo id s  wa s t e d v o t e s . Bu t t h e  r e l a t io n  i s no t o ne o f
i d e n t i t y , a s  I s ha l l  n e x t  t r y  t o  s l � w . 
II I 
IX 1'11E WASTED VOTE AS A MON ETARY M ETAPHOR 
Dumme t t  ends his d i s c us s io n  o f  t he " wa s t e d  v o t e "  i n  the c o n t e :<t
o f  t he a l t e rn a t ive vo t e  a s  f o l l o w : " I t  i s  e u t 1 r e l y  p o s s i b l e  t h a t
t h e  p ro p o s e d  d e f i n l t io n  o f  a wa s t ed v o t e  d o e s  no t a c c u r<l  w l t h  t h e 
i n t e n t i o n s  o f  t ho s e  who emp l o y  t he c on c e p t ; t h e r e  i s  no w;iy o f
e l imina t in g  t ha t  po s s i b i l i t y , s i nc e t h e y  n e v e r  t r o u b l e  t o  e x p l ;i i n  
wha t t h e y  d o  mean . The r ead e r  may l i k e  t o  s e e i f  he  c an d e v i s e  any  
mo r e  p l au s i b l e d e f l n l t ion"  ( p . 2 J O ) . L l u t e n d  to  t a ke u p  t h a t 
c h a l l e n g e  by l a y i n g  o u t  wha t l t a ke to be t he i d e a  o f  a n  e l e c t o r a l 
s y s t e m  w i t ho u t  wa s t ed v o t e s  t ha t  an ima t e s t h e  e n t hu s i a s t s f o r  STV . 
Beca u s e  the i d e a  canno t in f a c t  be mad e c o h e r e n t f o r  vo t l n g ,  I 
s ha l l  . have to g i v e  a me t a p ho r ic a l  a c c ou n t  o f  i t . 
Ima g i n e  then an a u c t io n  f o r  a c e r t a i n  numb e r o f  v a l ua b l e  
obj ec t s , say C i v e . T h e r e  a r e twe n t y- f i v e  b l d d c r n  e a c h  o f whom
i s  g iv e n  e.'lac t ly o n e  do l l a r 011  e n t e r i n g  t h e  au c t i o n  r o o m . On l y
t h i s  d o l l a r  c a n  be u s e d  i n  t h e  a u c t i o n , and 1 [  l t  1 �  l e [ t  o v e r 
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when a l l  f iv e  o b j e c t s  have b e e n  a u c t i o ne dAw i l l be c o u f i s c a t e d : 
mo u e y  n u L  used t o  p u r cha s e  ( o r  c o n t r i b u t e  to t h e  p u r c ha s e  o f )  a n  
o b j e c t i s  t he r e f o r e  was t e d . To ca s h  o u t  ( l i t e r a l l y ) t h e  s lo gan 
o f  " o n e  v o t e ,  one v a l u e "  i n  t h i s  c o n t ex t , l e t  u s  s u p po s e we a r e 
i n  Ca l i f o r n f a  and t he f iv e  o b j e c t s  a r e  ho t t u b s . The b idd e r s i n  
t he au c t ion c a n  f o r111 cons o r t i a t o  b id fo r t h e m .  A c o n s o r t ium t h a t  
b i d s  s u c c e s s f u l l y  f o r  a ho t t u b  own s  i t  c o l l e c t i v e l y . E a c h  p e r son 
wn11 t 11  as l n r g e  a s ha re in  one as po s s i b l e and d o e s n ' t  c a r e  w i t h  
whom i t  i s  s ha r e d . Und e r  t h e s e  cond i t ions , a n y  c o n s o r t i um t ha t 
h :i s  f o u r  o r  f e w e r  111emb e r s  w i l l  f a i l  to make a w i n n ing b id ; b u t 
no bo d y  w i l l  j o i n a conso r t ium t ha t  a l r eady has f iv e  membe r s  ( n o r
w i l l  s u c h  a c o n so r t ium l e t  an y bo d y  e l s e  i n ) . T he u p s ho t  w i l l
t h e r e f o r e  b e  t h :i t  e a c h  ho t t u b  w i l l  f in i s h  u p  i n  t he h :i n d s  o f  a 
c o n so r t ium o f  f i v e  p eo p l e . Eve r y one ' s  mon e y  w i l l  have g o n e  towa r d
t he p u r c ha s e  of  a ho t tub and e v e r y o n e  w i l l  have t he s am e  s ha r e 
i n  one . 
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Al t ho u g h  l h a v e  ne v e r s e e n  exac t l y  t h i s me t a pho r emp l oy e d , 
1 b e l i e v e  t h a t i t  w i ll s e e m  r i g h t  to a n y o n e  who has r e ad much o f
t h e  s t a nda r d p r o p a g a n d a  l i t e r a t u r e  i n  f a v o r  o f  STV . The mo n e t a r y
an.:i l ugue c a n  i nd e e d some t i mes b e  f o u nd t h o u gh w i t ho u t t h e  a u c t i o n
s t o r )o' . l h u s , ano t h e r a u t ho r  i n  Choo s i n g  a n  E l e c t o r a l  S v s t e m  w r i t e s
t h a t t h e " p h i l o so p hy" o f  a " f u l l y  p ro po r t i o n a l  s y s t e m" i s  t h a t
" e v e r y one ' s v o t e  shou l d  have t h e  s ame we i g h t i n  co n t r i b u t i n g  t o  t h e
2 3  e l e c t iu n  o f  a memb e r  o f  p a r l i amen t . " And a mome n t  l a t e r  t h i s 
p h y s i c :i l  me t a p ho r o f  "we i gh t "  i s c h a n g e d  to a mone t a r y  o n e  o f  " p r i c e "
w h e n  h e  s a y s :  "A f u l l y  p r o po r t iona l  s y s t e m  w o u l d  h a v e  ' c h a r ged ' 
2 4e v e r y  p a r t y  t h e  s ame ' p r i c e ' f o r  a s e a t . "  
Mo r eo v e r ,  t h e  i d e a  o f  the vo t e r s  f o r m i n g  c o n s o r t i a  t o  s h a r e  
l n  t h e  el e c t ion o f  a cand i da t e is o n e  conuuo n l y  f o u n d  i n  t he p ro - S TV  
l i t e r a t u r e , go i n g  a l l  t h e  way b a c k  t o  i t s inve n to r ,  Thomas H a r e , 
and i t s  mo a t  f amo u s  p r o p a g a nd i s t , J o h n  S t ua r t H i l l . As s um i n g , w r o t e
H i l l  i n  comme n d a t ion o f  H a r e ' s  p r o p o s a l  f o r  n a t io n -w i d e  STV , t h a t
t h e  numb e r  o f  v o t e r s  d i v i d e d  b y  t h e  numb e r o f  s e a t s  i s  t w o  tho u s a n d
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cThis is und e r the r e s t r ic t ive po s t- 1 832 f ra n c h i s e ) ,
why s h o u l d  no t any cand i d a t e  who can o b ta i n 2 000 s u f f ra g e s  i n
t h e  whole kingdom , b e  r e t u r ned t o  P a r l iame n t ?  . • . S i n c e  o n e
memb e r  can b e  given t o  eve ry 2000 , t he mo s t  j u s t  mo d e  o f  a r r a n g e -
men t a n d  d is t r ib u t io n mus t  e v i de n t ly b e , t o  g i v e  t h e  membe r t o  
2000 e l e c t o r s  w h o  have vo t ed f o r  h i m , r a t h e r  t ha n  t o  2 0 0 0  s o r.:e 
o f  whom have vo t e d  a ga i ns t h i m . • . No o n e  i s  r e p r e s e n t e d , o r  
r a t h e r m i s r e p r i- s e n t e d , b y  a memb e r  whom h e  h a s  v o t e d  .1 ga l 11 s t .  
Every  e l e c t o r  l. 1 1  the  k i ngdom i s  r e p r e s e n t e d b y  t he c a nd i da t e h e
mos t  p r e f e r s , i f  a s  many p e r s o n s  i n  t h e who l e  ex t e n t  o f  t h e  
c o u n t r y  a r e  f ound to a g r e e  w i th h i m ,  as c ome u p  t o  t h e  numb e r 
2 4 a  e n t i t led  co a r e p r e s e n t ? tive . 
Geo r ge Ha l l e t t  a t  o ne po i n t i n  t h e  a i :t i c l e  t h a t  I h a v e  q uo t e d 
f rom recognizes  t h e  o b i  e c t  i o n  · th a t  kno c k i n g o u t  c a n d i d a t e s  
s t a r t ing w i t h  t he o n e  who h a s  t he f ewe s t  
f i r s t  p r e f e r en c e  vo t e s  may e l im i 1 1 a t e
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someone who could hav e won if h e  had s t ay ed in l o ng e r . H i s
r e s p o n s e  is t ha t the s t and a r d  STV p roc ed u r e 
c o r r e s po nds to wha t the  vo t e r s  wo uld probably do if t he y we r e
a l l  t h e r e  in pe rson a n d  d ec id ing wha t to d o  n e x t  - - t h e  sma l l e s t
g r o u p  wou l d  g ive  u p  f i r s t and d i s p e r s e  to  o t h e r  c and i d a t e s  w i t h 
an a p pa r e n t l y b e t t e r  c ha nc e . In t heo r y , t h e  p r o c e d u r e  is a 
s u c c e s s ion  o f  ru n- o f f s , a l l in one  e l ec t io n . T h i s  o b j e c t io n i s
no t a c o ns t i t u t ion a l de f e c t , f o r  t h e  vo t e r s  who m i g h t , some o f  
t h em , b e  b e t t e r p l e a s ed to  have t h e  d e f ea t ed low m a n  a s t he i r 
r e p r es en t a t ive  ge t r e p re s e n t a t io n  by h e l p ing t o e l e c t o t he r 
�s 
c and id a t e s t ha t  t h e y  l ike . 
Th i s  is a b e au t i f u l l y n a i v e  s t a t emen t o f  t h e  und e r l y ing idea : 
und e r  STV the e l e c t o r s  "ge t r e p r e s e n t a t ion by he l p i n g to e l e c t
o t h e r  cand id a t e s  t h a t  t hey l i ke . "
/ f{g 
How d o e s  al l t h i s  conne c t  w i t h  t h e  no t io n  o f  t h e  wa s t e d vo t e ?  
The par t isans o f  S TV  o f ten sugge s t  t h a t  the con t ra s t t o  a was t e d
i s  an  " e f f e c t iv e "  vo te . And an e f f e c t iv e  vote i s  one t ha t  he l p s  
e l e c t  somebody . B u t  tha t s t il l , o f  c o u r s e , l eaves u s  w i t h  t he 
qu e s t ion : wha t exac t l y  d o e s  " h e l p ing to e l e c t somebod y "  me a n ?  
A s imp l e  a n d  natur a l  s t a r t ing po i n t  m i g h t be to s a y  t h.'.l t ,
wha t ever e l s e  i t  me ans , we should  be a b l e  to  s a y  t h a t  t ho s e  who 
vo t ed f o r  t he winning cand id a t e  in a r e l a t ive maj o r i t y e l ec t ion
he l p e d  to  e l e c t  h im .  Bu t t h e  par t i s ans of  STV w i l l no t even 
admi t t h i s . Thu s , Enid Lakeman , a no t h e r  ve t e ran campa i �ner  for 
i n  he r con t r ibu t io n  t o  Choo s in g  .'.I ll  E l e c t o r a l  Sv s t em 
STV , c l a ims.( t ha t  "an e l e c t ion mu s t  invo lve g i v i n g  t h e  e l ec t o r s  a 
c ho ic e  and caus ing t h a t  cho i c e  to h ave an e f f e c t  on wh i c h  p e r sons 
are e le c ted . 1 1
1'-
One might t h ink that  a l l  e l e c t o r a l  s y s t ems in 
u s e  in , say , wes t e rn Eu rope  and Nor t h  Ame r i c a  do t h i s . Bu t on
Lakerna n ' s  con c e p t ion of  " hav ing an e f f e c t "  t h i s  i s  far  f r-om t ru e : 
"As f o r  a f f ec t ing the  r e su l t , in l s r.'.le l abou t n in e t y - f i ve p e rcen t 
o f  t h o s e  who vo t e  e l ec t a mem b e r  o f  t h e  p a r t y  t h e y  vo t ed f o r ; 
//7 
in B r i t a i n  about  hal f t h e  vo t e s  e l e c t  nobody , and many o t h e r s
are c as e  f o r  cand ida t e s  w h o  wo u l d  h a v e  been e l e c ted w i t ho u t  
t h e i r  h e l p . "
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The c u r io u s  reason i ng imp l i c i t  in t h i s  i s  a l lowed t o  e f f l o r e s c e  
E l e c t o r a l  Sys t em ,  
in ano t h e r  con t r i b u t ion t o  Choo s ing an A whe r e  it is s a i d  tha t 
t h e  r e l a t ive maj o r i t y s y s tem 
-
f a i l s  to t a ke a c c ount  o f  t he vo t e r s ' p r e f e r e nc e s . Many vo t e r s 
da no t even have t h e i r  f i r s t  p re f e r e n c e  taken in t o  a c c o u n t . 
Those in con s t i tuenc i e s  whe re  t he i r  cand i d .'.l t e  w i n s , was t e  t h a t
f ra c t io n  o f  t he t o t a l  vo t e  fo r the  cand ida t e  ( and t hu s  t h e  S .'.lme 
f r ac t io n  of each e l e c t o r ' s  vo t e )  t h a t  is in exce s s  of the to t a l
needed to  w i n  the sea t .  Tho s e  i n  cons t i t u e nc i e s  wh e r e  the i r  
cand id a t e  l o s e s  wa s t e  a l l  o f  t h e i r  v o t e  - - i t  i s  i r r e l e v a n t  t o  
t he f ina l o u t come o f  t h e  e le c t ion ( in t e rm s  o f  t h e  a l l o c a t io n  o f  
sea t s ) . In any one cons t i t uency , t h e  numbe r  o f  e f f e c t iv e  vo t e s  
may be  r e l a t iv e l y  sma l l . ts 
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It is  p l a in that t h i s  c o n c e p t io n  of was t e d  v o t e s  has no t h i n g 
to do w i t h  t ho s e  pro p o s ed by Dunune t t .  Thus , 
consider  a n  e le c t i o n  in wl) i c h t h e r e a r e  o n l y  two c a nd i d a t e s . T h e
o n l y  a d m i s s ib l e  vo t e  i n  t� i s  c a s e  i s  a vo t e  f o r  o n e ' s mo r e  p r e -
f e r r e d  c a n d i d a t e . S inc e v o t i n g  
.
w i t h  t w o  c a n d i d a t e s  i s  " s t ra i gh t -
f o rwa r d "  - - e v e r y on e  has a u n i q u e  a d m i s s i b l e  s t r a t e g y  g i v e n  h i s
p r e f e r e n c e s  -- t he r e  c a n  n e v e r  b e  a n y  wa s t e d  v o t e s . B u t  on t h e  
v i ew we a r e  n o w  d i s cu s s i n g , t h e r e  a r e  wa s t e d  v o t e s  e v e n  i n a 
two - c an d i d a t e  e l e c t io n . S u p p o s e  o n e  c a n d i da t e ge t s  e i g h t y  p e r
c e n t  o f t h e  vo t e . The n  t he twe n t y  p e r  c e n t  o f  t h e  e l e c t o r s  who 
vo t e d  f o r  the d e f e a t e d  c a nd id a t e  was t e d  t h e i r  v o t e . B u t  s o , 
a p p a r en t l y, d id a lmo s t  t h r e e  q ua r t e r s  o f  t h o s e  who v o t ed f o r  t h e  
succe s s f u l  c a nd i d a t e . Thus in a l l  j u s t  u n d e r  e i gh t y  p e r  c e n t  o f
t h e  vo t e s  c a s t  w e r e  was t e d : t we n t y  p e r  c e n t  c a s t  f o r  t h e  d e f e a t e d  
c a n d i d a t e  and a l mo s t s i x t y o f  t h e  e i gh t y p e r  c e n t c a s t  f o r  the 
s u c c e s s f u l  o n e . 
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Wha t , the n , i� an " e f f e c t i ve " vo t e ?  The p a r t i s a n s  o f  STV 
a r e  so con f u s e d  or c a r e l e s s  t h a t i t  wo u l d  be e a s y  to go w r o n g  
he re . It  i s  t e mp t in g  t o  th ink t ha t they mus t h ave i n  m i n d  t h e  
i d e a  t h a t a n  e f f e c t iv e  vo t e i s  a d e c i s iv e  vo t e .
1q 
Th a t  i s  t o
s a y , a vo t e  i s  e f f e c t iv e  o n l y  if i t  a c t u a l l y  ma kes t h e  o u t come
of t he e l e c t ion d i f f e r e n t  f rom w h a t i t  wo u ld o t h erw i s e  h a v e  b e e n . 
In t h i s  s e n s e , howeve r ,  i t  can be s a i d  t ha t  in a lmo s t  e v e r y  
e l e c t i o n  all vo t e s  a r e  wa s t e d . A n d  a g a i n  i t  i s  impo s s i b l e  t o
d i s t i n g u i s h  STV f ro m  a r e l a t iv e maj or i ty p r o c e d u r e  o n  t h e  b a s i s
o f  s u c h  a c r i t e r ion . 
A p o s s i b l e , and admi t t e d ly a t t r ac t iv e , r e s p o n s e  a t  t h i s  
p o i n t  i s  to s a y  t ha t ,  j ud g i n g  f r om wha t t hey s a y , t h e  p a r t i s a n s
o f  STV mus t h a v e  some t h i ng l ike d e c i s iv e ne s s  in t h e  b a c k  o f  t h e i r
m i nd s , and t ha t  i f  t h i s  d o e s  no t d o  them any g o o d  t h e n  we s h o u l d  
j u s t  wr i t e t h e  who l e  l i ne o f  a r g ume n t  o f f . I t  was p r e c i s e l y  i n  
o r d e r  to f o r e s t a l l  s u c h  a r e s p o n s e  t h a t I w e n t t h r o u g h  t h e  a uc t i o n
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me t a p ho r a t t h e  b e g i n n i n g  o f t h i s  s e c t io n . Fo r on t h e  b a s i s  o f  
t h i s  we can , I t h i n k , s e e  a n  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  o f  t h e  no t i o n  o f  a n  
e f f e c t ive vo t e  t h a t  h a s some c on n e c t i o n  w i t h t h e p r e s ume d  o b j e c -
t ive o f  ma k i n g  a c a s e  f o r  t h e  v i r t u e s  o f STV . An e f f e c t iv e  u s e
o f  t h e  d o l l a r  in t h e  a u c t io n  was , we m i gh t s a y , t o  u s e  i t  a s
p a r t o f  a m i n i mum- s i z e d  s u c c e s s f u l b i d d i n g conso r t i um . Bv ana l o gy , 
we m i g h t  sugge s t t h a t a n  e f f e c t iv e  v o t e  i s  o n e t h a t f o rm s  p a r t  
o f a m i n imum- s i z e d s e t  o f  vo t e r s  t ha t  i s  j o i n t l y  s u c c e s s f u l  i n
e l e c t i n g  a c and ida t e . T o  p u t i t  mo r e  b r i e f l y ,  a n  e f f e c t i v e  vo t e  
i s  o n e  t h a t  f o rms pa r t  o f  a w i nn i n g  c a n d i d a t e ' s  q uo t a . 
Now i t  may be s a id t h a t  i t  i s  o d d  to u s e  s u c h a no t i o n to 
c r i t i c i z e  the r e l a t ive ma j o r i t y p r o c e d ur e , when the who l e id e a 
o f  a quo t a  is f o r e i gn t o  i t .  B u t  I s h o u l d  h e r e  r e p e a t  wha t I 
s a id in t h e  p re v ious s e c t i o n , t ha t  t h e t o l e r a b l y c ommon - s e n s i c a l 
c r i t e r io n  o f  a wa s t ed vo t e  on wh i c h  i t  m i g h t  b e  sa id t h a t some
v o t e s  are wa s t e d  some of the t i me i n  t h r e e -c o r n e r e d  f i g h t s  
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( o r  a f o r t io r i  w i t h  mo r e t han t h r e e  c an d i d a t e s ) i s  no t t h e  o ne 
t h a t  t he STV e n t h u s i a s t s  r e l y  on . On t h i s  c r i t e r i o n , as I have 
p o i n te d o u t , t h e r e  wo u l d  n e v e r  b e  any wa s t e d  vo t e s  in two -cand i d a t e  
r a c e s , y e t t h e  c a s e  f o r STV i s  no t in t e nd ed t o  co l l a p s e  i n  s y s t e ms 
w i t h o n l y two comp e t i n g p a r t i e s . I f  we s a y  t h a t  vo t e s  c a s t f o r
l o s e r s  a n d  " ex c e s s "  vo t e s  ca s t  f o r  w i n n e r s  a r e  was t e d , howeve r ,
we c a n  g e t  t h e  d e s i r ed r e s u l t . 
T h e  c u r ious qu e s t  io n  s t  i l l  r ema ins : i f  !!_ g e t s  8 0 1.  o f  t h e
vo t e  an d .!!_ g e t s  20�: ,  h o w  many vo t e s  a r e  wa s t e d ?  I s u g ge s t e d  t h e
a n s we r  807. , b u t  p e rhaps pa r t isans o f  S TV  wou l d  s a y  5 0 7.  - 1 . ( I  hav e 
no t s e e n  an exp l i c i t  s t a teme n t . )  The r a t io n a l e  f o r  t h i s  wo u l d  
e n t� i l  s t ip u l a t ing a q uo ta o f  507. + 1 a nd t a k i n g  a l l  vo t e s  i n
e x c e s s  o f  i t  ( a s  we l l  as vo t e s  c a s t  f o r t h e  l o s i n g  c an d ida t e s )  
a s  was t e d . T h i s  is o bv i ous l y  e n t i r e l y a r b i t r ar y , b u t  t h a t  s e em s
t o  me t h e  n a t u r e  o f  t h e  a r g ume n t . I n  e f f e c t  i t  s t a r t s  f r om t h e  
me chan i c s  o f  S TV  a n d  i n v e n t s  a d e f i n i t io n  o f  a was t ed v o t e  
/2 2. 
t o  f i t  i t  r a t he r  than s t a r t ing f rom any no t io n  o f  a wa s t ed v o t e
t h a t migh t na t u r a l l y  o c c u r  t o  some o n e  r e f l e c t i n g  on  the  o p e r a t ion
o f  the r e l a t ive maj o r i ty procedure . 
We now have a c r i t e r ion  o f  s o r: t s : a wa s t ed vo t e  is one
that does no t go towa r d s  f i l l ing  a c a nd i d a t e ' s  qu o t '1 . \.l i t h t h i s
c r i t e r io n  i n  hand w e  can exp l a in why , i f  you vo t e d  f o r  a c and i -
d a t e  who was i n  fac t e l ec t e d , you d i d  no t nec e s � a r i l y  he l p  e l e c t  
h i m .  F.o r  " h e l p i ng t o  e l e c t "  some b od y i s  t o  b e  con s t rued i n  t h e
l i gh t o f t h is c r i t e r ion ,  s o  " exc e s s "  vo t e s  don ' t  c o u n t  a s  he l p i n g
to e le c t the  c and ida t e  t he y  are  ca s t  f o r . 
Wha t can be s a id abou t t h i s  c r i t e r i o n  a s  a suppo r t  f o r  STV ? 
The f i rs t  p o i n t  to be made is t ha t STV d o e s  no t sa t i s f y i t .  I t 
w i l l  be r e c a l l e d  f rom s e c t io n  V I I  t h a t  t h e  quo t a  u nd e r  STV
( t he s o -c a l l ed "Droo p quo t a " )  is , r o u g h l y .!!./� + 1 ,  whe r e  k i s  t he 
n um b e r  o f  p l ac e s  t o  be f i l led  a nd .!!. the  numb e r  o f  b a l l o t s  c :i s t .
I t  w i l l  a l s o  be  r e ca l l e d  t h a t  t h i s me a n s  t h a t a g r o u p  o f  j us t
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und e r  t he s i z e  o f  a quo t a  w i l l  rou t inely  f a i l  to have i t s  vo t e s
c o unt ed towa r d s  the  e l e c t ion  o f  any winning  c and id a t e , b e c a u s e
i t s  vo t e s  have g o n e  to a cand ida t e  � h o  j us t  m i s s e d  be ing e l e c t e d . 
Th i s  co u ld be avo ided  i f  t he D roop quo t a  were re p l ac ed by t h e
o r i g inal  quo t '1  o f !:!/�. T h e  p r e f e rence f o r  the sma l l e r  quo t a
i l lus t r a t e s  the p o i n t  that t h e  p a r t i s ans  o f  STV abandon cons i s -
t e n c y  w i t h  t h e i r  own pr i nc i p l es when t hey c '1 n  s e c u r e  s o me t h i n g
t he y  r ea l l y want, name l y  the elect  ion of  m i no r i t y  p a r t i e s  and
cand i d a t e s  w i t h  only  l im i t e d  s u p p o r t . 
Suppo s e , howeve r , t ha t  the obj e c t ion th'1 t vo t e s  a r e wa s t ed
und e r  STV were me t by
� 
C quo t a  !!/�. Then we would s imp l y  s e e  even mo re  c l ea r l y the
bas ic obj e c t i o n , name ly  c h a t  it is  ha rd to s e e  why anyone who
und e r s t o o d  wha t wa s r ea l ly invo lved would  care whe t h e r  h i s  vo t e
( in t he r e l evant  sens e )  
wa s wastedJ_o r  no t .  A s  b e f o r e , it is  c l e a re s t  to b e g i n  w i t h  the
a l t e r na t ive vo t e . Wi t h  a quo t a  o f  !!.I� + 1 ,  up  to h a l f  t h e  v o t e s
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can fail  t o  b e  cas t for  the  success f u l  c and i d a t e and a r e  t he re f o r e
was t e d . Wi t h  a quo ta  o f  !!_/�, the  q uo t a i s  t h e  s ame a s  t h e  numb e r
o f  v o t e r s . T h i s  means tha t a l l  vo t e s  w i l l  e v e n t u a l l y  b e  t r a n s -
f e r r ed to the  wi nn i ng c a n d i d a t e . Eve r y o n e  " h e l p s  e l e c t "  t h e  w i n n i n g 
cand i d a t e  -- even those  who ra nk h i m l a s t out  o f  a l l  t h e  c :rn d i d a t e s . 
S ince  t h is w inning cand idate  will  inva r i a b l y  be the  same one a s  
would have  eme rged f rom a n  e l e c t ion w i t h a q uo t a o f .!!./� + l ,  i t
i s  hard t o  see  why t he vo t e r s  should a t tach  any s i gnif icance to 
an extra  s tage o f  t rans f e r s  w i t h  no conc e iva b l e c ons e quenc e s fo r 
the o u tcome . 
When there  i s  more than one place to be f i l led , a change in 
the  quo ta  may change the o u t come f r om a g i v en s e t  o f  b a l lo t s .  But
the  bas i c  po int  i s  s t i l l  the same . Suppo s e  t ha t , be c au s e  all  the  
o th e r  cand ida tes  have e i t h e r  b e e n  e l e c t e d  o r  e l im i na t ed , t h e r e  a r e
o n l y  t w o  le f t  in the  runn ing , t hen  t h e  vo t e s  o f  t h e  o n e  w i t h  t he 
f ewe r vo t e s  w i l l  b e  r e d i s t r i b u t e d . B u t s i n c e  the  o n l y  r e ma i n i n g  
c a n d i d a t e  i s  t h e  o t h e r  o n e , t h e i r vo t e s  w i l l  h a v e  t o  go t o  t h a t 
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cand idate  even i f  they l is t ed h im l a s t .  Thus , i t  i s  t r u e  tha t with  
a quo t a  o f  !!_/� ev e r yo ne ' s v o t e s  go towa r d s  a succ e s s f u l  can d id a t e , 
bu t they  avo id be ing was t ed only in a P i c kw i c k i a n  s e n s e . 
W i t h  a quo ta  o f  .!!_/� + 1 we g e t  t h e  a d d i t io n a l  p r ob l em tha t s o m e
vo tes  do  no t go towards a n y  s u c c e s s f u l  c a n d i d a t e ' s  q u o t a .  We d o  
e s c a p e  the problem o f  a v o t e g o i n g  to t he l e a s t - p r e f e r r e d  c a n d i -
d a t e . B u t  we d o  no t ge t v e r y  far . I t  i s  s t il l  p o s s ib l e  t ha t , 
because  o f  p r evious e l imina t io ns a n d  e l e c t i o n s , s o m e o n e ' s  vo te  w i l l
even t ually  f inish  up  b y  coun t ing toward s t h e  quo t a o f  a c and id a t e  
ranked next t o  t h e  bot tom o u t  o f  a l l  t h e  c a n d i d a t e s  i n  t h e  e l e c t i o n . 
Thus i f  we talk the language o f  "help ing to e l ec t , "  we c a n  say t h a t 
your vo t e  may e i ther f a i l  to help  elec t anyone , o r  i t  may h e l p  
elect  t he cand ida te  ranked next  to  las t . 
George Hall e t t , in h i s  p u f f  for  STV , says  t ha t " yo u can sa f e l y
ma rk mo r e  choices  t han a r e  b e ing e l e c t e d "  and o f f e r s  a s  an i l l us -
t r a t ion o f  t h i s  STV vo t i ng i n  t h e  N e w  Y o r k  b o r o u gh o f  Q u e e n s , 
whe r e  h e  say s :  " I o n c e  he l p e d  elec t a f i r s t c h o i c e '> 
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and the nex t t i me a t e n t h  c h o i c e  b e c ause s ev e ra l o f  my c ho i c e s
had b e e n  e l e c t e d b y  o t h e r s  b e f o r e  my f irs t c ho i c e  w a s  d e f e a t ed . " JO
I t h ink mo s t  p e o p l e  wou l d f in d t h e  n e w s  t h a t  t he i r  vo t e  h a d  gone
t o wa r d s  t h e  quo t a  o f  a t e n t h- cho i c e c a n d ida t e  r a t h e r  less  t h an
gr a t i f y in g . I n a s f a r  as they m i g h t  f e e l  an y s a t i s f a c t ion w i t h 
the  elec t ion r e s u l t i t  would be , I s ugge s t , on t h e  g r ou nd s t ha t
t h e v  w e r e  t i c k l ed b v  
s e ve r a l cand id a t e s  th e y l i k e d  had go t e l e c t ed
. 
r a t he r t h a r  b e c�u� 
t h e  e ve n t u a l  d e s t i n y  o f  t h e i r  own vo t e . 
This  b r ings o u t wh)'. the auc t io n  for  ho t tubs  i s  no t a good
a s s e s s ing 
b a s i s  for J.. e l e c to ra l s y s t em s . In t he au c t io n  it ma k e s  a d i f f e r -
ence whe t h e r  o r  no t y o u  we r e  a mo n g  t he s u c c e s s f u l  b i d d e r s  f o r  a 
ho t tub . I f  yo u we re Y'?.U ha v e  a sha r e  in i t , wh i c h  g iv es  y o u
c e r t a in r igh t s tha t you wou l d  no t o t h e rw i s e have . I f  y o u  f a i l e d 
t o  b elong to a conso r t i ulll tha t  mad e a s uc c e s s f u l b id you have 
no a c c e s s  t o  a ho t t ub . I f  y o u  b e l o n g e d to an ov e r s i z ed c o n s o r t i um 
you w i l l have t o  s h a r e  i t  w i t h a c r owd and i t s  va l u e  to y o u  w i l l
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be d im i n i s hed . The id eo logy o f  t h e  wa s t e d  v o t e , in t h e  form in
w h i c h  i t  i s  emp l o y e d  to g ive ba c k in g  t o  STV , t r ad e s o n  t h e  
imp l ic i t  a s sump t io n  tha t t he s ame id e as h a v e  r e l evan c e t o  vo t ing . 
Bu t t h e y  do no t . 
The r ea so n  i s  the f undame n t a l  o n e  tha t ma kes po l i t ic s  d i s -
t i nc t i ve : t ha t  i t  i s  c o ncer ned to  a l a r g e  d e gr e e  w i t h  p u b l i c  
goo d s . A p o l i cy -- s a y  a l aw o r  an e xe c u t iv e d e c i s i o n  in f o r e i g n
p o l i c y  - - a f f e c t s d i f f e ren t p eo p l e i n  d i f f e r e n t ways . Bu t i t
d o e s  no t a f f e c t  t hem d i f f e r e n t l y  d e p e nd in g o n  whe t h e r  o r  no t 
t h e y  vo t e d  f o r  i t , o r  whe ther or no t t h e y  vo t ed f o r  r e p r e s e n t a -
t ives who vo ted  f o r  t h e  l aw or s up po r t ed t h e  gove r nme n t  t h a t 
took the a c t ion . 
The same goes f o r  e l e c t ions . The e l e c t io n  r e s u l t is t he 
c o l l e c t ive  e f fe c t  o f  t h e  vo t e s  o f  a l l  those who vo t ed , f i l t e re d
t h ro ugh wha t e v e r  e l e c t i o n  p ro c ed u r e  is  in p l a c e . I t  i s t he s ame 
resu l t  for e v e r y b o d y , t ho u gh o f  c o u r s e  some w i l l  l i ke i t  mo r e  
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t ha n  o t h e r s . B u t  i t d oe s no t  a f f e c t  p eo p l e d i f f e r ent l y  de pe nd i n g 
on how t hey vo t e d  -- o r  whe t her  t h ey vo t e d  a t  a l l . He n c e  t he 
q u e s t io n  a b o u t  whe the r o r  no t y o u r  vo t e  he l p e d  e l e c t some o n e  i s  
qu i t e  i r re l evan t t o  any t h i n g  t h a t  ma t t e r s . For the r e  i s  no
advan tage that ac c r ue s t o  anyone f rom hav i ng he l p ed t o  e l e c t  a 
cand i d a t e , in the sense u s ed by t he p a r t i s a n s  o f  STV . ( I f  you 
he l p  r un some o n e ' s  c ampa ign you may ho p e f o r  p r e f e r:ne n t  if  he  i s
e l e c t e d , bu t t h e  qu e s t io n o f  p a t r o n a g e  i s  no t  c u r r en t l y  a t  i s s u e . )
This i s  no t to s a y , o f  c o u r s e , t h a t  t he r e  i s  no t h i n g to  b e
s a id a bo u t  t h e  p r o s  and c o n s  o f  e l e c t o r a l  s ys t ems . I sha l l say 
s o m e  t h i n g s  i n  th e rema inde r  of  t h i s  e s s a y . 
Bu t i t  d o e s  mean , I b e l i ev e , t ha t  t he 
c o n c e p t o f  t h e  was t e d  vo t e  ( and i t s  compan ion t h e  e f f e c t ive vo t e ) 
sho u l d  be la id to r e s t . I have g iv e n  i t  a lo nge r r u n  f o r  i t s  
money than Dumme t t  gave i t , b u t  i n  t h e  encl I conclude  t ha t i t  
h a s  no t h i n g t o  o f f e r .
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X FAIRNESS TO OUTCOMES VERSUS FAIRN E S S  TO VOTERS 
I n  t h i s  s ec t ion I sha l l  d iscuss  Dunnne t t ' s  c l a im t ha t  t h e  
r a t iona l e  o f  p rocedures  f o r  vo t ing fo r r e p r e s e n t a t iv e s i s  b a s i c a l l y  
d i f f e r en t  f rom the  r a t ional e o f  p r o c ed u r e s  f o r  v o t in g  o n  a n y  o t h e r 
qu e s t io n . Dumme t t  p ro po und s t h e  c on t r a s t b e tween the  c r i t e r ia f o r
e l ec t ing  r e p r e sen t a t ives  and cr i t e r i a  f o r  ma ki n g o t h e r  d e c i s io n s 
in a s l o gan wh i c h  t u r n s  o u t  to b e q u i t e  h a r d  to unpa c k .  Wha t h e  
says  i s  t ha t in  co n t ex t s o t h e r  t h a n  v o t i n g  f o r  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s
"our  c on c e r n  i s  no t to b e  f a i r  t o  the  vo t e r s , b u t  t o  t he o u t come s "
( p . 1 7 3 , i t a l i c s  i n  o r i g ina l ) . A " f a i r  p ro c edur e " is  "o n e  tha t
p r o d u c e s  t h e  f a i r e s t o u t come " ( p . 2 5 5 , i t a l i c s  i n o r i g ina l ) .  B u t
"when t h e y  a r e  e l e c t ing r e p r e s en t a t ive s , t h e  v o t e r s  m a y  r .:? a s o n a b l y  
d e ma n d  tha t t h e  p r o c e d u r e  b e  f air  t o  t h e m  -- t h e  vo t e r s , r a t he r 
than t h e  c and ida t e s "  ( p . 2 5 5 ) . Now a s  s l o gans go " f a i r n e s s  to
vo t e r s , n o t f a i r n e s s  to o u t c omes "  i s ,  t o  say  t h e  v e r y  l e a s t , o n  
t h e  o b s c u r e  s i d e . Howeve r ,  I t h in k  t h e r e  i s  so me t h i n g  i n  t h e
co n t r a s t , t h o u g h  no t in the  use Dumme t t  wan ts  to p u t  i t  t o . 
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As we s aw i n  s e c t ion IV of this e s s a y , Dunnne t t  has an e x t e rnal 
c r i t e r ion for t h e  a s s e s sment of vo t in g  p r oc edu r e s that are no t used 
to  e l e c t r e p resenta t ive s . I t  is no t ,  I s ho u ld add , a s  e x t e rna l a s
mo s t  e.'l: t e rnal  c r i t e r i a , be c ause i t  i s  d e f ined e n t i r e l y  i n  t e r.ns o f
p r e fe r en c e s .  Thu s , he h a s  n o  w a y  o f  t a lk i n g  ab o u t  t h e  me d io c r i t y  
o f  cand ida t e s  in t e r:ns o f  imag ina t io n , p r o f u nd i t y o f  though t , o r  
any o th e r  charac t e r is t i c  t ha t  any o r d i n a r y  p e r son wo u l d  a s s o c i a t e
w i t h  i t .  H e  h a s  to  con s t ru e  any c r i t e r ion , e v e n  o n e  l ike med i c c r i t y , 
as a s t a t emen t  abou t  p r e f e �enc e s  so a 3  to fi t i t  i n t o  h i s  way o f
th ink ing .  Neve r t he l e s s , h is s t and a r d  i s  ex terna l i n  t h a t  i t  d o e s  
no t s im p l y  define t he o u t c ome t h a t  s h o u l d  b e  c h o s e n  i n  t e rms o f
vo ting p a t terns o r  ( to a l low f o r  s t r a t egic vo ting) p a t t e r n s  o f  
o rdina l p r e ferenc e s ·. G ivel'l Dumme t t ' s  c r i ter ion , i t  m igh t b e  t h a t
w e  c o u l d  e s t ab l i s h  t h e  o u t come t h a t  s ho u l d  b e  c h o s e n  b y  i n f o rmed 
j ud gmen t or psychome t r i c  t e s t ini mo r e  e f f e c t ive l y than b y  us i n g
any s y s t e m  o f  vo t in g , a s  I po i n t ed o u t  ea r l i e r . 
I t  should be s a i d  th a t  Dunune t t  o c c a s io na l l y  spe aks as i f  t h e r e  
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exi s t s  some f u r t h e r  cr i t e rion f o r  cho o s in g an ou t come , and tha t 
max imiz in g  a g g r e ga t e  p r e f e rence-s a t i s f a c t io n  is j us t  a way o f  
ap p r o x ima t ing i t . Thus , he wr i t e s : " I f  w e  a re s imp l y  trying t o
es t ima t e  w h i c h  o u t come i s  probably  t h e  b e s t ,  there  i s  n o  r ea s o n
t o  g ive a s p e c i a l  we i g h t  to maj o r i t y  o p i n i o n : wha t ma t t e r s  is 
the p rev a l en t  o p i n ion , a s  j u d g e d  by g iv ing equa l we i g h t  t o  e a c h  
vo t e r ' s  p r e f e r en c e  be twe e n  two po s s ib l e  ou t c ome s " ( p . 2 5 6 ) . Th i s  
obvJ�usly  s ugge s t s  t ha t the re is in p r inc i p le a w a y  o f  t e l l i n g
w h i c h  ou tcome � is t h e  bes t , and t h a t  t h e r e  i s  s im p l y  a 
co r r e l a tion be twe en an o u t come ' s being " p r e v a l e n t "  ( L e .  maximiz i n g 
aggr ega t e  p refe rence- s a t isfac t ion) and i t s mee t in g  wha t ev e r  t h e  
r e a l  r e q u i reme n t  fo r being bes t i s .  Howeve r , D unnne t t  neve r vouch-
safe s any i nforma t io n  about wha t t his f u r the r e.'< t e r nal c r i t e r io n  
migh t be , a n d  i t  p l a y s  a b so l u t e ly n o  par t in h is d is c u s s ion o f  
a l t e rn a t iv e  vo ting scheme s . Fo r a l l  p ra c t ic a l  purpo s e s , the r e f o r e , 
we a r e  sa f e  in a t t r ib u t in g  to Dumme t t  t he v iew tha t t h e  c r i t e r io n
t o  b e u s e d  i n  a s s e s s ing outcome s is  the u t i l i ta r ian one  (res tric ted , 
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of course , so as t o  t a ke a c c o u n t o f  t h e  p r e f e r e nc e s  of o n l y  the  
vo t e r s )  and  t ha t prop o s ed vo t in g pr o c ed ur e s a r e  t o  b e  j ud g e d  
accord ing to the i r  tend ency to b r in g  a bo u t  the bes t o u tcome on 
th a t  c r i t e r ion . 
In the  end , howeve r ,  i t  does  no t in t he p r e s e n t  c o n t e x t make 
a lo t  of d i f f e r ence whe ther  we t re a t  maximum p r e f e renc e - s a t i s i ac t io n ,  
aggrega t ing p r e f e rences  accord ing t o  t h e i r  numb e r  mu l t i p l i e d b y  
the i r  i n tens i t y , a s  the c r it e r ion o f  t h e bes t o u t come o r  a s  a me r e  
symp tom . E i t h e r  way , the essen t ial  point  i s  t h a t  t h e r e  i s  an 
independent  s tand a r d  for a s s e s s ing o u t come s , and vo t ing p r o c ed ur e s 
a r e  to be j ud ged by t he i r  r e l a t ive e f f i c ie nc y  in a c h i e v i n g  i t .  Now 
it i s  t rue tha t Dumme t t  s p eaks of t h e  b e s t o u t come a l s o  a s  a " f a i r " 
one , b u t  t h e  concep t o f  f a i r n e s s  p lays no r o l e  in the  assessmen t .
The acco l a d e  o f  f a i rn e s s  i s  s imp l y  awa r d e d  t o  wh a t eve r ou t come i s 
" p r eval en t , " t h a t  :ls to say , wh ic heve r o u t c ome max:lm i z e s  a g g r e g a t e
p r e f e r en ce - s a t i s f ac t i on . I f  p reva l en c e  i s  t h e  c r i t e r ion  o f  the  
best  out come , then  the  f a i r e s t o u t come i s  t h e  o n e  that  i s  b e s t ;  
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i f  p r eva len c e is a surroga t e  for  wha t eve r a c t u a l l y  c o n s t i t u t e s  t h e  
b e s t o u t come , t h e n  t he f airest  o u t come i s  the  o n e  t ha t i s  p ro bab l y  
t he b e s t .  E i the r way , I th ink  that  we can now s e e t h a t , when 
Dumme t t  sa y s  t ha t  the  obj ec t ive is to  b e  " f a i r  t o  t h e  ou t c o me s "  
t h i s  i s  n o  mo r e  than a mis lead ing way o f  say ing t h a t  t h e  obj e c t iv e  
is  to ge t the  bes t o u t come . 
\./ha t ,  then , i f  t h i s  is i.;ha t be ing " f a i r  to the  ou t come s "
amoun t s  to , are  w e  t o  s a y  about  t h e  c o n t ra s t in g no t io n  o f  " be i n g 
f a i r  to the  v o t e r s ? "  Un f o r tunate ly ,  Dumme t t t  says a l mo s t  no t h in g 
abo u t  wha t in genera l t h i s  means : h is d i s c u s s ion o f  vo t i ng f o r 
r e p r e s e n ta t iv e s  a lmos t immed ia t e l y move s  to a d i s cu s s ion o f  
mechan i sms f o r  ensu r ing the e l e c t ion o f  cand idates  su p p o r t ed b y  a 
m ino r i ty o f  v o t e rs . Howeve r ,  we can g e t  a t  l eas t a c lue from h i s  
app l ica t io n  o f  t h e  co n t r a s t  t o  t h e  al t e rn a t iv e vo t e . I t  may b e  
no ted  tha t , o f f i c i a l l y ,  D umme t t  canno t t r e a t  t h e  a l t e r na t i v e  vo t e  
a s  a m e t hod  f o r  e l e c t i ng r e p r e s e n t a t iv e s  b e c a u s e  i t  p r o d u c e s  o n l y  
a s i n g l e  s u c c e s s f u l  c a n d i d a t e . Luc k i l y , howe ve r , he depar t s  f rom 
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c o n s i s t e ncy su f f i c ien t l y  long to give u s  a s t ar t .  
Thus , in h i s  ana l y s i s  o f  the a l t e r n a t ive vo t e  a s  a me t l w d  
o f  ma king d e c i s io n s  o the r t h a n  t h o s e  o n  r e p r e s e n t a t iv e s  ( c h a p t e r  9 )
h e  a r gu e s  c h a t  i t is an o b j e c t ion to the a l t e r n a t i v e  v o t e  t ha t , 
ina s f a r  as i t  takes ac co un t o f p re f e r en c e s  o t he r t h a n  f i r s t  c h o i c e s
i t  do e s so " i n a hapha z a • d  f a s h i o n " ( p . 1 7 ) ) . (T h i s , o f  c o u r s e , 
is by t he s t and a r d  o f  t h e  p re f e r e n c e  s c o r e  p r oc ed u r e , w h i c h  g iv e s
a l l  f i r s t  p r e f e r e n c e s the same va l ue , a l l  s e c o nd p r e f e r e n c e s  t h e
s ame v a l ue , a n d  so on . )  Thu s , he s a y s , some vo t e r s  ge t o n l y  t h e i r 
f i r s t c ho i c e  c o un t ed ,  o th e r s  the i r  s e co n d  or t h i r d  p r e f e r e n c e s , 
b u t  then " i t  a s s i gns e."ta c t ly t l1e  s ame we ight to t h o s e  s e cond o r
t h i rd cho i c e s  o f  wh i c h  i t  do e s  take ac coun t a s  t o  f i r s t  c ho ic e s " 
( p . 1 7 3 ) . He t he n · says tha � "advoc a tes  o f  t h e  a l t e rna t ive vo t e
p r o c e d u r e  a r e  d i s po s ed t o  connne n t  t h a t  t h i s  i s  o n l y  f a i r "  ( p . 1 7 3 ) : 
t h o s e  who s e  f i r s t p r e fe r e n c e s  a r e  t he o n l y o n e s  coun t e d  c a n  have 
no comp l a in t  b e c a u s e  they go t the i r  f i r s t  cho i c e  anyway ; and p r e -
s uma b l y ( t ho ugh Dunnne t t  d o e s  no t comp l e t e  t he a na l y s i s  i n  t h i s
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way )  t ho s e  who d id no t ge t t h e i r  f ir s t  c ho ic e  should no t be f ur t her
p e n a l ized by h av in g  t he value of  their lowe r p r e f e renc es r edu c e d .  
As we may b y  now p r e d ic t , h i s  r e p l y  i s  t h a t " t he argume n t  i s
qu i t e  f a l l a c io u s : o u r  c o n c e rn i s  no t t o  b e  f a i r  t o  t h e  vo t e r s  bu t 
to t he o u tcome s "  ( p . 1 7 3 )  .. And t h i s i s  g l o s s ed by sa y i n g  t ha t 
i t  ma y be t h a t  the  s econd o r  t h ird p r e f e r en c e s o f  t ho s e  who s e
f ir s t  c h o i c e  wa s ac tual l y  e l e c ted " s how some o t h e r  o u t come t o  h a v e
a b e t t e r  c l a im t o  have b e e n  s e l e c t e d "  ( p . 174) . 
Th i s  i s  no t much t o  go on , b u t  i t  g ive s  us a t  l e a s t a h i n t  
o f  wha t " f a i rn e s s  t o  t h e  vo te rs " a s  a ga ins t " f a i rn e s s  t o  t h e  o u t c ome s "
mi gh t b e  t aken t o  mean . An d  i n  h i s o p en in g  d i s c u s s i o n  o f  e l e c t i n g
r e p r e s e n t a t ives -- the brief  page and a ha l f  t h a t i s  a l l  we g e t 
b e f o r e  h e  p l unge s  in to de ta i l -- Dunune t t  r e p ea t s s ub s tan t i all y t h e
s a m e  po in t abo u t t he a l t erna t ive vo t e , s a y i n g  n o w  t ha t " t he no t io n  
o f  b e ing fa i r  t o t he vo t e r s  i s  a t  l e a s t i n  p l a c e  when r e p r e s e n t a-
t ives a r e  b e ing e l ec ted : there  may be g r o u p s  o f  vo t e r s  who a r e  
en t i t l ed to b e  r e p r e sen t e d , even t ho ugh t h e  cand ida t e  t h e y  s up p o r t  
13b 
d o e s  no t by o t he r c r i t e r ia m e r i t  e l ec t io n " ( p . 2 5 6 ) . The id e a  
h e r e  i s  a p p a r e n t l y  t h a t  w e  h av e  t o  make a d i s t inc t ion , whe r e p eo p l e 
a r e  t o  b e  ch o s e n  to f il l  a p o s i t i o n , b e t ween t h e a im o f " a p po i n t in g 
t h e  b e s t qua l i f ied to f i l l  c e r t a i n p o s i t i o n s " and " s e l e c t ing
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s "  ( p . 2 5 6 ) . The " p re va l en c e "  t e s t i s  the a p p r o p r i a t e  
o n e  f o r  t he f i r s t bu t no t f o r  t h e  s e c o nd . 
As I unde r s t and i t , Dwmue t t ' s  t ho u g h t  h e r e is t ha t a vo t e  may
b e  r e ga r d e d  i n  two a l t e r n a t iv e  ways . I n  o n e , i t i s  t o  be r e g a r d e d  
a s an i np u t  in t o  a p r oc e s s  who s e  r a t i o n a l e  i s  t h a t i t  � i l l  t end 
t o  p ro d u c e  t h e  best r e s u l t . In t h e  o th e r , i t  i s  an i np u t  i n t o  a 
p ro c e s s  t h a t  i s  supposed to g i ve e v e r y o n e  an e q u a l c han c e  o f  
g e t t in g  wha t h e  wan t s , o r  mo r e  p r e c i s e l y  a n  e q u a l c h a n c e  o f  con t ro l -
l in g  t h e  o u t come . Hence t h e  no t io n  t h a t  s ome one who s e  mo s t - p r e f e r r e d
c a n d i da t e  und e r  the a l t e rn a t ive s y s t em i s  e l e c t ed has no c au s e  f o r  
c o mp l a i n t  ( p . 1 7 3 )  and t ha t t h o s e  wh o s e  f i r s t - p r e f e r r ed cand ida t e 
i s  no t e l e c t e d  shou l d  have h i s  vo t e  car r ied o v e r w i t hou t d i m i nu t i o n
t o  h e l p  e l ec t a le ss - p r e f e r r ed c a n d id a t e .
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D umme t t  wr i t e s  tha t " t he u s e  o f  t h e  ma j o r ity pr e f e r ence cr i -
t e r io n  i n  p l a c e  o f  t h e  p r e f e r e n c e  s c o r e c r ite r io n  f o r  j ud g ing 
wh i ch o u t c ome s  is [ s i c ) th e  f a i r e s t is i n  its e l f a c on c e s s i o n  t o
the p r in c ip l e  of  b e ing f a i r  to t h e  vo t e r s "  ( p . 2 5 6 ) . Now a s  t h i s  
s t a nd s  i t  i s  fa l s e  inas f a r  a s  i t  s u g g e s t s  t h a t  t h e  maj o r i t y  p r in-
c i p l e canno t b e  re l a t ed to t h e  a im o f  p roduc ing t h e  b e s t  o u t c ome . 
As I a r g u e d  e a r l i e r  in s e c t ion IV , i f  o n e  t h i n k s  o f  vo t in g  i n 
co 111111 i t t e e s  and l e g i s la t u res as o f f e r i n g  an o p i n io n  a b o u t t h e  " r i g h t  
answer , " t h e r e  d o e s  no t seem to b e  a n y  goo d r e a s o n  f o r  g i v i n g ad d i -
t io n a l  we i g h t  t o  mo r e  i n tense p r e f e r e n c e s . One m i g h t  we l l  t h e r e f o r e  
c onc l ud e , w i t h  Cond o r c e t ,  t h a t the o u t come w i t h  ma j o r i t y s up p o r t 
h a s  t h e  b e s t  chance o f  ac tua l l y  b e i n g  t h e  " r i gh t  an swe r . " 
Neve r t h e l e s s , i t  i s  I t h in k c o r r e c t t h a t t h e  pr imary r ou t e to
t he maj o r i t y  p r i n c i p l e  i s  through the no t io n  of f a i rn e s s  t o  vo t e r s . 
F rom t h i s  p o i n t  o f  v i ew t h e  r a t iona l e  o f  t h e  maj o r i t y p r i nc i p l e  
i s  t ha t , i f  e v e r y o n e h a s  o n e  vo t e ,  mo r e  v o t e s  s ho u l d  b e a t  f ewer
vo t e s . A s  Ho bb e s p u t  it i n  exp la i n i n g  w h y  i n  an a s semb ly - t he 
co l l ec t ive d e c i s i o n  s h o u l d  c o r r e s po nd w i t h  the maj o r i t y  of vo t e s : 
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And i f  t h e  R e p r es e n t a t ive c o n s i s t  o f  many men , the ·voyce o f
t h e  gr ea t e r  numb e r , mus t b e  c o n s i d e r e d  a s  t h e  vo y c e  o f  t h e m  a l l . 
Fo r i f  t he l e s s e r  numb e r  p ro no u nce ( f o r  examp l e )  in t he A f f i r m-
a t iv e , and the g r e a t e r  in t h e  N e g a t i v e , t h e r e  w i l l  be N e ga t i v e s 
mo r e  than enough to d e s t ro y  t he A f f i r ma t i v e s : and t h e r e b y  t h e  
exc e s s e  o f  N e ga t i v e s , s t and i n g  u n co n t ra d i c t ed , a r e  t h e  o n e l �· 
v o y c e  t h e  Re p r e s e n t a t iv e  ha t h . 3 1
T h e  e x t e n s i o n  t o  t h e  a l t e r n a t iv e vo t e  a nd t h e  s i n g l e t ra n s f e r a b l e  
v o t e  comes v i a  an ex t e n s ion o f t h e  s a m e  ba s ic id e a . A s  en t hu s ia s t s  
f o r  STV s ome t ime s e.'C p r es 11 i t , " o n e  p e r s o n  o n e  vo t e "  i s  no t enough ; 
t h e  r i g h t  f o rm u l a  f o r  g i y i n g  e v e r y o n e  an e q u a l  s h a r e  in d e c i s i o n -
ma k i n g  i s  "o n e  p e r s o n , o µ e  v o t e , o n e  v a l u e . "  I hav e  d r awn a t t e n -
t io n  t o  t h e  p r o b l ems inhe r e n t in g i v i n g  o p e ra t io n a l  s i gn i f i c a n c e  
t o  t h i s  i d e a . B u t  I t h i n k  t h a t  i f  w e  t a ke i t  s e r io u s l y  we c a n  e x -
p l a in wha t u nd e r l i e s  c l a Jms a bo u t  t h e  f a i r n e s s  o r  u n f a i r n e s s  o f vo t i ng 
p r o c e d u r e s . 
The reade r w i l l  have o b s e r v e d  t ha t I am h l en t l f y i ng Dunune t t ' s
no t i o n  o f f a i r n e s s t o  vo t e r s  w i t h  wha t l c a l  l ed e a r l i e r  t h e
in t r i n s i c  f a i rn e s s  o f  a yo t i n g  p roc ed u r e . T h i s  i s  w h y  I s a id a t 
IJCj 
t h e  b e g i n n i n g  o f  t h i s  s e c t io n  t ha t  I t h i n k  t h e r e  i s  some th in g  i n  
D u nune t t ' s  d i s t i n c t i o n  be twe e n  f a i rn e s s t o  o u t comes and f a i rn e s s
t o  vo t e r s , bu t no t i n  t h e  u s e  he make s o f  i t . F o r  I s e e  no r e a s o n  
c a l l s  f a i r n e s s  to vo t e r s  
f o r  a c c e p t i n g  t h a t  Wha t h e /.. i s  exc l u s i v e l y  r e l e v an t t o  d e c i s i o n
p r o c e d u r e s f o r  t h e  e l e c t io n  o f  r e p r e s e n t a t ive s  and t h a t  wha t h e  ca l l s  
f a i rn e s s  t o  o u t comes i s  
A exc l u s ive l y  r e leva n t  t o  a l l  o t h e r  d e c i s i o n s . 
My own v i e w  i s  t h a t  t h e r e  a r e  t wo a l t e r n a t ive way s  o f  loo k i n g
a t  !!.!!!. p r o c e d u r e  f o r  t h e  mak i n g  o f  d e c i s i o n s , t a k e n  b y  a g r o u p  o f  
p eo p l e  c o l l e c t iv e l y , whe the r i t  b e  e l e c t i n g  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  o r  
any t h i ng e l s e . O n e  i s  c o n s e que n t ia l i s t , i n  t h e  b r o a d e s t  s en s e . 
Tha t i s  t o  say , any p r o c e d u r e  i s  u l t ima t e l y  to be j ud g e d  by i t s  
t e n d e n c y  t o  p rodu c e good c o n s e q u e n c e s , wh e r e , i t  s h o u l d  b e  emp ha -
s i z e d , t h e  r e l e v a n t  c o n s e q u e n c e s  a r e n o t  c o n f i n e d  to t ho s e  f l o w i n g
d i r e c t l y  f r o m  t h e  d ec i s io n s  t h e ms e l v e s  b u t  inc l u d e  any o t h e r  
c o n s e q u e n c e  o f  t he p r o c e d u r e  t h a t i s  o f  s ign i f i ca n c e  i n  e v a l u a t i n g
t h e  good n e s s  o f  s ome s t a t e o f  a f f a i r s . T he o t l 1 e r i s  n o n - c o n s e q u e n -
t i a l i s t  a n d  i s  d r iven by t h e  i d e a  t h a t I hav e t r i e d  t o  a d umb r a t e
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o f  f a i r n e s s  as e q u a l  s h a r e s  i n  t h e  d e c i s io n . Bo t h  o f  t he s e a l t e r -
n a t ive ways o f  loo king  a t  vo t ing  r e q u i r e  some s p e c i a l  t r e a t me n t  
o f  vo t ing f o r  r e p r e s e n t a t ives , s imp l y b e c a u s e  w e  have t h e n  a two-
s t age p r o c e d u r e  to  deal  w i t h .  B u t  b o t h  a r e  e q ua l l y c a p a b l e  o f  
d e a l ing w i t h  bo t h  s t a g e s  c o n s i s t e n t l y  i n  t he i r  own t e r ms . 
S u p p o s e  t h a t  we j u d ge p ro c e d u r e s  by t h e  s t anda rd o f  i n t r i n s i c 
f a i r ne s s . Then t h e  mo s t  s t ra i gh t f o r wa r d  ( o r  mo s t  na i v e )  a p p ro a c h  
i s  t o  d i s:1ggrega t e  t he p ro c e s s  a nd t r e a t  e a c h s t a g e  a s  an  i nd e p enden t 
q ue s t io n  abou t f a i r n e s s . T h u s , on t h i s  v i e w  we c a n  t a l k  a b o u t  t he 
f a i r n e s s  o f  p r o c ed u r e s  f o r  e l e c t i n g  r e p r e s e n t a t iv e s  b y  s i m p l y  
t r e a t i n g  t h e  e le c t io n  o f  a r e p r e s en t a t iv e  a s  a n  o u t come and s t i p u -
la t i n g  tha t ev eryone s h o u l d  hav e a n  e q u a l  c o n t r o l  ove r i t . We 
t h e n , as a s e p a r a t e  m a t t e r , a s s e s s  t h e  f a i rn e s s  o f  t h e  p r oc ed u r e s 
to be u s e d  by r e p r e s en t a t ives  t o  t a ke d e c i s i o n s , t r e a t i n g  t h e m  a s 
a commi t t e e  and in e f f e c t i g no r i n g  t he i r  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  f u n c t i o n . 
I n  o th e r  wo r d s  we a s k  "G iven t h a t  suc h - a nd - s u c h  l e g i s l a t o r s  
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s u p p o r� t h i s  and s u c h-and - s u c h  l e g i s l a t o r s  s u p po r t  t h a t , wha t 
wo u l d  t he f a i r  o u t come be? " Bu t t h e  f ac t  t ha t  t h e s e  l e g i s l a t o r s  
h a p p e n  t o  b e  r e p r e s e n t a t ives d o e s  no t e n t e r  i n t o  con s id er a t io n . 
I n  p r i n c i p l e  the s ame answe r wou ld be e q ua l l y  ap p l i c a b l e  to any  
vo t i n g  bod y of  the  s ame s i z e  s u c h  a s  a f a c u l t y  mee t in g . 
A mo r e  sop h i s t ica t e d  ve rs ion o f  t h e  in t r in s i c  f a i rn e s s  d o c t r i n e  - -
a nd one  t h a t  i s  seeming l y  t o o  sop h i s t i c a t e d  f o r  a l mo s t  a l l  o f  i t s  
s u p po r t e r s  - - wou ld in s i s t t ha t  i t  make s n o  s e n s e  t o  d is a g g r e g a t e  
t h e  two s t a g e s  o f  d e c i s io n-making i n  t h i s  way . W e  s hou l d  i n s t e a d  
f o c u s  o n  f a i rn e s s  t o  t h e  e l e c t o r a t e  a n d  t r e a t  e v e r y t h i n g  e l s e  a s  
i n s t rumen t a l . T h a t  i s  t o  s a y , w e  sho u l d  s t a r t f rom t h e  id e a  t h a t  
e a c h . vo t e r  shou ld have an e q u a l  s h a r e  i n  t he c o n t r o l  o f  t h e  
eve n t u a l  po l i cy o u t p u t s  o f  t he s y s t em , and we  s ho u l d  a s s e s s
t oge t h e r  f rom t h i s  po i n t  o f  v i ew bo t h  t h e  s y s t em o f  vo t i n g  f o r  
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  and t h e  me t hods by  wh i c h  t h e y  a c t co l l e c t iv e l y  
( e i th e r  in  a body o r  t hrough comm i t t e e s )  to p rod u c e  p o l i c y  o u t come s . 
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The analy t ic a l  d i f f i c u l t i e s  of ma k i n g  an y t h i n g  o u t  of t h i s  d e s i <l c r -
a t um a r e  f o rm idab l e , exp e c ia l l y  when we g i v e  <l u e  a t t e n t ion t o  t h e
add i t ion a l  ana l y t ical comp l ex i t ie s  ge ne r a t ed  b y  the r o l e p l a y e d 
by g o v e rnmen t s  bo t h  in t h e  p ro c e s s  o f  l e g i s l a t i o n  an<l i n  p ro du c i ng 
o u t comes i t se l f . I n  a p a r l i amen t a r y  s y s t em we ha ve t o  an a l y s e t h e
way i n  wh i c h  a gove r rune n t  ( w h i c h  i s  i t s e l f  a comp l e x  a p p ar a t u s  o f
d e c i s i o n-ma k ing ) d e p e nd s  o n  t he s u p po r t  o f  ( o r  a bse n c e  o f  o p p o s i t ion
f ro m )  a maj or i t y  of the e l e � t e <l  r e p r e s e n t a t iv e s . I n  a p r e s iden t i a l
s y s t em ( s u c h  a s  the U SA )  o r  a m i xed s y s t em ( s uc h  a s  F ranc e )  we have
to ana l y s e  t h e  i n t e rac t ion b e tween two i nd e p enden t l y - e l e c t e d  e n t i t i e s . 
to g iv e  
T h e  p rev ious s ec t io n  s h o u l d  h a v e  g iven a h i n t  a s  t o  h o w  h a r d  i t  i s  A 
o p e ra t ional s i gn i f i c ance  t o  t h e  no t ion o f  an e q u a l s h a r e  in c o n t r o l
o f  ou tcomes even f o r  t h e  f i r s t  s t age o f  e l e c t ing r e p r e s en t a t iv e s , 
consid e r ed in i so l a t io n  f rom a l l  t he r e s t  o f  t h e  s y s t e m . Bu t I 
t h i n k  t h a t  i t  is in fac t p o i n t l e s s  t o  t a l k  a b o u t t he f a i r n e s s  o (  
a s y s t e m  o f  e l e c t ing r e p r e s e n t a t iv e s  i n  any c on t ex t  e x c e p t t ha t  
o f  t h e s y s t e m  w i t h i n  wh i c h  i t  i s  a p a r t . 
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Suppose  now t ha t  we j u d ge p ro c ed u r e s by  the i r  co n s e que n c e s . 
Then we have no alte r native to treati n g . th e  who l e  pro c e s s  o f  
e l e c t o r s  c ho o s ing r e p re s e n t a t ive s and t h e s e  r e p r e s e ntat ive s taking 
d e c i s ions as a s i n g l e u n i t  o f  eva lu a t i on . No p a r t  c a n  b e  eva l u a t e d
independ e n t l y  b e c a u s e  w e  c a nno t s a y  wha t is  a g o o d  w a y  o f  e l e c t i n g  
r e p r e s e n t a t iv e s  unl e s s  w e  know wha t t h o s e  r e p re s e n t a t iv e s  a r e  to
d o  a nd how t he y  a r e  t o  o r g an i z e  t hems e l v e s  t o  t a ke d e c i s io n s . And 
conve r s e l y  we c a nno t say wha t they s h o u l d  do and how t he y s h o u ld 
o rgan i z e  the m s e l v e s  to t a k e  d ec i s ion s u nle s s  we know by wha t pro -
c e <l u r e  t hey a r e  e l ec t ed . I f  we l e ave a s i d e  o t her c o n s e q u e nc e s  o f
p r o c e d u r e s  and s im p l y  look a t  t he o u t come s -- t h e  s u b s t a n t i v e
d e c i s io ns t aken by t he r e p r e sen t a t iv e s  -- we w i l l  s t ar t  by a s k i n g
wha t good o u t come s wo u l d  be a n d  t h e n  a s k  wha t comb ina t io n s  o f
p ro c e d u r e s  amon g  l e g i s l a to r s  and p ro c ed u re s f o r  e l e c t i n g  them
have t he t e nd e ncy to  r e s u l t in  the re p r e s e n t a t iv e s t a k i n g  good
d e c i s ions . 
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We s ha l l , of cou r s e , no t t a ke it for gran t e d  t h a t  t h e  b e s t 
o u t c om e s  w i l l  tend t o a r i s e  f r om any k i nd o f  p r o c e s s  in "1h l c h
r e p r e s e n t a t ives a r e  e l e c t e d  and t a ke d e c i s i o n s . I t  i s  a p u r e l y  
c o n t i n ge n t  ma t t e r  whe t he r  o r  no t  t h i s  w i l l  be s o , o n e  d e p e n d i n �  
o n  our  view o f  wha t c o n s t i t u t e s  a good o u t come ;:ind o u r  e s t ima t e s
o f  t he b e h av i o r  t o  be a n t i c i pa ted f r om c i t i z e ns and l e g i s l a t ur e s
und e r  v a r i o u s  a l t e rn a t i v e  i n s t i t u t io n a l ar rangeme n t s . S u p p o s e  w e  
t a k e  t h e  v iew t ha t  s c h o o l  d e s eg r e ga t ion wo u l d  be  a g e n e r a l l y good
o u t come in t he U SA ,  for examp l e . Then we s h a l l  h a v e  t o ask wha t 
d e c i s i o n-making a r r angem e n t s  a r e  the  mo s t  l i k e l y  t o  ad vanc e t h i s  
e n d . Th i s  que s t ions f o rm s  t h e  f o c u s  o f  a r e c e n t  b o o k  by J e nn i f e r  
Hoc h s c h i l d , and he r answe r i s ,  r o u g h l y  sp e a k i ng , t ha t  t h e f u r t h e r  
a d ec i s io n-ma ke r  i s  f rom po pu l a r c on t r o l  t h e  mo r e  c ha nc e t h e r e  i s  
o f  t h e  o u t come b e i ng f av o r a b l e  t o  s c hoo l d e s e g r e g a t i o 1 1 . J ud g e s
a p p o in t ed f o r  l i f e a r e  b e t t e r  t ha n  j ud g e s w h o  h a ve t o  f a c e  
r e - e l e c t i o n , t h e  f e d e r a l b u r e a u c r a c y  i s  ( o r  h a s  un t i l r e c e n t l y 
llfS 
been) be t t e r  t han the Congr e s s , peop l e  a ppo i n t ed to r u n  sc ho o l 
d i s t r i c t s  a r e  be t t e r t h a n  p eo p l e  e le c t ed t o  run t h em , and " c i t i e s  
whe r e  s c ho o l  p o l i cy-ma k i n g  i s  s u b j e c t to  p o p u l a r  c o n t r o l  [ e . g .  
t h e  s c ho o l  budge t is p a r t o f  t he mun i c i p a l  bud ge t ]  s how l e s s 
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c hange than c i t i e s  w i t h  re l a t ive i n s u l a t e d  po l i cy-ma k i n g  p r o c e s s e s . 
As Hoc h sc h i l d  says in comme n t ing  on t he s e f i n d i n g s , t h e y
s h o u l d  n o t  b e  su r p r i s i ng . I n  f ac t ,  t h e y  s ho u l d  r e a s s u r e  t ho s e  
wlw va l u e p u r e  p roc ed u ra l demo c r a c y  o v e r  pa r t i c u l a r  o u t comes . 
Rou gh l y s p e a k in g ,  p op u l a r con t ro l  wo r k s ; e l e c t e d  exe c u t i v e s  and 
l e g i s l a to r s do less to f ac i l i t a t e  and mo r e  to imp e d e  d e s e g r e -
ga t ion s u c c e s s  than do none l e c t ed j udge s  a n d  b u r e a u c r a t s . The 
c a t c h , o f  c o u r s e , is t ha t  success  for  p o p u l ar con t r o l  means  
l i t t l e ch ange in rac i a l  iso l a t i o n  and r a c i a l  i nj us t i c e . B l a c ks 
know t h i s  -- why e l s e  have t hey r e l ied  on t he co u r t s ( and , a t  
t i me s , OCR [ t he O f f i c e  f o r  C iv i l  R i gh t s i n  t h e  D e p a r tmen t o f  
l lea l t h ,  Ed uc a t ion and We l f a r e ] i n  t h e i r d r iv e  t o  d e s e g r e g a t e
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s c h o o l s ?  J u d g e s  and b u r e a u c r a t s  may b e  t h e  l e a s t d e s i r a b l e  X I  THE CONCEPT O F  REPRES ENTAT ION 
a g e n t s  f o r  a f f e c t i ng d e s e g r e g a t ion s u c c e s s , e x c e p t f o r  l e g i s - Dumme t t  r e co g n i z e s  t ha t " t h e  cho ice  o f  a n  e lec t o ra l s y s t e m
la to rs ,  mayo r s , p r e s i d e n t s , a n d  t h e g e n e r a l  c i t i z e n r y �! i nvo l v e s  many comp lex p r o b lems " ( p . 2 9 3 )  bu t t h a t d o e s  no t p r e v e n t
The " new Ame r ic a n  d i l emma " i d e n t i f ie d b y l loc h s c h i l d  i s , t he n , h i m  f r om p u t t i n g  fo rwar d  a p ar t i c u l a r  p r oced u re a s the be s t " g ive n 
t ha t  in a s o c i e t y  whe r e  r a c i a l i s m  i s  d ee p l y  emlw d d t!d  and p o p u l a r a n  e le c t o r a l s y s t em w i t h  mu l t i -memb e r  cons t i tuenc i e s ' '  ( p .  29 3 ) . 
a mo n g  a ma j o r i t y  o f  t he c i t iz e n s , t h e r e  i s  a f l a t  c o n t rad i c t i o n S i n c e  he a l s o  ma i n t a i n s ( a s  I men t ione d  in s e c t i o n  V I ) t ha t "wha t 
be twe e n p o pu l a r  con t ro l  and t he d i sman t l ing o f  t h e  i ns t i t u t i o n s p r i nc i p a l l y  d i s t i n g u i s he s  e l e c t o r a l  p ro c e d u r e s  f rom o t h e r u s e s  o f  
t ha t  p e r p e t u a t e  r a c ia l i nequfl l i t y a n d  s e p a r a t i o n . vo t i n g  p r o c e d u r e s , f r om a t h e o r e t i c a l  s t and po in t , is t h e  n e e d  t o
A t  t h e  mo s t  ba s i c  l e v e l ,  p o p u l a r  c o n t r o l  me a ns j u s t  that  -- t he e n s u r e  r e p re s e n t a t io n  f o r  mino r i t i e s "  ( p .  2 5 6 )  and a l s o  s ay s t h a t 
p r e f e r e nc e s  o f  a maj o r i t y o f  c i t izens a r e  t r an s f o rmed , mu t a t i s t h i s  c a n  be d o ne o n l y  in mu l t i-memb e r c o n s t i t u e nc ie s , i t  s e em s
mu t a nd i s , i n t o  go v e r nme n t  p o l ic y . Mo s t  Ame r i c a n s  a r e  wh i t e ; mo s t t h a t  h e  mu s t  i n  f a c t  ma i n t a i n  t h a t h i s p ro p o s e d  p r o c ed u r e i s  t h e
w h i t e s r e s i s t  l a r g e - s c a l e  o r  manda t o r y  s c ho o l d e s e g r e g a t i o n . b est one f o r  e l e c t i n g  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s . Thus , al thou gh he p a y s
I t  i s  a b a c khand e d  c omp l imen t  t o  t h e  v i a b i l i t y  o f  maj o r i t a r ian l i p - s e rv i c e  t o  t h e  t r u t h  t h a t a vo t in g  s c heme i s  e mb e d d e d  i n  a 
d em o c ra c y t h a t  sc hoo l d e s e g r e ga t ion se l dom o c c u r s  t h r ou gh c hanne l s l a r g e r  s y s t e m , h e  d o e s  no t wh e n  i t  comes down t o  i t  ac ce p t  wha t 
o f  p o p u l a r  c on t r o l  and s e ldom t a ke s  t h e  f o r m  o f  l a r ge , s y s t em- I wou l d  t h i n k  t o  b e  t he c o r r e c t c o n c l u s i o n , name l y  t h a t i t  ma k e s  
34 
s h a k i n g  change s .  n o  s e n s e  t o  a b s t ra c t t he d is cu s s ion o f  s chemes f o r  vo t i ng i n
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cons t i tuenc i e s  f rom w i d e r  ques t ions a bo u t  t h e  p r o p e r t i e s t o be 
l o o ke d  f o r  i n  an e n t i r e  po l i t i c a l  s y s t e m .  
I n  t h i s  s e c t ion a n d  t h e  n e x t  I sha l l  c o n t e n t  my s el f w i t h  m;:i k i n g
two n e ga t ive p o in t s . T h e  f ir s t  i s  t ha t  t he r e i s  n o t h i n g  in t h e
no t ion o f  r e p r e s e1!1 t a t ion i t s e l f  t h a t  d emands t h e  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  o f  
mino r i t ie s . The second i s  tha t t h e  s c heme p ro po s ed b y Du rmne t t - -
a so r t  o f  mixture  b e tween STV and the p re f e r enc e s c o r e  s y s t e m 
wou l d  be unl i k e l y  to h a v e  t h e  po l i t i c a l  e f f e c t �  if it w e r e  i n t r o -
duc ed in Br i t a in, t ha t Dunune t t  ho p e s f o r , a nd m i gh t  we l l  a c t u a l l y 
b e  c o un t e r p rod uc t ive . 
Dumme t t  wr i t e s  o f  advo c a t e s  o f  p r opo r t i o na l r ep r es en t a t i o n 
t h a t " hav ing gouged the p robab le  e f f e c t  o f  e a ch r iva l s y s t em on the  
s t ru c t u r e  o f  p o l i t ical p a r t ies  and t h e  compos i t ion of  P a r l iamen t , 
they  a rgue in favour o f  t h a t  s y s t em mo s t  l ike l y ,  in t h e ir j u d gemen t ,
t o  produce  t h e  e f f e c t s  whi c h  are  mo s t  to  t h e i r  own t a s t e" ( p . 1 0 ) . 
No do ub t t he y d o ,  b u t  t h e same can be s a i d  w i t h  e q u a l t r u t h o f
D ulllllle t t . T h i s , howeve r ,  i s  no t i n t e n d e d a s  a c r i t i c i s m  b e c a u s e  I 
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d o  no t think t h e r e  i s  any o t her a p p r o a c h  th a t i s  s e ns i b l e . My 
only  c r i t ic ism of D umme t t in t h i s  ma t t e r  is  t ha t , l ike s o  many
e l e c t o ral r e f o rme r s , he plays down the way in which h i s  p r o po s ed 
r e f o rm  i s  d r iven b y  a concern f o r  o u t co me s . L ik e  them h e  p r e t e nd s  
tha t h e  can provide reasons f o r  ac c e p t in g h i s  p e t  p ro p o s a l t h a t
should  move peo p l e who a r e  ind i f f e r e n t  o r  h o s t i l e  t o  t h e  o u t come s 
t h a t  he f avo r s . Bu t , a s I sh a l l try to show , no t h i n g  us e f u l  f o r
h i s  purpo s e s  c a n  b e  ga ined f rom an a p p e a l  to t h e  c on c ep t o f  r e p r e-
s en t a t ion .  
I t  sho u l d  b e  said  t h a t , immed i a t e ly f o l l ow ing  t h e q u o t a t io n 
I gave above , D ulllDe t t  s t r ike s a no t e  t h a t  h a s  po t en t ia l l y  
qu i t e  f a r - reaching imp l i c a t ions , and i t  i s  u n f o r t u n a t e  t h a t  h e  
nowhe r e  f o l lows u p  t he d i scuss ion l a t e r . He says , ag a ins t t h e  
"advo c a t e s  o f  p ropo r t iona l repres e n t a t io n "  j us t  r e f e r r ed t o , t h a t 
t h e  p rob lem is no t 
to d e c i d e  in advance wha t t y p e  o f  re s u l t  is d e s i r ab l e , a n d
then to  impo s e a s y s t em t h a t  w i l l  ma ke s u c h  a r e s u l t p ro b ab l e : 
i t  is to d e v i s e a s y s t em t h a t w i l l , a s  n e a r l y  a s  p o s s ib l e , g iv e  
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t h e  e l e c t o r a t e  wha t i t  wan t s ,  wha t e v e r  t ha t may b e . To fo i s t 
o n  p eo p le an e l e c t o r a l s y s tem t h a t w i l l  make i t  d i f f i c u l t to
e le c t  a p a r l i ament in wh i c h o n e  p a r t y  h a s  a m a j o r i t y , ev e n  w h e n  
t h e  bulk o f  t h e  e l e c t o r a t e  wo u l d  p r e f e r any maj o r i t y  to  none , 
i s  no t '  f a i r e r  o r  mo r e d em(l c r a t ic t h an t o c ompe l t h e m  to u s e  a 
s y s t em t h a t make s i t  very  hard to achieve a coa l i t ion gove rnme n t , 
even t h o u g h  t h a t  m i g h t  be wha t mo s t  e l e c t o r s  wan t e d . O f  co u r s e , 
t h e  p h r a s e  ' wha t t h e  e le c t o r a t e  want s '  d o e s  no t a lway s h ave a 
c l e a r  a p p l ic a t io n : we a r e  b a c k  w i t h  t h e  p r o b l e m  wha t c o n s t i t u t e s  
a fair d e c is io n , g iv e n  vo t e rs ' p r e f e r e n c e s . (P . 10 . )
I t  i s  p l a i n  t ha t  " vo t e r s ' p � e f e r e n c e s "  h e r e  canno t b e  i d en t i f i e d
w i t h  t h e i r  p r e f er e nc e s  f o r  c a n d ida t e s  o r  p o l i t ic a l p a r t i e s  in an
e l e c t io n . We mu s t · conce ive t h e m  a s  p r e f e r e n c e s  for muc h  mo r e  
b roadly-conce ived ou t come s . Fo r wha t Dumme t t  i s  h e r e  c o n t em-
p l a t i ng i s  that some o n e  m i gh t s u p po r t  a c ha n g e  in t he e l ec t o ra l 
sy s t em t o  o n e  und e r  w h i c h  t h e  p a r t y  h e  mo s t  p r e f e r s ge t s  f ewer , 
o r  no ,  s e a t s  i f  t h i s  a l t e r na t ive s y s t em i s a me a n s t o  ma k i n g i t
mo r e  l i ke l y  t h a t  some p a r t y  g e t s  a ma j o r i t y . 
l!il 
A good e..�amp l e o f  t h is is p ro v id ed by c o n t empo r a ry F r anc e . 
The p a r l iamen t a r y  e l e c t ions in 1 9 8 6  we r e  h e ld und er a s y s t em o f  
l i s t  PR . The o b j e c t  o f  i n t roduc in g t h i s  s y s t e m ,  wh i c h  w a s  vo t ed 
in b y the Soc i a l i s t  maj o r i ty ,  w a s  t o  m i n im i z e S o c ia l i s t  l o s s e s  and 
s in g l e 
p r eve n t a nyi p a r t y  o f  t h e  r i gh t f r om o b t a in i ng a p a r l i amen t a r y
maj o r i t y . The ho p e was tha t  t h i s  wo u l d  l e ave t h e  S o c i a l i s t P r e s i -
d en t , Hi t t e r and , w i t h  t h e  max iwum amo u n t  o f  room f o r  mane uve r . 
Bu t � r e c i s e l y b e cause o f  t h is p ro p e r ty o f  ma k i n g  i t h a r d  f o r  any
p a r t y  t o  g a i n  a maj o r i ty , the s y s tem i s  unpo p u l a r w i t h  the e l e c -
t o ra t e . "Al l p o l l s  s how t h a t a maj o r i t y  o f  Fr enc hme n wan t to go 
back t o  the o l d maj o r i t a r ian s y s t em , which they a s s o c i a t e  w i t h
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s t r o n g , cohe r e n t  and s t ab l e  gov e rnmen t . "  Thus , we may s ay tha t 
in France t h e  s y s t em o f  s ing l e - me mb e r  c ons t i t ue nc i e s w i t h  two
rounds o f  b a l lo t ing i s  b e t t e r  at s a t i s f y ing the ·�o t e r s ' p r e f e r -
e n c e s "  t h a n  t h e  s y s t em o f  mu l t i -memb e r c o n s t i t u e n c i e s  t h a t  i s , 
ac c o r d i ng to Dumme t t ,  ind i s p ensab l e t o  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n . 
I t  shou l d , f u r t he r , b e  bo r ne in m i nd tha t  mos t o f  t h e  c i t i z e n s  
in  a co u n t ry may qu i t e r e a s o n a b l y  i n s o m e  c i r cums t a n c e s  p r e f  e r  a 
po l i t i e a l  s y s t em t h a t  ha s no e l e c t o r a l  compo n e n t  a t  a l l  - -
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whe ther " r e p r es e n ta t iv e "  in Dunw1e t t ' s  e xc e s s ive l y n a r r ow s e n s e  
o r  a n y  o t he r . Thus , i t  may b e  t h a t , i n so me s oc i e t y t h a t i s  
s h a r p ly d iv i ded into  communa l g rou p s a l o n g  r a c i a l , r e l i g i ou s , o r  
t r i b a l  l in e s , exp e r i enc e s u g ge s t s  t ha t  t h e  who l e  p ro c e s s  o f
e l ec t o ra l c ompe t i t ion s i mp l y  exac e r b a t e s  c o n f l i c t s , a n d  t h a t  a 
non - e l ec t ed gov e r nmen t s e n s i t iv e  t o  t h e  n e ed to c o n c i l ia t �  t he 
d i f f e r e n t  g r ou p s  is b e t t e r . 'lfTh i s b r o a d  s e n s e  o f  "wha t t h e  ele c -
t o r a t e  wa n t s " i s no t , ob v i ou s l y , id e n t i c a l  w i t h  my c l a i1:1 t h a t we
s ho u l d  wo r k  back f ro m  d e s i rab l e  o u t c o m e s  to p r o c ed u r e s . Bu t bo t h 
o f  t hem have in common t he f e a t u r e  t h a t we c a nno t e xpe c t t o ge t 
any t h i ng muc h  o u t  o f  t ry ing to d e r iv e  any in s t i t u t io na l imp l i -
c a t i o n s  f r om t h e  no t i o n  o f  f a i r vo t in g  p r o c ed u re ,  c o n s id e r ed in 
then , 
t h e  ab s t r a c t . S u p p o s e,kh a t  "wh a t t h e  e l e c t o r a t e wan t s " - - o r wha t i s
r e g a r d e d  a s  h av in g a t end e ncy t o  good ou t c ome s -- i s  a s y s t em 
t h a t  u s ua l ly p r odu c e s maj o r i t y pa r t y  gove r nmen t s . D o e s  t h i s 
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r e a l l y  e n t a i l  a cho i c e  b e tween an e l e c t o r a l  s ys t em �i th t hi s 
p r o pe r t y  and one tha t is r e p r e s e n t a t iv e ?  I t  d o e s  no t s eem t o
m e  t h a t  t he r e i s  a n y  l e g i t ima t e b a s i s  f o r  re s t r i c t i ng t h e  c o n c e p t 
o f  r e p r e s e n t a t ivene s s  i n t h i s  way . The r e l a t iv e  maj o r i t y  s y s t em ,
wh i c h  i s  ge ne r a l l y r e c koned t h e  be s t  c a n d i d a t e  f o r  ens u r i ng 
maj o r i t y p a r t y gov e r nmen t s , is a sys t em t ha t  p r o d u c e s  r ep r e s en -
t a t i v e s . I t  i s  o f  cou r s e  poss i b l e t o  d e f i n e  t h e  no t ion o f  a 
r e p r e s e n t a t ive so as t o  exc l u d e  t h i s s y s tem b u t  in my v i ew d o i n g
s o  i s  s imp l y  an exe r c i s e  in t end e n t io u s ne s s . 
The b a s i s  o f  t h e  re l a t iv e maj o r i ty s y s t e m -- o r  any  o t he r 
t h a t ha s s ingl e-membe r  cons t i t uenc i e s  -- is t ha t  the  pe r s on 
e l e c t ed re p r e s en t s t he d is t r i c t -- he i s  t he S e na t o r  f o r  Id aho 
or the MP f o r Dar l ingto n .  The no t io n t h a t the r e p r e s e n t a t iv e
re p r e s e n t s  a d i s t r i c t  g o e s  r i gh t b a c k  t o  t h e  d im o r i g i ns o f  the  
En g l i s h  p a r l iamen t ( and c omparab l e  bod ies  i n  o t h e r  c o u n t r ie s ) 
in t h e  t h i r t e e n t h  a n d  f o u r t e en t h c e n t u r i e s . The p a r l iame n t s  i n  
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t h a t p e r iod me t for  a f ew weeks a year  and t rad ed r e d r e s s  o f
g r ievan c e s  f o r  ac qu i e s cence i n  the t axa t io n  as ked f o r  b y  the  king . 3 6
The knigh t s  a n d  b ur ges s e � r e p r es en t ed coun ties  a n d  b o r o u gh . Ov e r
t ime the c r i t e r ion f o r  b � ing a r e p r e s en ta t iv e  o [  a county  o r  a 
bo r ou gh changed , w i t h  t h e  in t rod uc t io n  o f  e l e c t io n s  and t hen chan ge s
in t he f ranc h i s e , b u t  t h e  b a s i c  id e a r ema i ne d  t h r o u g ho u t  t ha t  t h e  
MP r e p r e s e n t ed the c on s t � tuency , no t just  tho s e w i t h a vo t e  a n d
a fo r t io r i no t j u s t  thos • who had v o t ed f o r  h im . Exc e p t  whe r e  z e a l
f o r  e l e c to ral  r e f o rm  d r iv e s o u t  couunon s e n s e , e v e r y o n e  na t u r a l l y
t h inks o f  r e p r e s en t a t io n  i n  th i s way : a c oun t ry is r e p r e s e n t e d  b y
i t s  amb a s s ad o r , w h o  i s  t h e  mo u t h p i e c e o f  t h e  gov e r nmen t  and no t 
the o p p o s i t io n ; a lo c a l  chap t e r  o f  a na t iona l o rgan i z a t ion o r  a 
b r an c h  o f  a na t io nal tra4e union s ends i t s  r e p re s en t a t i1.C t o a 
na t i o n a l  de c i s io n-mak ing body , and s o  o n . 
Tho s e  who d i s l ike t�e s y s t em o f  s i n g l e-memb e r  c o n s t i t u e n c i e s
are  s o  carried away by the i r  o wn  id e a s  tha t t h e y  cus toma r i l y p u t
t h e  wo i:d " r e p r e s en t a t iv e ' � in  s c a i: e-quo t e s  whe n  i t i s  u s e d  f o r  t h e
r e l a t io n  b e tween an MP o r  C o n g r e s sman and h i !> c o n s t i t ue n t s . Thus , 
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Ha l l e t t  wr i t e s that "mil l ions o f vo t e r s  a c ro s s  t h e  country [t he 
USA] a r e r e g u l a r l y  l e f t  w i t h  ' r e s p r e s e n ta t ives ' whom they v o t e d
aga ins t b e c a u s e  they w e r e  o u tvo t e d  i n the d i s t r ic t  whe r e  t h e y
r e s i d e d . Though t h e y  a r e  a l l  s o r t s  o f  people , t h e y  f o r m  t o g e t h e r  
a maj o r c La s s  o f  unr e p r e s e n t ed c i t i zens j us t  as s u r e l y  a s  i f  t h e y  
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ha d  b e e n  deni ed ' f r ee  exerc i s e  o f  t he f ranch i s e ' . " But  t h i s  
s imp l y  p r e s uppo ses f i r s t  t h a t  " r e p r e s e n t a t io n" i s  a r e l a t io n
b e tween a n  i nd iv idua l v o t e r  and a n  e l e c t ed c and ida t e and s econd
tha t it i s  the r e l a t ion of  hav i n g  v o t ed f o r  t h a t  cand ida t e . Bo t h  
a s s ump t ions  a r e  h ighly q ue s t ionab l e . 
Whe r e  an ind ividual  has a p e rsonal  r e p r e s en t a t iv e , we can 
s a y  t h a t  tha t per son i s  r epre s en t ed : f o r  examp l e , I may appo i n t  
an agent w i t h pow e r  t o nego t i a t e  o n  m y  b e ha l f  a n d  ma k e  b inding 
agreeme n t s . B u t  where what is  to  b e  r e p r e s en t ed is  a group
( s ay a c l ub , in  my examp l e o f  s ending a r e p r e s en t a t iv e  t o  the  
na t ion al  o rgan i z a t ion ' s me e t in g )  it  s e ems t o  me that  it  i s
l o g i c a l l y  inappro p r i a t e  to  t a l k  abo u t  ind iv id ua l memb ers  b e ing
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represe n t ed excep t �n t he t r iv ia l  s e n s e  t h a t  t h e  c l u b  i s  r e p re-
s e n t ed and they a re members  o f  the  c l u b . We c a n  a s k whe t he r
t h e  club i s  wel l  o r  i l l  r e p r e s e n t ed : whe t he r  i t s  i n t e r es t s , o r
the  p re pond e r an t v i ews o f  i t s  membe r s , a r e  b e ing f o r c e f u l ly and 
e f f e c t ively  advanced a t  t he na t iona l me e t in g . And we c an a s k
w h a t  me thod o f  choos ing a r e p r e s en t a t ive  (whe t h e r  by  e l e c t ion  o r  
no t ,  a n d  i f  b y  elec t ion ac cord ing t o  wha t  vo t i ng  p ro c e d u r e )  i s  mos t  
l ikely t o  produce good r e p r es en t a t i on . Bu t we c anno t s ens i b lJ a s k
which  c lub memb e r s  are  represen t ed by  whoever  ge t s  sent . Th ey 
a r e  a l l  r ep r es ent ed inas f  ar as t h e  c lub i s  r e p r e s en t ed and t h a t
i s  a l l  t ha t the re i s  to be  sa id on t h a t  s c o r e . 
In Choos ing an Elec toral  Svs t em a We s t  Ge rman po l i t i c a l  
s c i e n t is t ,  D i e t e r · Nohlen , ma k e s  a g o o d  s tar t a t  ana lys ing conce p t s  
o f  pa r l iamen t a ry represen t a t ion b y  sugges t i ng t h a t  t h e r e a r e  two 
and o nly two fundame n t a l  no t ions . One i s  t h e  p r inc i p l e o f  p r o -
po r t i o na l r e p r e se n t a t ion . A s  N o h l e n  co r rec t l y o b s e r v e s  t h e
o pe ra t iv e  ideal  h e r e  a n t e d a t e s  t h e  p r a c t i c e  ( b y  o v e r a c en t u r y  i n
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f a c t ) , go ing b a c k  to "Mirabeau ' s  conc e p t ion  o f  r e p r e s en t a t ion  a s  
3i 
a 1 mi r ro r o f  t h e  n a t ion . " ' 
f� a,,.. o.�� ;_ 17 � '1  
The f amou s  phrasejreads as f o l lows : 
....... 
"Les e'ta t s  sont  pour  la na t io n c e q u ' e s t  une car t e  r�du i t e  p o u r 
son e t endue  p h y s ique ; s o i t  en p ar t ie , so i t  en g r a n d , la co p i e 
do i t  t ouj o u r s  avo ir  les memes p r o po r t ions que I ' o r i g ina l . " 
gq 
Nohlen s t a t e s  the  p r inc i p l e  o f  p ro po r t iona l r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  a s
f o l l ows : " P R  s y s t ems in t end t o  r e f l ec t , as  exac t l y a s  p o s s ib l e , 
tqe  soc i a l  f o r c e s  and p o l i t ic a l  g r ou ps in the po p u l a t ion . T h e
s h a r e  o f  vo t e s and o f  s ea t s f o r  t h e  p a r t ie s  should c o r r e s pond
a p p rox ima t e l y  t o each o th e r . Th i s  is t h e  b a s i c  f unc t io n  of the
p r i nc i p l e o f  PR and the c r i ter ion o f  e f f ec t ivene s s of a p ro po r t ional
fO 
s y s t em . "  
The al t e rna t iv e i s  ca l l ed by No h l e n  t h e  "maj o r i t y / p l u r a l i t y "
f o rmu la . Und e r  t h i s  " the gaining o f  a s e a t  in P a r l iame n t  d e p e n d s  
o n  a cand i d a t e  o r  party  winning t h e  r eq u i red maj o r i t y o r  p lura l i t y 
o f  vo t e s . The e l ec t io n  l a w  read s a s  f o l lows : The c a n d i d a t e  o r  
p a r t y  who w i n s  a maj o r i t y  o r  p l ur a l i t y  o f  t h e  vo t e s  c a s t i n  a 
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g i ven t e r r i t o r y s h a l l be e l e c t e d � ' '  So f a r  so g o o d . N o h l e n  s e e ms 
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t o  me , however ,  to s l i p  a t  t h e  s t age  w h e r e  h e  d i s c u s s e s  t h e  
r a t ional e o f  t h e  fo rmu l a . " U nd e r  maj o r i t y / p l u r a l i t y  s y s t ems , " 
h e  s a y s , " t he go a l  i s  t o  a t t a i n  a p a r l i ame n t a r y maj o r i t y f o r
u
o n e  p a r ty o r  f o r  a par t y  a l l i a n c e , "  
Th i s  may , indeed , be a co ns equ e n t ia l i s t j u s t i f i c :i t i o n  o f
s u c h  a sys t em ,  b u t  i t  i s  no mo r e  than a t end e n c y a n d  i s  t oo 
loo s e l y  r e l a t ed l:o i t  to f o rm a r :i t i ona le  c o r r e s po n d i n g  t o  t h a t
o f  t he "mi r r o r  o f  t h e  na t; i on . "  W e  m i gh t j u s t  a s  w e l l s a y  t h a t
t h e  goa l  o f  a P R  sys tem i s  t o  ma i n t a i n  a s e t - u p  in  w h i c h  a numb e r
o f  p ar t i e s a r e  p re s e rved in b e i n g  a n d  no p a r t y  ge t s  a maj o r i t y . 
Indeed , in t h e  f i r s t  two de ca d e s o f  t h e  c e n t u ry when mo s t  P R  
sys t ems w e r e  c r e a t ed in w es t ern Eu r o p e , t h e  d r iv i ng f o r c e  w a s  t h e  
f e a r  o n  the p a r t  o f  t h e  eeel iAiR8 "bourgeo i s " p a r t i e s  o f  b e in g
w i p e d  o u t  b y  t h e  newer ma s s  p a r t i e s  who s e  f o [" t U1\e s wer'!
o r  expe c t ed to · r i � e w i th manhood suf f r a ge .
4 3
r i s ing i n  t h e  wake o f · s l! f f ra g e  e x t ens ions A ( Th e an a l o gue w i t h 
t h e  mo t i ves o f  the F r e n c h  S o c i a l i s t s  i n  r e i n t ro d u c i n g  PR t o  s t em 
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d e c l ine and f ra gmen t  t h e  o ppos i t io n  i s  a p i q u a n t  o·ne . )
Wh a t , then , i s  t h e  r a t i o na l e o f  t h e  p l u ra l i t y /maj o r i t y  
s y s t em ?  S imp l y  t h e  one I have a l r e ad y  imp l ied . W e  s t a r t  w i t h
t h e  no t ion o f a t e r r i to ry r e p r e s e n t ed b y a s i n g l e p e r s o n  and
-we say t h a t  t h e  cand i d a t e  who should  b e c h o s e n  is t h e  one t h a t
be s t  r e p r e s en t s  i t .  Th i s  p e r s o n  i s  t o  re p r e s en t  e v e r y o n e : 
tho s e  who :i r e t oo young t o  vo t e , t ho s e  who a r e  no t c i t i z e n s , 
and t h o s e  who a re e l i g ib l e t o  vo t e b u t  choo s e  no t t o . ( D i s t r i c t s , 
i t  should be no t ed , a r e  based on p o p u l a t i o n  and no t numb e r s  on t h e  
e l e c to r a l  rol l s . )  G iven t h a t  o n e  p e r s o n  i s  t o  b e  chosen  in an 
e l e c t ion , the  que s t io n  i s  then  who s ho u l d  b e  e l e c ted . And t h e r e  
a r e , i t  wo u l d  ap p ear , t w o  o b v i o u s  c o n t e nd e r s : f i r s t  t ha t  t h e
cand i d a t e  w i th the  mo s t  v o t e s  should  w in ,  and s econd t h a t  t he 
c and i d a t e  w i t h  a maj o r i t y  o f  vo t e s  s ho u l d  w i n . Whe r e  there  a r e  
maj o r i ty 
mo r e  than two cand i d a t es,  gua r a n t e e i n g  a � e n t a i l s e i t h e r  e l imi-
na t io n  and t r a n s f e r i n  a s i n g l e e l e c t io n  o r  ho l d i n g  a run-o f f  
e l e c t io n  b e tw e e n  the  two l e a d i nr, c a n d i d a t e s i f  none o b t a i n s  a 
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maj o r i ty on the f i r s t b a l l o t . T h e  d o u b l e b a l lo t s y s t e m  w i t h  l e s s 
s t r in g e n t  r u l e s  f o r  e l irnina t io n  o f  c and i d a t e s may b e s e e 1 1  a s  a 
hyb r i d : on t h e  f i r s t ba l l o t a c and i d a t e  r e q u i r e s  a n a b s o l u t e  
maj o r i ty t o  wi n and o n  t h e  s e cond b a l lo t o n l y  a r e l a t i v e  ma j o r i t v .  
We sho ul d no t e  th a t  t h e  s e c o n d  o f  No l l len ' s  s y s t em i c  c o n c e p t s  
o f  r e p r e s e n t a t io n i s  i n comp l e t e i n  t h a t  i t  a d d r e s s e s  o n l y  t h e
q u e s t io n o f c hoos i ng a r e p r e s en t a t iv e f o r  a c on s t i t ue nc y . B u t  i t  
i s  s i l e n t  o n  t h e  q u e s t i o n  o f  d e t e rm i n i n g t h e  c o m po s i t i o n  o f  c o n s t i -
tuenc i e s . The re a r e  t h r e e  po s s i b l e a n swe r s  t o  t h i s q ues t i o n . 
The f i r s t  answer , wh i c h  is t h e  one  t ha t  i s  mo s t  c o m f o r t ab l e  f o r  
t h e  t h e o r y , i s  t ha t  wha t should  b e r e p r e s e n t e d a r e  " na t u r a l "  
cons t i tuenc ies . Each c lub s end s  i t s  r e p r e s e n t a t iv e  to t h e  n a t io n a l  
mee t ing ;  e a c h  s h i r e  o r  bo rough sends  i t s  two MP s  t o  pa r l i ame n t .  
Wh e r e  s i z e s  o f  " na t u ra l " cons t i t u e n c i e s  a r e  v e r y  u n e q ua l ,  the
l a rge r ones  may ge t add i t io na l repr e s e n t a t i v e s. 
Th i s  c o n c e p t io n  s urv i v e d i n  B r i t a i n t h r o u g h  t wo r e f o rm s o f  t he 
lb ! 
f r a nc h i s e an d  s t i l l  s u rv iv e s v e s t i g ia l l y in t h e i ns t r uc t i o n . 
to t h e  Bounda ry Commi s s io n e r s  t o  t r y  t o  a v o id c r o s s i n g  ma j o r 
loc a l  gove r nmen t bounda r i e s  i n  c r e a t i n g p a r l iame n t a r y  c o n s t i t u e n c i e s . 
T h e  s e c o nd i d e a  i s  a na t u ra l d eve l o pmen t o f  t h e f i r s t . A f t e r  
g i v i n g  l a r g e r  " n a t u r a l "  c o n s t i t u e n c i e s  mo r e  r e p r e s e n t a t iv e s  ( t h e 
1 86 7  r e f o rm gave bo r o u g h s  f r om one  t o  t h r e e se a t s ) , t he n e x t  s t e p  i s  
s u bd iv id i ng t he m ( s ing le -membe r  c on s t i t u e n c i e s  b e came t he n o r m
i n  B r i t a i n i n  1 88 5 )  a nd t h i s  n a t u r a l l y  s u g ge s t s  a c r i t e r i o n  o f
a p p rox ima t e l y e q u a l  c o n s t i t u e nc i e s .  B u t  he r e t he p a t h  d iv i d e s . One 
d i r ec t i o n ,  f o l l o wed b y  B r i t a i n a nd , o n  t he who l e ,  t he Co mmo nwe a l t h , 
a t t em p t s  t o  t r e a t  t he q ue s t i o n o f  b o u n d a r y- d r a w i n g  a s  a t ec hn ic a l o n e .
Fo rma l c r i t e r ia ,  s u c h  a s  compac t n e s s , g o o d  i n t e r na l  c ommun i c a t io n s , 
a nd r e s p e c t  f o r  l o c a l  g o v e r nm e n t  b o u n da r i e s , a r e  g iv e n  t o  a n  
" im p a r t i a l "  Bound a r y Connn i s s i o n  a nd i t s  r e c onnne n d a t ions a r e  no rma l l y  
e na c t e d . Th i s h a s  i n  c o mmon w i t h  t h e  f i r s t  a p p r oa c h  t he f e a t u r e  t h a t  
t he r e  i s  n o  o v e ra r c h i ng s y s t em i c  c r i t e r i o n  f o r  d r aw i n g  c o n s t i t u e nc y 
bound a r i e s .  The a t t i t u d e  i s  " l e t t he c h i p s  f a l l  w h e r e  t h e y  m a y . "
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Each cons t i t uency is rep r e s e n t e d  a c co rd i n g  t o  t h e  c r i t e r i a  o f  
r e pr e s e n t a t ion ap p l icab l e .  a t tha t l ev e l , and t h e  ov e r a l l r e s u l t 
i s s imp l y wha t ev e r  i t  is . 
Th i s  a p p r oach has i t s ac ademic s u p p o r t e r s  i n  the  U S A  b u t  i n
t h e  pas t quar t e r  c e n t ury b o t h  t h e  p r a c t i c e s  o f  t h e po l i t i c i a ns 
(wh i c h  d a t e  b a c k  f a r  f u r t he r ) and t h e  theo r i e s  o f  t h e  c ou r : s 
(wh ich  a r e  new a n d  s t i l l evo l v i n g )  have p u l l e d  i n  sy s t em i c  c r i t e r i a 
t ha t  go o u t s i d e  t h e  i nd iv i d u a l  c o ns t i t u e n c y  t o  j u d ge me t h o d s  o f
appo r t ionmen t .  The s inp l e s t  way o f  b r inging i n  a w i de r s y s t em i c  
conce p t ion o f  r e p resen t a t ion i s  t o  a s k  f o r  p r o p o r t iona l i t y 
b e twe e n  the  vo t e s  c a s t  f o r  a par t y  and i t s  s e a t s w i t h i n  a s t a t e
l e g i sla t u r e o f  w i t hin a s t a t e ' s  d elega t io n  t o  t h e  House o f  
Re p r e sen t a t ive s .  Mcir e complex e f f o r t s  hav e b e e n  manda t e d  t o
give rac ial  minor i t ies  electo ral maj o r i t ie s  i n  a numbe r  o f  
c o n s t i t u e nc i e s  p r opo r t i ona l t o  t he i r  numb e r s  w i t h i n  a 
s t a t e . Thu s ,  e l e m e n t s  o f  t he f i r s t  s y s t em i c  c o n c e p t i o n o f
r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  h a v e b e e n  g r a f ted o n t o  t he s e c o nd . Once  we
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s e e  that  the  two hav e d i f f e re n t  s u b j e c t-ma t t e r s , we s hould recog-
n i z e  t h a t  the t•.;o concep t ions a r e  no t mu tually exclus iv e . 
Nohlen  ma i n t a ins  that the two r a t io na les  he has g iven f o r  a 
s y s t em o f  r ep re s e n t a t i on a r e  the o n l y  ones . B u t  h e r e  I t h ink h i s  
German background l eads h i n  to ove rlook t h e  p e c u l iar i t ie s  o f  the
Eng l i sh-speaking  wo r l d . Fo r it  mus t b e  no t ic e d  tha t bo t h  t he 
r a t i o n a l e s  I hav e s e t  o u t ( and t he same wo u l d  go f o r  N o h l e n ' s  
p r o po s ed  r a t iona l e  f o r  the maj o r i ty / p l u ra l i ty s ys t e m ) d e p end o n
a s y s t emi c  conc e p t ion o f  r e p r e s en t a t io n . Wha t I me an b y  t h i s  is  tha t 
bo t h  sys t ems make represen t a t io n  a f un c t io n  o f  t h e  s y s t em a s  a 
whol e .  We talk abou t the represen t a t iven e s s  o f  t h e  s y s t em , no t 
whe ther  Mr X o r  M r s  Y is represen t e d . The d i f f e r en c e  b e tween t h e
two conc e p t ions is i n  the sys t emic r el a t ionship  t o  be  l o o ke d  f o r . 
I n  the f i r s t  case , the r el a t ion s h i p  l i e s  b e t we en t he el e c t o r a t e 
o f  t h e  co un t ry as a whole and the  s e t  o f  r e p r e s en t a t iv e s  as a who l e . 
The qu e s t ion t o  be asked i s : do t h e  r e p r esen t a t iv e s  c o l l e c t iv e l y
m i r ro r t h e  po l i t i c a l  com pos i t ion o f  t h e  en t ir e  e l ec to r a t e ? D o
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the i r  propo r t ions r e f l e c t  t he p r o po r t io n s  o f  s u p p o r t  f o r  va r i o us 
t endenc i e s  wi t h i n  the c o un t r y ?  I n  t h e  s e c ond c a s e , t l 1 e  r e l a t ion-
s h i p  l i es b e tween the  vo t e r s  i n  t h e  d e s i gn a t ed t e r r i t o r y  and 
t h e i r  r e p r e s en ta t iv e . The q u e s t i o n  t o  b e a s k e d  i s : d o e s  t h e
p e rson e l e c t ed b e s t  r e p r e s e n t  t h e  t e r r i t o r y  a s  a who l e ?  I s  t h e
p e r so n  e l ec t ed  t h e  one  w i t h  p r e p o nd e ra n t  suppo r t  among t h e  vo t e r s ?  
I f  t he r e p r e s e n t a t ive ' s  a r e a  i s  a who l e  c o u n t r y , t h e  imp l i c a t i o n  
i s  tha t h e  s ho u l d  have  a p l u r a l i t y  or  maj o r i t y  of  t h e  t o t a l  vo t e .  
{Th i s  imp l i e s  t h a t  t he U S  e l e c t o r a l  c o l l e g e  i s  a n  anoma l y , and so 
it i s . It is  wor t h  no t i c in g  tha t it is no t norma l l y  d e f ended in 
t e rms of p r inc i p l e . )  If the a r e a  i s  a d i s t r i c t  w i t h in the count ry , 
t h e  imp l ic a t io n  is tha t t h e  s u c c e s s f u l  c and i d a t e  s ho u l d  have a 
p l u ra l i t y  o r  maj o r i t y  w i t h i n  t ha t . 
There  i s  an i n t e re s t i n g  s id e l i g h t  h e r e . U n t i l  1 8 8 5 , t h e r e
we r e  man y  two-membe r  c o ns t i t ue n c i e s  i n  B r i t a i n ,  b u t  e l ec t i o n s  
w e r e  t r e a ted a s  t h e  s i mu l t a n e o u s  f i l l i ng o f  t w o  p o s i t i o n s  b y  t h e 
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p l u r a l i t y  me t hod . Each e l e c t o r  had two vo t e s  and the  two l e a d i n g  
cand id a t e s  we r e  e l ec t ed . T h e  r e s u l t  wa s gene r a l l y  tha t t h e  s ame 
p a r t y  won b o t h  s e a t s . Th i s  is . t h e  l o g i c a l  way o f  cond u c t i n g  a 
d o u b l e  e l e c t io n  i f t he obj ec t is t o  s end t wo p eo p l e to W e s t m i n s t e r
bo t h  o f  whom r e p r esent  t h e  cons t i t uency  a s  a wh o l e  r a t h e r  t ha n 
s e n d ing one  to represen t the  maj o r i t y  and ano t h e r  to r e p r e s e n t  
t h e  m i n o r i t y .  
A s  Dumme t t  not e s , the  s ame s y s t em -- g i v i n g  e a c h  vo t e r  a s  
many v o t e s  a s  there  a r e  p l aces  t o  b e  f i l l e d  - - i s  o f t e n  u s e d  w i t h  
l a r g e r  numb e r s  o f  vacanc i e s  whe r e  commi t t e e s  a r e  t o  b e  e l e c t ed . 
I t  i s  charac t er is t ic o f  h i s  t o t a l  inab i l i t y  t o  und e r s t a nd t h a t 
t h e r e  is a ra t ion a l e  f o r  maj o r i t y  v o t ing t h a t  Dunune t t  c a n  t h ink
of o n l y  on e ,  r e ason f o r  us ing such a p ro c e d u r e , name l y  " t he con-
v e n i en c e  o f  t he t e l l e r s "  ( p . 2 5 7 ) . B u t  if  t he o b j e c t  i s  t o  
p r o d u c e  a conuu i t t e e  t h a t  c o l l e c t iv e l y  r e p r e s en t s  t h e  maj o r i t y  o f  
t h e  vo t e r s , t he natura l ex t e n s i o n  o f  t h e p l u r a l i t y  s y s t em w i t h
o �e p l a c e  a n d  o n e  vo t e  i s  � p l a c e s  and n vo t e s . 
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So f ar I have b een a r gu in g t ha t t h e  PR and p l u r a l i t y / ma j o r i t y
s y s t ems a r e  ind eed b a s e d  o n  t wo l o g i c a l l y  d i s t i nc t and i n t e r n a l l y
coher e n t  ideas-; Eac h o f  t h e s e  p r inc i p l e s  o f  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  has a 
me thod t h a t  mos t pe r f e c t l y f u l f i l l s  i t . In t h e  PR c a s e i t  i s  a 
par t y  l i s t  s y s t em w i t h  l a r g!l c o n s t i t u e n c i e s  -- i d e a l l y  the  who l e
( i n e f f e c t )  
coun t ry a s  i n  I s r a e l  ani t hf!; N e t h e r l and s - - and a l ow t h r e s ho l d . 
In t h e  p l ur a l i t y / ma j or i t y case  i t  i s  a s ys t em o f  equa l - p o p u l a t ion
con s t i tu en c ie s e ach re p r e s en t ed b y on e p e rson a c c o rd ing  to  o n e  o f
t h r e e  me t hod s : p lura l i t y ,  t h e  a l t e rna t iv e vo t e , and a do u b l e b a l l o t 
(und e r  any o f  a va r i e t y  o f  r u l e s ) i f  no cand ida t e  ge t s  a maj o r i t y 
on the f ir s t  round . Bo t h  � r e , I have a r gued , s y s t em i c  mod e s  o f 
r e p r es e n t a t ion : in the f i q ; t  the c o un t r y  a s  a who l e i s  r e p r e se n t ed 
by the  mapp ing f r om pa r t y  p r e f e renc e to e le c to r a l o u t come ; i n  the
second ea c h cons t i t ue nc y i s  r e p r e s ent ed  ina s f a r  a s  the  ca nd ida t e 
e l e c t ed is , i n  some r e l ev a n t  sense , t h e  one w i t h  t h e  l a rge s t f o l l o w i n g
w i t h in i t . 
What N o ll l en misses  i s , I w i s h  t o c l a im ,  t h a t  t he r e is an a l  t e rn-
. a t iv e  t o  b o t h  o f  t he s e sy s t em i c  conc e p t s o f  r e p r e s e n t a t io n . 
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Th i s  r a t i o n a l e  i s t h a t  r ep re s e n t a t i o n  is p e r s o n a l : i t  is a 
r e l a t i o n  be tween the ind iv idua l vo t er and h i s  r e p r e s en t a t iv e . 
An e l e c t o r  i s  r e p r e s e n t ed by t h e . c and ida t e he vo t e d  f o r , i f  tha t 
cand ida t e  i s  e l e c t ed . I f  the c and ida t e he vo t e d . f o r  is no t e l e c t e d , 
he i s  no t r e p r e s e n t e d . He i s , as Ha l l e t t  c l a ims , e f f e c t ive l y 
d i s f r a n c h i s e d , h e r e  e c ho i ng M i l l , who wr o t e  o f  t h e " c omp l e t e d i s -
f r a nc h i s eme n t  o f  m i no r i t i e s " unde r  t h e  r e l a t iv e  ma j o l" i t y  sy s t em . 4 3 a 
As we saw i n  s e c t i o n L� , t he r e is some qu e s t i o n in a q u o t a -
p r e f e ren t i a l  s y s t em a b o u t  wha t "hav ing vo t e d  f o r  a cand i d a t e "  means .
A s imp l e  app roach mi gh t be to say t h a t  i f  a c and i d a t e  mo r e  than a 
c e r t a in d i s tanc e down yo u r  l i s t  is e l e c t ed you a r e  r ep r e s e n t ed . 
B u t  the t r ouble  is tha t your vo t e  may have b e e n  unne c e s sary in
e i t he r  of two way s : i f i t  w a s  co un t ed towa r d s  a cand ida t e  e l e c t ed
w i t h  many t ime s t h e  quo t a  i t  was onl y  f rac t ional l y  "used " ; and
if it wa s t r ans f e rred f rom an e l imina ted c a nd id a t e , a h i gh -p r e f e r e n c e
c a nd i d a t e  o f  y o u r s  may a l r eady h a v e  b e e n  e l e c t e d . Thu s ,  we s aw 
tha t Ha l l e t t  d id no t c l a im t h a t  h e  was r ep r e s en t ed in v i r t u e  o f  
s e v e r a l  o f  h i s  h i gh- p r e f e l" e n c e  cand ida t es be i ng e l e c t ed , b e c a u s e  t h e y
/J,f; 
had a l ready been e lec t ed b e f o r e  h i s  f ir s t - p r e f erence cand idate
wa s e l imina t e d . Ra t he r , he  was represented  because  he " h e l ped 
e l e c t "  a t en th -p re f erence cand ida t e .  Thus , und e r  STV , it  appears
that "being rep resent ed ' '  i s  no t a ma t t e r o f  co rr e s ponde nc e be tween
vo t e  and out come but  the pecul iar  one o f  hav ing  "hel ped to  e l e c t "  
a cand ida t e -- even perhaps one nex t t o  bo t tom out  o f  a l l  the
c a n d id a t es . I sha l l no t rehearse here  t he d i s cuss ion in  s e c t ion I X .
I t  w i l l  b e  clear  t h a t  I re ga rd t h e  no t ion o f  p e r sona l rep resen ta-
t io n  in t h i s  sense as an absurd i t y . \./hat  i s  impor tant  to real i z e , 
howev e r , is t ha t , b izarre  as i t  may b e , i t  r e a l l y  is a d i s t i nc t iv e  
i d e a  and o n e  wh i c h  has t o  be  g r a s p e d  i f  one i s  t o  und e r s t and t he 
reasons  f o r  t h e  a t t r ac t ion o f  STV over l i s t  P R  in such  coun t r i e s  
a s  Br i ta in , Aus t ralia  and ( t o a l es s e r ext ent ) the  U S A .
I f  w e  look a t  t h ings i n  t h e  way Nohlen sugge s t s ,  w e  s im p l y  
l wn p  S TV  in  w i t h  o t he r  mu l t imembe r  cons t i t uency sys t ems and po int  
o u t  t ha t , s i nce  i t  is  p r a c t icable  only  w i t h  sma l l  cons t i t uencies
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( b e c a u s e  the voters  have to vo t e  for  ind iv idual c and ida t e s )  i t  
i s  no t a ve ry propor t ional sys tem .  I t  should  be  said  that  t h e  
propor t iona l i ty 
en thus ia s t s for  STV g iv e t he impress ion tha t A
i s  wha t t h ey 
have in mind too , when t hey are  a t t ac k i ng the r e l a t ive maj o r i t y  
s y s t e m .  Very o f ten o n e  f inds them saying a f ter  some e l ec t io n , 
" I f  the s y s t em had been one o f  propo r t ional represen t a t ion , t h e  
r e s u l t  would have b e e n  . • •  , "  when i t  t urns o u t  t h a t  t hey  hav e 
no t s imu l a t ed any ac tual ele c t o ra l sy s t em bu t  s imp ly d iv ided up
the t o t a l vo t e s c a s t  in the who le  e l ec t ion among t he s ea t s . B u t
a s  I have po in ted o u t  b e f o r e , i t  i s  o n e  o f  t h e  endearingly  do t t y 
a s p e c t s  o f  STV p r o p a ganda t h a t  there i s  a d is j u n c t ion b e tween 
the a s s ump t ions und e r l y i ng t he i r  a t t a c k  on the  r e la t ive  maj o r i t y  
s y s t em  and the assumpt ions required t o  lead t o  STV. 
We can see  clearly  t ha t  t he r a t ionale o f  STV is no t t h e  
" m i r r o r  o f  the na t ion" bu t a qu i t e  d i f ferent  idea o f  pe r sonal
representa t ion  by no t ic ing t ha t  � sys t em can b e  j udged by the
/t'/0 
s t andard o f proport ional i t y , ye t p r o po r t iona l i ty does  no t in i t se l f  
sa t is f y  the advo ca t es o f STV . I t  is no t eno ugh t ha t the s ys t em as
a who le represen ts  t h e  e l e c t o r a t e  as a who l e , in the "mi r r o r  o f  t h e  
na t ion" sense . What ma t t e r s is  that ind iv idual e l ec t o rs should  be
r e p r esented by cand ida t e s  for whom they vo ted . 
Thus , con s id e r  the p l ural i t y  sys t em .  l�1ere  there  a r e  only  two 
pol i t ical par t ies , t h i s  may do a q u i t e  f a i r  j ob of p r oduc i ng pro-
po r t io na l i t y  be tween vo tes  and seats  o v e r  the e l e c t o r a t e  as a who l e . 
Richard Rose  has cons t ru c ted an " index o f  p r o p o r t io na l i t y "  by t a k ing 
" t he sum o f  the  d i f ference  b e tween each par ty ' s sha r e  of sea t s  and
i t s  p e r c e n t age share of v o t es , d ivided  by two and s ub t r a c t ed f rom 
one hund r ed .  The closer  the index is t o  one hundred , the mo r e 
, . 4 4 exa c t ly pro po r t iona l is t he relat ionship  be tween s ea t s  and vo tes .
The r esul t of Ro se ' s compu t a t ions i s  t o  show tha t the cor r e l a t ion
be tween a c t ua l  propo r t ional i ty ,  mea sured  by t h i s  index , and the
kind o f  e l e c to ral s y s t e m  i s  q u i t e we a k .  T h e  !lo u s e  of Re p r e s e n t a t iv e s
has an ind ex numb e r o f  9 4 , wh ich pu t s  i t  abo u t  h a l f  way d own the
r ankings of  l i s t PR  sys t ems 
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rankings o f  l i s t  PR sy s t ems ( C a nad a , Au s t r a l i a  and Br i t a in
a re at 88 , 8 7 and 85 res p ec t iv e ly . ) Thus , look ing a t  i t 
s y s t c1� J ,· :i I l y , we c a n  say t ha t .  t he U SA has qu i t e a to le ra b l e 
degree  of p r o p o r t io na l i t y .
I f  pro po r t iona l it y we re rea l ly a t  issue , t hen , t h e  s y s tem
in use to  e l e c t  t he House of Rep r e s en t a t ives  wou ld no t b e  o p e n  
t o  se r ious c r i t ic ism. Bue we have only  t o  r e f l e c t o n  Ha l l e t t ' s  
l in� o f  c r i t ic ism , and t ha t  o f  t he o t he r  be lievers  in the  no t io n 
o f  "wa s t e d  votes"  in two- c a nd idat e e l e c t  ions , to r e a l i z e  t h a t
such people  wou ld no t be  pac i f ied by even  t he m o s t  p e r f e c t 
propor t io na l i t y  w i t hin t he system a s  a who l e . Fo r t he y wou ld 
shif t f rom t he systemic to t he ind iv idual lev e l and sa y t ha t  ma ny 
ind iv idua l vote rs are  s t i l l  unrep r e sented . I t  is , s t i l l , a f t e r  a l l ,  
t rue t ha t  i n  t he USA a t  least  a t h i r d  o f  t h e  e l e c t o ra t e v o t e s  f o r
cand ida t es who a r e  no t success f u l , a n d  t hese  peo p le a r e , ac c o rd i n g  
t o  t he p e c u l i a r  l o g i c  o f  p e r s o ua l re p • e s e n t a t io n , no t • e p i: e s e n t e d , 
This  shows c le a r l y  enough , I 
1 ? 2.. 
th ink , tha t the concep t ion o f  r e p r e s en ta t ion as a p e r sona l re l a t ion 
b e tween the  ind ividual vo t e r  and t he e l e c ted  cand i d a t e  i s  no t r e d u -
cible  i n  any w a y  to  the und e r l y ing no t ion of  P R ,  the s y s t emic idea  
o f  the  l e g i s l a t u re a s  the "mir r o r  of  the n a t ion . " 
M i l l  is aga in ins t r u c t iv e  b ecause o f  h i s  c l ea r g r a s p  on t h e  
impl ica t ions o f  the  conc e p t o f  p e r sonal r e p r e s en t a t ion . Thus , in 
t h e  Cons id e r a t i o n s  on Rep r e s e n t a t iv e  Gov e r nme n t  h e  cons idered a 
d e f ense  o f  the relat ive maj o r i ty on the  l ines t h a t  "as  d i f ferent  
o p inions p r edomina t e  in d i f f er e n t  l o c a l i t i e s , the  op inion which  
is in  a mino r i ty in some p l aces  has a maj o r i t y  in o ther , and on 
the who l e  every op inion which  exi s t s  in the  cons t i tuenc ies  obta ins 
i t s  f a i r  share  of voices  in the  r e p resenta t ion . 1 1
4 4aAnd he conceded 
tha t " t his i s  roughly t r ue in  the p resent  s t a t e  of the  cons t i t uenc y ; 
i f  i t  were no t , the d i sc o rdanc e o f  the  House w i t h  the g e n e r a l
s en t ime n t  o f  t h e  coun t r y  would  soon become evident . "
4 4b H i s  f i r s t  
reply  was t ha t  t h i s  propo r t iona l i t y co u ld no t b e  coun t e d  on t o
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con t inue . But  his  second -- which i s  the  one to which I wa n t to
-
d r aw a t t en t ion here� cons i s t ed in say ing : " Even now , is i t  no t a
great  gr ievance ,  tha t in eve ry P ar l i amen t a ve r y  nume r o u s  p o r t io n
o f  t h e  e l e c t o r s , w i l l i n g  and anxious to  b e  r e p r e s e n t ed , have no 
. 7 . , 4 4c  memb e r  i n  t he House for whom they have  vo t e d . 
I have focused here on one v e r s ion o f  t h e  ind iv i d u a l i s t i c no t i o n
o f  rep resen t a t ion , namely the one tha t und e r l i e s  t h e  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c 
a r guce n t  f o r  STV in terms o f  i t s  no t wa s t ing vo tes . I s ho u l d  howeve r 
say t h a t  t h e  c r i t e r ion o f  ind iv idual r e p r e sent a t ion h a s  b e e n  d ev e l o p e d  
i n  a va r ie ty o f  o ther ways in t he USA dur ing the pa s t  q ua r t e r  c en t u r y . 
There a r e  two r eason s for  the way in which  the academic ( and , to
the d e g r e e  tha t  i t  exis t s , t he popul a r )  d iscu s s ion of  represen ta t io n
has take n  an ind iv idual i s t ic form .  As with  o t her i s s u e s  ( rever s e  
d i s c r imina t io n  i s  a good examp le)  t h e  two reasons a r e  mu tually  
r e info r c in g . One is tha t Ame rican cul ture  is highly individual i s t ic --
any Eur ope an t ea c h i n g  in t he U SA i s  bou nd to b e  s t r u c k  b y  t h e  n a t u r a l
Lockean i sm o f  und e r gradua t e s . The o t he r  i s  tha t o n c e  a que s t i o n g e t s
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in t o  t h e  cour t s  i t  h a s  to be turned i n t o  o n e  o f  ind i v i d u a l  r i gh t s
b e c a u s e  tha t i s  the in t ell ec tu a l currency t h e  c o u r t s  u s e  i n  d e c i d i n g
c o n s t i t u t ional qu es t ion s , Thu s ,  mov e s  t h a t c o u l d  b e  d e f ended qu i t e
s t r a ig h t f o rwa r d l y  by saying t h a t t hey ma ke t h e  s y s t em a s  a who l e  
mo r e  r e p r e s en t a t ive have t o  b e t o r t u r ed t o  f i t the  r e q u i r emen t  t h a t  
t h e y  b e  shown t o  in s t an t :l.a t e  ind iv i d u a l  r i gh t s  to " a n  e qu a l l y e f f e c ­
a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  r i g h t  
t iv e  v o i c e "  i n  t h e  e l e c t io n  o f  a l e g i s l a t u r e  ot.! ' t o  c a s t an e q u a l l y 
d , , 4 5 we igh t e  vo t e .  The r e s u l t h a s  b e e n  t o  pro du c e v e r y  s t range
r a t iona l i z a t io n s  for d ec�s ions th a t  are c l e ar l y  mo t iva t ed by  s y s t emic
c o n s i d e r a t io n s . 
4 6  
Thu s , i n  t h e  c a s e  o f  U J O  v .  Ca r e v  the ba s i c
a r gume n t  f o r  a " b e n i gn" ge rryma nd e r t o p r o d u c e  a p r e d ominan t l y
b la c k  Con g r e s s io n a l  d i s t � ic t wa s c l ea r ly s y s t em i c  w i t h  t he S t a t e 
o f  New Y o r k  a s  t h e  s y s t e � . Mr J u s t i c e  Wh i t e  wr o t e a s  f o l lows : 
• • • t h e  p l a n  l e f t  wh i t e maj o r i t i,e s  in a p p ro x i ma t e l y  7 0  p e r c e n t
o f  t h e  a s s emb l y  and s e n a t e  d i s t r i c t s  o f  K in gs Coun t y [ Brook l yn ) , 
whi c h  had a co un t ywi d e  popula t io n  t h a t  wa s 6 5 p e r c e n t  wh i t e .  Thus , 
e v e n  i f  vo t ing in the c�un t y  o c c u r r ed s t r i c t l y  a c c o r d ing t o  ra c e , 
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whites wo u l d  no t b e  underrepresen t ed rela t iv e  to t h e i r  sha re 
o f  t h e  4 7  p o p u l a t io n . 
At t h i s  po i n t , however , White  p r e sumab l y  f el t tha t t a l king a b o u t 
"wh i t e s "  wa s too over t l y  col l ec t iv i s t  t o  go down we l l , s o  he t r ied 
to say t he same t h i ng over again in ind i v id ua l is t i c t e rms , wr i t i ng 
as f o l lows : 
In in d iv i dua l d is t r ic t s  whe re non-wh i t e  maj o r i t ie s  we r e
i nc rea s ed
, 
• • •  i t  b e c ame l e s s  l ik e l y  t h a t  whi t e  vo t e r s  wo u l d
b e  r e p r e s e n t ed by a memb e r  o f  t he ir own rac e ; b u t • . . t h e  w h i t e
vo t e r  • • •  i n [ such ] a d is t r i c t • • •  wil l b e  r e p r e s en t ed , t o  t h e
ex t en t  t h a t vo t in g  co n t i nues t o  f o l low r ac ia l l in e s , by  l e g i s l a-
4 8  
t o rs e l e c t ed from maj o r i t y  whi t e d i s t r i c t s . 
Wh i t e 
Th is o bvio us l y o p ens � up to the cha r g e  o f  p u t  t ing f o rwa rd a 
t h e o ry o f  v i r t ua l  rep r e s e n t a t ion : j u s t  a s  d e fend e r s  o f  t h e  unre-
f o r me d  B r i t i s h system claimed t ha t f1 anche s t er was v i r t u a l l y  r e p r e -
s e n ted  b y  Liverpool because t h e y  had s im i l a r  me r c a n t i l e  i n t e r e s t s , 
so a wh i t e who i s  in t he m ino r i t y  i n  one cons t i tuency i s  v i r tua l l y
/7h 
rep resen ted b y  the person  e l ec t ed in a n e i ghbo r ing con s t i t uenc y 
whe r e  whi t e s  have a maj o r i t y .
4 9 B u t  the re is no t h ing wr ong w i t h  
t h e  d e c ision , on l y  w i t h  t h e  a t t emp t t o  p resen t  i t  i n  terms o f  
ind iv idual r epresen ta t io n  ins t ead o f  s t i c k ing w i th  t h e  f l a t  s t a t e-
ment , an ineluc tably sys t emic one , that  the o bj e c t i s  to ensure
that  in t he S ta t e  o f  N e w  Yo r k  t he number o f  s e a t s  wi th  b l a c k  
maj o r i t ies  is  app roxima tely  p ro po r t ional to the  numb e r  of  bl acks 
in the s ta t e . 
My conclus ion is , then , that  t h e r e  a r e  t h r e e  f undamen tal  con-
c ep t ions of representat ion . One i s  the no t io n  of p e rsona l r e p r e-
sen t a t ion . For the reasons s e t  o u t  in sec t ion IX I do no t think
that in its  "he l p ing to elect"  form this  is sensible  as  a rat iona l e  
f o r  a n  electoral sys t em . And al t hough much would have to be said  
to p rove that  there  is no  o t he r  vers ion t h a t  makes sense , I bel ieve 
that  this  could be done , I shall  s imply  have to as sume tha t r e s u l t .
Do ing so l eaves t he two sy s t em i c concep t ions : the  id e a l  o f  p r o p o r -
t iona l i ty b e tween po l i t ical  sent ime n t  i n  the coun t r y  and i t s  exp r e s -
s ion in the l e g i s l a t u r e , and t h e  i d e a l  o f  t h e  b e s t r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  
of  a c e r t a in t e r r i to ry , -- -- - -
177 
measu.red b y  the achievemen t o f  a p l u r a l i t y  o r  maj o r i ty w i t hin  t he 
elec t o ra t e  o f  that  area . 
As f a r  as I can see , bo th have imp e c cab l e  h i s t o r ical  c r ed en-
t ia l s  as concep t ions o f  rep resenta t ion , though the l a t t e r  is much
o l d e r  and has a wider range of o t h e r  a p p l i c a t ions . I do no t 
bel ieve that  any thing is to be gained by asking which is t h e  
" t rue ' '  conc e p t ion o f  r e p resenta tion . In par t i c ul ar , i t  s h o u l d
no t' s imp ly b e  assumed ( a s  Dunme t t  f o r  examp l e  does ) t ha t  the
theory of  represen t a t ion as propo r t ional i t y i s  unqu e s t ionab l y  t h e
c o r r e c t  one . 
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It h as b e en well s a id t h a t  to the cob b l e r  t h e re ' s no t h i ng l ik e
lea t he r , and a s im i l a r  a t ta c hmen t to the ma t e r i a l s  o f  the t rad e no
doub t t en d s  t o  c a u s e  t ho s e  who wr i t e  about  e l e c t o r a l  sys t ems t o
ove r es t ima t e  t h e i r  pol i t i c a l  e f f ec t s .  Thus , i t  i s  a w e l l -wo rn 
gen e r a l i z a t ion in compa ra t iv e  p o l i t i c s  t h a t  " t he p l u ra l i t y sys t em 
t end s to l e ad t o  a two - pa r t y  s y s t em . 1 1 5 1  O f c o u r s e , " t end s "  is a 
no t o r io u s l y  vague t e rm ,  b u �  no maj o r  coun t r y  w i t h  a p l u ra l i t y s y s t em 
5 2  has only two par t ie s  exc � p t  t h e  U SA ,  which d o e s  no t have par t ie s  
a t  all in t h e  o r d inary s e n s e  becau s e t h e  vo t e r s  p ic k  t h e  c and ida t e s , 
and t h e s e  i f  e l e c t ed become memb e r s  o f  the Congress ional p a r t y 
regard l e s s  o f  t he r e l a t ion b e tween the i r  v iews and t ho s e  o f  the 
par ty l e a d e r s .  Mo reover , i f  " t end s "  i s  t ak en d ynamical l y , the  
gener a l i z a t i o n  i s  a lso  ques t ionab l e . I,n B r i t a in , fo r examp l e , i t
t o o k  t h e  po l i t ic a l  upheava l o f  1 9 3 1  t o reduce  t h e  L i b e r a l  P a r t y to 
i n s i gn i f i c a nc e ,  and i t  s e e!J!S q u i t e  p o s s i b l e  t ha t  t h e  c u r r e n t  pa r t y 
/7') 
sys t em ,  wh ich i s  q u i t e  s imilar t o  t h e  i n t e rwar o n e  · u n t i l  1 9 3 1 ,
may c o n t i nue un t i l  some o th e r  u pheaval produces a real ignmen t .
The no t io n  tha t a p a r t y  which i s  " s q ue e zed " by the e l e c toral s y s t em 
w i l l  lose i t s  s u p po r t  over t ime d o e s  no t s t and up we l l  to emp i r i c a l
t e s t ing . The L iberal  P a r t y  in Br i ta in provides  a good c o u n t e r -
examp le . And in Franc e , a l t hough t he s ingle-memb er doub l e-ba l l o t
sys tem o f  t h e  Fi f th Repub l ic grea t l y  d imin i shed t h e  Commun i s t
P a r t y ' s  s ha r e  o f  s e a t s , i t s  s ha r e  o f  t h e  vo t e s h e l d  up u n t i l  t h e
s k i l l  o f  M i t t e rand and the  s c l e ro t i c  inep t i tude o f  i t s l e a d e r s  led
t o  mas s  d es e r t ions . 5 3 
We should a l s o  rea l i z e  t h a t  causa t ion runs in b o t h  d i r e c t ions --




tha t the e f f e c t s  in the f ir s t  of t h e s e  two d i r e c t ions can
b e  swi f t  and d e c i s ive . In many coun t r i es all tha t i s  needed to
change the  e l e c t o r a l  sys t em i s  a pa r l iame n t a ry maj o r i t y . Thus , 
wh i l e  i t  is t r u e  t h a t we s e l d o m  f ind t h r e e  o r mo r e  pa r t i e s  w i t h
roughly equal s u p po r t  i n  conj unc t io n w i t h  - t h e  p l u ra l i t y
sys t em ,  t h i s  
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can b e p l au s ib l y  exp l a ined b y  the  t end enc y o f
t h e  p ar t i e s  to a c connno d a t e t h e  e l e c to r a l sys t em to the po l i t ic a l 
s i t ua t i o n  b y  changing t he p lu ra l i t y sys t em to o n e  b a s e d  on the
propo r t ional pr inc ip le o f  r ep r e s e n t a t ion . Thus , to  the extent
t ha t  the r e  is a corr e l a t io n  b e tween the  p lu ra l i t y elec t o r a l  sy s t em
and a p a r t y  s y s t em in wh i c h  two par t i es s tandard ly g e t  ( s a y )  a t
l e a s t  e ighty- f iv e  per  c en t  o f  t he popular  vo t e , w e  might  expla in
t h i s · b y  saying t h a t  the  pe r s i s t en t  v io l a t ion o f  t h i s
cond i t ion b y  t h e  p a r t y  s y s t em l ead s t o  a c hange i n  e l ec to r a l  s y s t em 
ra ther 
� than by a p p eal ing to  some " t end ency" in the  elec toral  system to
d e t ermine the shape o f  t h e  p ar ty sys t em .  
A l t hough i t  would b e  a mi s take to  ove r e s t ima t e  the  independ ent
e f f ec t s  o f  e l ec t o ra l  sys t ems , it  seems s a f e to  say t ha t  a par ty
l i s t  PR s ys t em with large c o n s t i t uenc i e s  and a low t h r eshold o f  
r ep re sent a t ion makes t he p ro l if e ra t io n  o f  pa r t ie s v e r y  easy t hough
no t inev i tabl e . (The t hr e s ho l d  o f  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  i s  the m i n imum 
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propo r t io n  o f  v o t e s a p ar ty requ ir e s  to b e  r e p r e s e n t ed in t he l e g i s -
lature . )  W e  can a l s o  say t ha t
)
wher e t h e r e  a r e  many p a r t ie s , the
e f f e c t  o f  e l ec t ion s  is  to crea t e  a s e t  ( o f t e n  a l a r g e  s e t )  o f
coal i t ional po s s i b i l i t ie s . Whi c h  of  t h ese i s  r e a l i z e d , a n d  henc e 
t h e  compo s i t ion and program o f  t h e  gove rnmen t ,  d e p end s on nego t ia-
t ions among p a r t y  l e ad e r s . E l e c t i o n s  i n  h i gh l y  f r agmen t ed s y s t ems 
o f t e n  leave much  the same coa l i t i ona l  p o s s i b i l i t i e s  o p en a s  b e f o r e , 
and such change s  in suppo r t  a s  t h e r e  a r e  have unp r e d i c t ab l e  imp l i-
c a t ions . P a r l iamen tary ar i t hme t i c may r e s u l t  in a pa r t y t h a t  has
lost suppo r t  in an elec t ion gaining o f f ic e , for examp l e .  Thus ,
vo t e r s  may wel l f e e l  t ha t ,  whi l e  t h e y  have an eno rmo u s  cho i c e  o f
par ties , they have very l i t t le con t r o l  over  gove rnmen t f o rma t ion
o r  po l icy . 
I t  should b e  o b s e rved t h a t  we c anno t deduce  f ro m  vo t e rs ' 
suppo r t ing sma l l  par t ie s  that  they l ike the  s y s t e m .  We have h e r e
the po tent ial fo r a p r i sone r ' s d i l enuna comp a ra b l e t o  t hat  ar isin g
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from s t ra te g i c  vo t ing un d er t he p r e f e r enc e  s c o r e  s y s t em . I may
wish t h e r e  were f ewe r and la r ge r pa r t i e s  b u t  a l so f e e l  tha t , i f
everyone e l s e  i s  go ing t o  v o t e  f o r  t h e  exac t s h a d e  o f o p in ion t ha t 
is c l o s e s t ,  l eav ing the p a r t y  l eaders  t o  d o  t he res t , I shou l d  be  
a c t ing in a p ub l ic-sp i r i t e d  but  s e l f -d e f ea t in g way to s u p po r t  a 
l a r g e  par ty t ha t i s  mo r e  d is ta n t  r a t h e r  than a sma l l e r one tha t  
i s  n e a r e r . 
The N e t he r l and s , w i t h a t h r e s h o l d  o f  r e p r e s e n t a t ion o f  two -
t h i r d s  o f  one p e r  c e n t  o f  t h e  po p u l a r vo t e , i l l u s t r a t e s t h i s s t a t e 
o f  a f f a i r s . The r e  is b ro a d  a g r eeme n t  t ha t  t h e  f ragmen t a t io n i s
o u t  o f  hand , b u t  i t  is  a s king t oo muc h  t o  exp e c t  t h e  vo t e r s  t o
f ix  t h i n g s  by the i r  own c ho i c e s  w i t h i n  t h e  exi s t ing e l ec to ra l 
sys t e m .  "Wh e r e a s  a l l  p a r t i es p l. e ad t h e  n e e d  f o r  du id e l ikhe id 
( c l e a r  s t and s ) and p ro c la im t h e  ur ge nc y o f  g iv i n g the e l e c t o r a t e
a mo r e illWle d i a t e  inf l uence o n  th e f o r ma t io n  a n d  a c t io ns o f  govern-
me n t s , the  p a r t y  sys t em h a s  b ecome i n c r e a s ingly f r agme n t e d  and 
compl ex . " 5 4  G iven t he s y s t em, each vo t e r vo t e s  f o r  the c l o s e s t p a r t y , 
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b L t "wha t t h e  vo t e r s  wan t "  is a sys t em w i t h  f ewe r b u t  mo r e  po ten-
t e n t i a l l y  d e c i s ive cho ic e s . 
We c a n  say some th in g ( t hough with le s s  emp i r i c a l  ev i d e n c e  t o
d r aw u p o n )  abo u t the s ing l e t r ans f e r a b l e  vo t e . I n  i t s  e f fec ts  o n
t he numb e r  o f pa r t i es r ep r es ent ed in p a r l iamen t ,  i t  i s  comp a r a b l e  
to a par ty l i s t  s y s t em w i t h  t h e  s a m e  numb e r o f  s e a t s  p e r  cons t i -
t u e nc y . Thu s w i t h  cons t i t ue nc i e s  w i t h  t h r e e , f our , o r  f iv e s ea t s  (as  i n
w i t h  cons t i tuenc i e s  w i t h  t h r e e , f o u r , o r  f iv e  s e a t s  ( a s  i n  
I r el and ) i t  wo u ld be incompa t ib l e  w i t h  a l a r g e  numb e r o f  n a t io n a l
p a r t i e s  bu t c o u l d  ac coimnod a t e seve ra l . Bo t h  s y s t ems have t h e
e f f ec t  t h a t  a b l o c  o f  vo t e r s  l a r ge r t h a n  a quo ta c a n  ge t i t s 
cand i d a t e  e l e c t ed no ma t t e r  how u np o p u l a r  he i s  wi t h  t h e  res t o f
t h e  e l e c t o ra t e .  (With S TV  t he r e can b e  s e v e r a l  cand ida t e s  o f  t h e
same b loc b u t  so long as t h e  memb e r s o f  t he bloc l i s t  t hem a l l
t h e s e  cand i d a t e s  
ahead o f  o t h e r s  t h e  o n e  mo s t  po p u la r among /.. w i l l  b e  e l e c t ed . )
Ther e  is , howev e r , an im p l i c a t ion f o r  t h e  number o f  candida t e s . 
Because STV i s  a p r e f e r e n t i a l  sy s t em i t  enco ura ges p a r t ie s  w i t h
m l y  l i t t l e  expe c t ed s u p p o r t  t o  s t and , s in c e  vo t e r s  w i l l  b e  t o l d  
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(even if it isn ' t  true ) t ha t " you r vo t e  is  neve r wa s t ed . "
B u t  w i t h  a p ar t y  l is t  PR sy s t em a v o t e  c a s t  f o r  a p ar t y t oo s ma l l
to  reach t h e  quo t a  do e s no t g e t t r an s f e rr e d . The r e  i s  therefo r e  
a s t ronger inc en t ive no t t o  vo t e  for  p ar t ie s  w i t h  l i t t l e chance 
o f  cap tur i ng a sea t .
There  a r e  t;;o o t h e r  imp l ic a t io n s  o f  STV t ha t we can d e r i v e  
ana l y t ical l y . One , wh i c h  aga in f o l l ows f rom i t s  n a t u r e  a s  a 
p r e f e re nt ia l sys t eo , i s  t h a t  i t  i s  ad van t a ge o u s , in c o r:ip a r i s o n  
with  a par t y  l i s t sys t em w i t h  s ame - s i z e d  c on s t i t u enc i e s , t o
par t ies  tha t canno t ob ta in a quo t a  o f  f i r s t  c ho ice  vo tes but  can 
p i c k  up eno ugh lower p r e f er ences  r ed i s t r ibu t ed f rom o t h e r  cand i-
d a t e s  to reach the quo t a .  Thus i f  t h e r e  is a large p a r t y  o f
t he r igh t 1 a la rge par ty o f  t he l ef t ,  and a sma l l  par t y o f
the  c en t e r , i t  is  pos s ib l e  f o r  t he a r i t lune t i c t o  wo rk o u t so t h a t  
t he c en t e r p a r t y  g e t s  a s e a t  o u t  o f  t rans f e r r e d  vo t e s , e v e n  i f
eve ry s u p po r t e r  o f  t h e  l ar ge p a r t i e s vo t e s  a s t r a i gh t p a r t y  t i c k e t
b e f o r e  l i s t ing cand i d a t e s  o f  t he c en t e r  p a r t y .
Ano t h e r and s t ronge r c en t r i p e t a l  f o r c e , wh i c h  h a s  b e e n
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observed i n  I r el and , i s  crea t ed b y  the way i n  wh i c h  und e r STV
vo t e r s  vo t e  f o r  ind iv i d u a l  cand i d a t e s , no t f o r  p a r t i e s . T h i s  
makes STV d is t i nc t ive . T h e  po in t i s  no t s im p l y  t ha t  the par t y ' s
cand ida t e s  a r e  in comp e t i t ion wi t h  one ano ther : t h a t  can a l s o  
occur  under a p a r t:1 l i s t  s y s t em t h a t  p e rm i t s vo t e r s  t o  a f f e c t  t he 
rankings w i t h in t he l is t .  The po i n t  h e r e  is tha t  they  a r e  com-
p e t ing for vo t e s  gene r a l l y ,  no t o nl y  amo n g t he pa r t y ' s s u p po r t e r s . 
A large p e r sona l vo t e  f o r  one c and i d a t e  d o e s  h i s  o r  h e r  c o pa r -
t i sans n o  good unless  it  i s  transf erred e xp l i c i t l y t o  them . 
Analogous ly , vo ters can suppo r t  a par t icula r cand id a t e  wi t hou t 
emb racing tha t cand id a t e ' s  par t y .  Even t h e  vo t e s  o f  a pa r t y ' s 
loy,al suppo r t e rs  may be trans f e r re d  to o t h e r  cand i d a t e s af t e r 
a l l  o f  i t s  nom inees a r e  el ec t ed o r  e l imi na t ed . As a re sul t ,
wise cand idates  will no t r es t r i c t  t h e i r  q u e s t  f o r  p e r so nal 
suppo r t  t o  their  own pa r t y , and t he y may t ry t o  a t t ra c t  p e r s o na l 
s u p p o r t  w i t h o u t  n e c e s s a r i l y  enco ura ging  suppo r t  f o r  o t her  can-
d idates  o f  t he ir pa r t y .  The in t e r pe r so na l compe t i t i o n  t ha t  i s
chara c t e r i s t ic o f  a l l  s y s t ems w i t h p r e f e r en c e  vo t i n g  may t hus 
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t end to s up e rsed e in t e r p a r ty c omp e t i t io n , r a t h e r  t han t a k i n g
p la c e  s t r ic t l y  w i thin party bound a r i e s � S� 
Al t ho u gh p re f e ren c e  s co r e  vo t ing i s  no t in u s e in na t i o n a l
elec t ions anywhe r e ,  i t  i s  w? r t h  s p ecu l a t ing f o r a mome n t abou t i t s
p r o p e r t i e s . Th i s  sys t em can b e  us ed t o  e l e c t e i t he r  o n e c a n d i d a t e
o r  s eve ra l . I n  t h e  l a t t e r c a s e , t h e  p r e f e r e n c e  s c o r e s  a r e  t o t a l l e d
in exa c t l y t h e  s ame way a n d  t ho s e w i t h  t h e  h i ghe s t s c o r e s  d e c l a red
e l e c t e d  u p  t o  t he numb e r  o f  s e a t s t o  b e  f i l l e d . I s h a l l  d i s c u s s
t h i s  l a t t e r  v e r s ion . 
As a p r e f e re n t ia l  s y s t eq) t h e  p r e f e r enc e s c o r e  s y s t em h a s  t he 
i t  has i t  
same t end en c y a s  S TV  t o  f avo r cen t er p a r t i e s  bu tl i n a f a r  s t r an ge r 
f o r m .  Und e r STV , wlni c h is an e l imina t io n sys t e m ,  a p a r t y  c a n
b e ne f i t  f rom t r an s f e r s  o n l y  i f  i t  has e n o u g h  f i r s t  p r e f e r en c e s  t o  
s t ay in t h e  runn ing un t i l  t he t r a n s f e r s ' s t a r t  com i n g  in . B u t  
w i th t h e  p r e f e renc e  sco r e  s �s t em , i t  c a n  g e t c a n d i d a t e s  e l e c t e d 
w i th no f ir s t  p r e f e renc e s . Thu s , s u p p o s e t h e r e  a r e  fou r s e a t s  
and two p a r t ie s d iv id e  t h e  f i rs t p r e f e r en c e s  be twe en them . Then
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under eve r y  s y s t em  ( in c l ud i ng srv) exc e p t the p r e f e r enc e s c o r e
s y s t em o n l y  those two p a r t ie s  wil l g e t  s e a t s . Bu e i f , say , 
e a c h  o f  t h e s e  two par t ie s  p u t s  up two cand ida t e s  an d a t h ir d 
( c e n t e r ) p a r t y  pu t s  one u p , it c ou ld g e t  a s e a t . 
A c l ea r  d isadvan tage  o f  the p r e f e r e nc e  s c o r e  s y s t em ,  if i t
i s  u s e d  *he r e  t he r e  a r e  po l i t i cal p a r t i e s , i s  t h a t  i t  ma k e s  t h e  
numb e r  o f  nomine e s for  each  pa r t y  a comp l e x  s t r a t e g i c  p ro b l em 
un l e s s  t h e  p a r ty can ge t i t s  su p p o r t e r s  t o vo t e  i n  a d i s c i p l in e d  
way . ( I t  is t hus l ike t he c umu la t iv e v o t e  and t h e  l im i t e d v o t e . )
fo r t he r e  i s  no way in  wh i ch t h e  vo t e s  f o r  a p a r t y  can b e  a gg r e-
ga t e d , even in the  awkw a r d  way allowed for by STV . T hu s , i f
a p� r t y  p u t s  u p  a s  many cand ida t e s  as t he r e  ar e s e a t s  and i t s  
su p p or t e rs sp read th e ir vo t es amon g t hem e venly , a ll ma y  f a i l  t o
ge t e l e c t ed even t hou gh t h e  s ame s up po r t  conc e n tr a t ed on o n e  o r
two ca nd ida t e s might have go t them e l e c t ed . I t  may a l s o  b e  no t i c e d  
t ha t t h e  p re f e r e n c e  s c o r e  sys t em greatly a c c e n t u a t e s  t h e  f e a t u r e 
o f  STV a lr ead y comm e n t ed o n , t h a t  wh i c h  o f a p a r t y ' s  nominees
ge t s  e l e c t ed  may d e p e nd heav i l y  on t h e  v o t e s  o f  t ho s e  who do  no t 
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give  t h e  par t y  the ir  f ir s t  p r e f e r enc e .  
M y  reason f o r  d is c u s s ing S TV  and the p r e f e r en c e  s c o r e  s ys t em 
a t  some length is t ha t  D umme t t , in h i s  l a s t sub s t an t ive c ha p t e r , 
propo s e s  a scheme that  he c a l l s  QPS ( f o r  " Quo t a  P r e f e re n c e  S c o r e " ) 
t h a t  is a combina t io n  o f  the two . I t  takes f rom STV t h e  idea 
that a cand ida t e  w i t h  a q uo t a  of f i r s t  p r e f er en c e s  is  e l e c t ed . I t
then ex t end s  t h i s  b y  p i cking u p  a f e a t u r e  o f  STV tha t Dumme t t  
l ikes , name l y  tha t the memb e r s  o f  a b l o c  c a n  g e t  a cand id a t e  
elec ted s o  long as t h e y  cons t i t u t e  a q uo t a ,  even i f  t h e y  s p r ead 
t he i r  v o t e s  over several can d i d a t e s . The only cond i t io n  i s  t ha t  
they a l l  rank b l o c  cand i d a t e s , i n  any o rd e r , a h ead o f  o t h e r s . 
( S e e  p p . 2 8 2 - 3 . )  This is f o rmal i z e d  by saying t h a t  the  t e l l e r s  
a r e  t o  l o o k  f o r  pa i r s  o f  candida t e s  who se vo t e r s  a r e  " so l id l y  
commi t t ed "  to t hem , t he n  t hr e e somes , a n d  so o n .  ( S e e p .  2 84 . )
P r e f e rence scores  e n t e r  i n  two way s . F i rs t , they are u sed  t o
d e termine which o f  a p a i r  ( e t c . )  that  ge t s a j o i n t quo ta  i s
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elec t e d : t h e  candida t e  wi t h  t h e  h i gh e s t p r e f e r ence s c o r e  ge t s  t h e  
sea t . And second , pref erence s c o r e s  a r e  u sed t o  a l l oc a t e  a n y  s ea t s
l e f t over a f t e r  the quo t a  sc heme has  gone some p r e d e t e rm ined numb e r  
o f  round s . (Dumme t t  sugge s t s  k + 2 whe r e  k is t h e  n umb e r  o f  s e a t s
t o  b e  f il l ed - - s e e p .  2 8 7 . )
Thi s sc heme is s a i d  by Dunnne t t  t o  be s impler  t o  o p e r a t e  and
e a s i e r  t o  exp l a i n  tha t STV . Al so , s in c e  it i s  no t an  el im ina t iv e
s cheme , i t  avo ids some o f  t h e  q u irks o f  STV , s u c h  a s  t h e  l a c k  o f  
mono ton i c i t y .  This is  a l l , I t h i nk , co r r ec t . B u t  w e  can a l so 
s p e c u l a t e  abo u t  i t s  o th e r  f e a t ures . Dumme t t ' s  p r o p o s e d  s y s t em h a s  
s o m e  o f  t h e  f e a tures o f  STV mixed u p  w i t h  s o m e  o f  t he features  o f  
the p r e f e rence score sys t em .  Each a s p e c t con t r ib u t e s  t o  the ove r a l l  
p o l i t ical e f f e c t s  to b e  an t ic ip a t e d . Thus , t h e  s c h eme i s  l ike STV 
in t h a t  i t  a l lows any b l o c  to ge t a cand id a t e  e l e c t ed , so long as 
i t s  membe r s  c omp r i s e  a quo t a ,  however they rank t h e  b l o c ' s  cand i -
d a t e s . And f a r  mor e  so than STV i t  a l lows a pa r t y ' s  c h o i c e  o f
w inning cand i d a t e s  t o  b e  mad e  by t h o s e  o u t s i d e  t he p a r t y .  Thus , 
i t  has t h e  f i s s i parous t endenc i e s ' / 
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o f  STV in a g r e a t l y  enhan c e d  d e g r e e . Ins a s f a r  a s  t h e  s cheme turns
i n t o  a p u re p re f e renc e s co r e  s y s t e m  w h e n  no mo r e  cand id a t e s  a r e  
e l e c t ed wi t h quo tas , i t  h a s  a l l  t h e  char a c t e r i s t i c s  a l r ead y a c t r i -
b u t ed t o  t ha t  sys t em .  I t  c an , t h e r e f o r e , r e su l t  in t he e l e c t ion o f
a cand i d a t e  w i t h  f ew o r no f i r s t p re f e r enc e s . 
S in c e  t h e r e  is no ex p e r i enc e w i t h  t h is s c h e me in any na t iona l 
e l e c t o r a l  s y s t em ( n o r  is t h e r e  ev e r  l ike l y  t o  b e � we canno t a p p ea l 
to a n y t h i ng excep t d e d u c t i o n s  o f  t he k i n d  j u s t  mad e  to e s t ima t e 
i t s  po l i t i c a l  imp l i c a t i o n s . Wha t t he se sugge s t  is , I t h i nk , t h a t
t h e  s c h eme i s  favo rab l e  t o  two so r t s o f  p a r t i e s : sma l l  ex t r em i s t 
par t ie s  who s e  suppo r t e r s amoun t t o  a q u o t a , and cen t e r  p a r t i e s
t h a t  a r e  f ew p eo p l e ' s f i r s t  c ho i c e . I t  wou l d  be bad f o r l a r g e
par t i e s  of  t h e  r i ght a n d  l e f t s u c h  a s  t h e  B r i t i s h  Labour and 
Cons e rva t iv e  p a r t ies . 
D umme t t , a s we hav e  a l r eady s e e n , d e p e n d s  heav i l y  on an a p r i o r i  
a r gume n t  a bo u t  t h e  mean ing o f  t h e  wo rd "representat ion . "  I have
d i smi s s e d  t h is , and in f a c t  i t  i s  no t ,  I b e l ieve , what r e a l l y
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mo t iva t e s  Duume t t ' s  conc ern for mino r i ty r e p r es en t a t io n . I n the 
end h i s pr e f e r enc es ov e r  electoral s y s t ems a r e  a s  mu ch d r iv en b y
no t ions o f  the good so c i e ty a s a r e  tho s e  o f  any o f  t he p eo p l e 
he c r i t i c i z e s . Dumme t t has fo r many years p layed an a c t iv e
ro l e  in p ro t e s t ing r e s t r i c t iv e  inuni g r a t io n  po l ic i e s  in t h e  UK b a s e d
o n  ( i n  e f f ec t ) s k in co l o r , and d emand i n g  mo r e  e q u i t a b l e  t r e a t�e � t
f o r no n-wh i t e s  al ready i n  the c o u n t ry . U n f o r tuna t e l y , howev e r , 
admi r ab l e  as h i s  ob j ec t iv e s a r e , Dumme t t ' s  p o l i t i c a l t ouc h s e ems 
t o  me no mo re sure a t  the level of n a t iona l po l i t i c s  than at t h a t  
o f  c o l l e ge po l i t i c s . 
The r e  is an immed i a t e  c aus e f o r  s us p i c ion in tha t Dumme t t
vr i t'. e s  a s  i f  h e  held the mo s t  na ive o f a l l  v e r s io n s  o f  the "mi r r o r
o f  t he na t io�'  t he o r y  o f  rep resentat ion , accord ing t o  whic h 
r e p r e se n ta t iv e s  should have t he same d emog r a p h i c  c h rac t e r is t ic s 
a s  t he pop u la t io n  a t  la rge . 5 7  Thu s , he s ays , ex t r ao r d ina r i l y  
enou g h , t ha t s inc e " t he o n l y  two memebe rs o f  the rac ia l mino r i t i e s  
t o  b e  f o und i n Pa r l iame n t  
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are bo t h  p e e r s "  i t f o l lows t h a t  " i t  i s  undemo c r a t i c  t o  propose
abol i s h ing t h e  Hou s e  o f  Lo r d s "  ( p . 260 ) . Even i f  t h i s i s i n t end ed 
as hyperbo l e , i t  s t i l l  s ug ge s t s  t h a t  Duuune t t  h a s  an a l a rming ly  
weak g r a s p  o f  wha t make s a po l i t ic a l  sys t em demo c r a t i c . Democ racy 
i s  a que s t io n  of  c o l l e c t iv e  con t r o l  exe r c i s ed t h r o u gh the e l e c t o r a l  
s ys tem . Even i f  t h e  Hou se o f  Lo r d s  we r e  a p e r f e c t  m i c ro c o sm o f  the
coun t r y  on every th inka b l e  d e mo g r a p h i c  v a r i a b l e  it  wou l d  s t i l l  h ave 
no t h ing to do w i t h  demo c racy . 
Dunune t t  go es on t o  say t h a t " t h e  adequa t e  r e p r e sen t a t ion o f
mino r i t ie s  i s  one o f  the c r i t e r i a  b y  w h i c h  a d e mo c ra t ic s y s t e m  is 
t o  be  j udged" ( p .  260)  and it  is c lear f rom wha t comes before and 
a f t e r  t h i s  s t a temen t tha t " r e p r e s en t a t io n "  h e r e  means " demog ra p h ic 
r e p r e se n t a t ion . "  Tha t  i s  to say , b l a c ks a r e  r e p r e s e n ted by v i r tue 
of  t h e r e  b e ing b l acks in P a r l iamen t . The s tandard i s  p r o po r t ion-
a l i ty : " I f  t he re we r e  t h e  same pro po r t io n of those mi no r i t i e s in 
t he Hou s e  of Conunons as i n  the p o pu l a t ion at l a r ge , t h e r e  wou l d  b e
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abo u t  twen t y - f ive black MPs ; ye t t he p r o s p e c t  o f  g e t t in g  even o ne 
seems bleak" ( p . 2 6 0 ) . 
We have now e s t ab l i s hed Duuune t t ' s  s t andard o f  a s s e s smen t . 
E l e c toral  sys t ems are to be j udged by t h e i r  p ro s p e c t s  o f  p r od u c i ng 
MPs f rom r a c i a l  mino r i t ie s . Duuune t t  t h inks tha t a q uo t a  s c heme
such as STV o r , even b e t t e r , his own QP S , w i l l  aid i n  the achieveme n t
o f  t h i s  obj e c t ive i n  two ways . F i rs t , h e  sugge s t s  tha t any mu l t i-
memb e r  sys t em w i l l  lead p a r t i e s  t o  p u t  up one memb e r  o f  a ra c i a l  
mino r i t y  to p ic k  up mino r i t y  vo t e s  ( p . 2 6 0 ) . S e cond , D ulIDlle t t 
sugge s t s  t h a t  QPS would make i t  par t i cu l a r l y  easy f o r  the memb e r s
o f  a rac ia l mino r i ty t o  a c t a s  a b lo c  c u t t ing ac ro s s  p a r t i e s  b y
l is t i ng those o f  i t s  members  who w e r e  c and i d a t e s  ahead o f  a l l  
o thers ( p p . 286-7 , 2 89-90 ) . T h i s  p r e s u p p o s e s , o f  cou r s e , a rac i al 
mino r i ty a l l  { o r  mos t )  o f  who s e  memb e r s  wo uld p u t  a Labour c and i -
d a t e  w h o  w a s  b l a c k  f ir s t  a n d  a Co n s e rva t iv e  cand i d a t e  who w a s  b la c k
second . I t  i s  p l a i n  t ha t  o n l y somebody d e e p l y imbued wi t h  t h e  
s p i r i t  o f  d e s c r i p t iv e  r e p r e s en t a t io n  wou l d  e x p e c t  t h i s to  be s u c h  
a common o c c u r r ence as t o  d e s i gn a p ro c e d u r e  wi th t h i s  c o n t ingency 
largely in mind . 
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Duoune t t  a l so c l a im s  t ha t , t h ro u gh some dynamic who s e  p r o c e s s  
h e  do e s  no t exp l a i n , blacks  wou l d  d o  b e t t e r  w i t h  mu l t imember 
con s t i t uencies qu i t e  apa r t  f rom t h e i r  imp ro v e d  p r o s p e c t s  for  
d e s c r ip t ive r e p r e s e n t a t ion . He says  t h a t  
und e r  s u c h  a n  e l e c t o r a l  s y s t em ,  p o l i t i c a l  p a r t i e s  wi l l  f e e l  
a g r e a t e r  n e e d  t o  woo t h e  v o t e s  o f  a mino r i t y gro u p ; t he h i s t o r y
o f  Br i t i s h  s ince 1965  i s  amp l e  proo f t ha t , und e r  the e l e c to r a l  
s y s t em now in f o r c e , p o l i t ic ians s e e  t h e i r  b e s t advan tage  a s  
ly ing in an appeal  t o  t h e  p rej u d i c e s  o f  t h e  maj o r i ty and i n
a comp l e t e  d i sr ega rd f o r  t he minor i ty .  A f a i r e r  e l e c t o r a l  
sys tem wo u ld have changed mor e  t h a n  t h e  i d en t i ty o f  B r i t i s h  
M P s : i t  wou ld ·have change? the i r  behavio u r . ( P p . 2 60- 6 1 . )
The lo gic o f  t h i s  e s c a p e s  me , I m u s t con f e s s . I f  the p r e s e n t  
sys t em o f  c ompe t i t io n  among broad -bas ed p a r t ie s  d o e s  no t s t imu l a t e  
t h e  p a r t ie s  (and in pa r t i c u � ar t h e  Labour p a r t y )  t o  s e e k  o u t  vo t e s
f rom r a c ial mino r i t i e s , w h y  s ho u l d  t h i n g s  imp r o v e  w i t h  t h e  i n t r o -
duc t io n  of  STV o r  i t s cous i n  QPS?  S ho u l d  we no t r a t h e r  p r ed i c t
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a g r ea t er p o lar i za t ion , in which a new p a r ty r e p r e s e n t ing the 
mino r i ty pe rhaps p icks up a f ew s e a t s  wh i l e  the  r e s t of t h e  pol i-
t i c i ans comp e t e  for the v o t e s  of the w h i t e  maj o r i ty b y  p ander ing to
the i r  rac i s t p r o c l iv i t i e s ? 
We do no t have t o  res t on a p r i o r i r e a s o n i n g . No r t h e r n  I r e l and ' s
expe r ience w i t h  STV is again ins t r u c t ive . The i n t r o du c t io n  o f  STV
for the e l e c t ions o f  19 7 3  s ha t t ered t h e  he gemony of the U n ion i s t 
p ar ty among P r o t est ant s bu t i t s  e f f e c t  wa s to sp l i t  P r o t e s t an t vo t e s 
among f o u r  g r o u p s  a l l  o f whic h s e c u r e d  a numbe r o f  s e a t s . O f t h e s e
o n l y  one grou p , c ons is t ing of  t ho s e U n i o n i s t s  w h o  f o l l owed the  
leader o f  the par ty and f o rme r P r ime M i n i s t e r  Br i a n  Fau l kne r ,  
su ppo r t ed the so-called " power shar ing" cons t i t u t io n .  The o th e r  
5 8t h r e e , which compe ted in int rans igence , we r e  adama n t l y  opposed . 
We can a lso learn fr om t h e  in t rod uc t i o n  o f  p r o p o r t i o na l
re p r e s e n t a t ion i n  France i n  t h e  1986 elec t ions i n  p l ac e o f  t he 
o l d  two-ba l lo t maj o r i t y  s y s t e m .  The campaign s e t  in t r a in a 
su r g e  o f  rac i a l i s t  ou t b idd ing . As R .  W .  Jo h nso n h a s  o b s e rved , 
und e r  t he ea r l i e r s y s t em Le P e n , t he lead e r  o f  t he 
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over t ly rac i a l i s t  Front  Na t iona l , 
cou ld have said  wha t h e  l iked on t h i s  t h eme , go t h i s  1 0  p e r  c e n t 
o f  the f ir s t-round vo t e , and then wa t c he d  h i s  s u p po r t f l oc k 
cowar d s  o r thodox cons e rv a t iv e s  o n  the s e cond ba l l o t  w i t ho u t  
end ing u p  w i t h  much l ev e r a ge o r  a s in g l e  s e a t . Und e i:  P R ,
howeve r ,  eve ry v o t e L e  P e n  t a ke s  i s  a d i r e c t l o s s  f o r  t he RP R  
a n d  UD F  [ t he ma in cons e rva t ive p a r t ie s ) -- a n d  he w i l l  g e t  l o t s
o f  s ea t s . H i s  leverage i s , a c c o r d ing l y ,  eno rmo u s : h e  c a n  ev e n
d r eam o f  making a n d  u nma k i n g  gov e r nmen t s . The r e su l t  is an 
alarming and e s c a l a t ing auc t io n  in rac i s t  p r om is e s  and t h r ea t s  
a s  t he o r t hodox R igh t engage s w i t h L e  P e n  i n  a f ie r c e  c o mp e t i-
t ion f o r  eve ry l as t  rac i s t  vo t e . 
5�  
T h e  " key me chanism , "  he s um s  u p , " is PR : i t  f o rc es C h i r a c  t o  
comp e t e  w i t h  Le P e n ; G is c a r d  w i t h  C h i r a c ; e v e n  t h e  So c ia l i s t  
p r emi e r , Fab i u s , c a n  b e  he ard boas t ing o n  TV o f  t h e  ' ex c e p t iona l 
f i rm e s s ' t h e  Gove r nme n t  wo u l d  d i s p l ay a g a i n s t c l a n <l e s t i n s  [ i l l e ga l 
al i e n s ] .  PR ha s me a n t  t h a t  Le P e n  h a s  b e e n  a b l e  co s e nd powe r f u l
19 7 
r ipp l e s flowing ac r o ss  t he en t i r e po l i t ic al s p e c t rum . "
6 0  
In the  
event , Le Pen go t his t e n  p e r  c en t o f  t h e  vo t e s  a n d  h i s  c o rr es -
pond i n g  s ha r e  o f  the p a r l iame n t a ry s e a t s . Ev e n  mo r e  ominous f o r
t h e  f u tu r e , t h e  l ine be tween t h e  " r e s p e c t ab l e " a n d  " no n - i: es p e c t a b l e "
r i g h t , which m i g h t  have been ma i n ta ined e a s i l y  enough u nd e r  t h e
o l d  e l e c t o r a l  s y s t e m ,  co l l a p s e d  as o r thodox c o n s e rva t iv e s  i n  a 
numb e r  o f  D e p a r t �e n t s  c o n c l u d e d  po s e -e l e c t o r a l a l l i a nc e s  w i t h  t h e
Fron-t N a t io n a l  to t a k e  c on t ro l . 
I f ind i t  o n l y  too d e p r e s s i ngl y p l au s ib l e t ha t t he in t rod u c -
t i o n  o f  mu l t i-memb e r  cons t i tuenc i e s  in B r i t a in wou l d  come c lo s e r  
t o  
t o  d u p l i c a t ing t h e  F r e n c h  exp e r i en c e tha�p ro du c in g Dunnne t t ' s 
h o p e d - f o r  o u t c ome o f  a bevy o f  b l ac k  M P s  and a comp e t i t ion f o r  t h e  
s u f f r a g e  o f  rac i a l  mino r i t ies on t h e  p a r t o f  o t h e r c and i d a t e s . 
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X I I I  THOUGHTS O N  ELECTORAL REFORM 
I s a i d  a t  the beginning o f  this  d i s c u s s i o n  in s e c t io n  X I
tha t m y  obj e c t s  in tha t s e c t io n  and the  f o l lowing o n e  were  nega t ive : 
t o  argue aga ins t  the ident i f i ca t ion o f  r e p r e s en t a t i o n  w i t h  t h e  
"mi r r o r  o f  the na t ion" conc e p t ion and t o  p u t  the  c a s e  agains t 
Duoune t t ' s  p roposed e l e c t o r a l  sc heme . I ho p e  I have achieved  
t h e s e  a ims . Even i f  I have no t I do no t in t end to p u r s u e  t h e m
any f u r ther here . Howev e r , I mu s e  admi t that  if  someone were to 
ask , il propos the B r i t ish e l e c toral  s y s tem , " A l l  r i g h t , w i s e  guy , 
what would you do ? "  I should f ind i t  h a r d  t o  d e n y  t h a t  the ques t io n
i s  a f a i r  one .  
I have argued that i t  i s  no use a p p e a l ing t o  i n t r ins i c  f a i r -
n e s s  o r  t o  any supposed imp e ra t ives  d e r ived f r om t h e  conc e p t  o f  
r e p r e s en t a t ion . One can appeal  o n l y  t o  c o n s e q u e n c e s . B u t  t h i s  d o e s  
no t have t o  reduce to a n  a t t emp t t o  c a l c u l a t e  wha t e l e c t o r a l  s y s tem
wou l d  g iv e  some par t i c u l a r  po l i t i c a l  pa r t y  the  b e s t c han ce . A good 
d e a l  of advo cacy is  o f  this kind , though th i s  i s  r a r e l y  �ade  an
ove r t  par t of the a r gumen t .  An amu s ing examp l e  in B r i t a i n wa s t h e
sud d e n  conve r s i on o f  many C o n s e rva t i v e s  to  t h e  c a s e  f o r p r o p o r t i o n a l  
19') 
r e p r e s en t a t ion a f ter the Labour P a r t y  won a maj o r i t y  in 1 9 7 4  w i t h  
j us t  u n d e r  for t y  per  c e n t  o f  the vo t e . D a v i d  B u t l e r  i n  his  c on t r i -
b u t io n  to Choos ing an E l e c toral  Sys t em remarks t h a t  a f t e r  the  1 9 7 4  
e le c t ion , " a  s ignif ican t  numb e r  of influen t ial To r i e s  recognized 
t ha t  PR o f f ered the mo s t  r e s p e c t ab l e  o f  cons t i t u t ional s a f egua r d s  
a g a i n s t revo l u t ionary changes be ing enac ted  b y  a m i no r i ty par ty , 1 1
6 1 
and a l though there is some t h ing r ichly comic in the no t ion o f  the  
1974  ·Labour gove rnment as a " revo l u t iona ry" body , the  po in t is
clear  enough . 
In the eve n t  a p ro f e s so r  o f  p o l i t i c s  a t  Oxford  ed i t ed a pro-PR
vol ume tha t  was sponsored and publ i shed by a man who " s t a r t ed the 
Conserva t ive Ac t ion for Elec toral  Re form group a f t e r  the 1 9 7 4
electio n . 1 162  And t h e  Hansard Soc i e t y  s e t  up a coouni t t e e , wh ich
j us t  happened to b e  chaired by  a Con s e rva t ive Life Peer,  and wh ich  
r ecoounended the ado p t ion o f  a PR  sys t em mod e l ed on the Wes t G e rman 
s y s t em ,  whe r e  the Free Demo c r a t s , with barely f iv e  p e r  cen t of the 
100 
several  decades  
popular vo �e , have been  enab led  to  hold the  balance o f  powe r ove r � 
Al though the mo t ives  o f  these people  should  be c lear  enough , 
the ac tual argument s  appealed heavily  t o  abs t r a c t  no t ions o f  fai rnes s : 
the  e d i ted volume carr ied the  c l a im that i t  is "p re t t y  se l f - ev iden t
and rarely  chal lenged in p r in c i p l e "  that  "elec toral  r e f o rm • . .
would  ensure greater  j u s t i ce o r  f a i rness in the representat ive 
process . " 6 3  And the Hansard Soc i e t y  r e po r t  said that  " t here  can be 
no doub t tha t the f irs t-pas t - the-pos t  s y s t em does  no t produce a f a i r  
r e presentat ion o f  the v i ew o f  t h e  peop l e  in P a r l iamen t . Indeed 
suppo r t e r s  o f  the p resen t sys t em do no t a t t empt t o  d e f end it on 
64 
grounds o f  fa irness . "  The ed i ted  vol ume also  a t t emp ted to sugge s t  
tha t "adv e r sary po l i t ics"  w a s  p roduced b y  t h e  exi s t ing electoral  
sys t em and was  respons ible  for  Bri tain ' s poor  pos twar economic  record . 
When the  Conserva t ives g o t  back in 1 9 7 9 , �owever ,  winning tha t elec-
t io n  and the next  on s imilar  mino r i ty vo t e s  and  pu t t in g  in to e f f e c t  
f a r  mor e  genu inely  rad ical change s , t h e  un f a i r n e s s  a n d  adve rsa r y
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na ture  o f  the sys t em d id no t ,  cur iously  enough , con t inue to exc i t e  
t h e  same peo p l e  i n  anyth ing l ike t h e  same way . 
I canno t take the space  to s e t  o u t  and d e f end in any d e t a i l
the c r i t e r ia tha t I th ink should b e  u s e d  to a s s e s s  a l t erna t ive  
electoral  systems in Br i t a in .  Le t me therefore  s imp ly p r o p o s e  three . 
The f ir s t  is that the sys t em should b e  l e g i t imat e  in the  eyes  o f  
mo s t  people . The second is t h a t  i t  shou ld preserve , as  f a r  a s  
poss ible , t h e  f eature tha t a vo ter  knows wha t t he impl icat ion o f  h i s
vo te  is  for  t h e  f o rma t ion o f  a gove rnment . (We can exp r es s  this 
f orma l ly by des idera t ing a mono tonic r e l a t ion b e tween vo t e  and govern-
men t : a vo te  for  par ty _! should make i t  mo re ra the r than l e s s  l ike l y
tha t · par ty ! comp r ises , or  f o rms p a r t  o f , the  next governmen t . ) And
(or part ies  o f  a s imilar  k ind ) 
t h i rd , the rac i s t  Nat ional Front�should no t g e t  any sea t s  o r  be i n
a pos i t ion to s e t  the agenda as in the 1 9 8 6  French e l ec t ion . 
G iven these  c r i t e r ia , the  obvious que s t ion to s ta r t  with  i s :  
should t h e  elec toral  sys t em b e  changed so as  to accommod a t e  the
201. 
present sys t em o f , in e f f ec t ,  three  na t iona l par t ies p lus some 
r e g ional o ne s ?  (The Al l ianc e o f  Soc ial  Demo c r a t s  and Libera l s  can 
b e  counted as one in that i t s  cand id a t e s  do  no t comp e t e  in the same
con s t i tuencie s . )  The p r e s e n t  sys t em s hould  no t , I argued in sec t ion
XI , have to d e f end i t s e l f  agains t a t tacks based on the inapp ropr i a t e  
conc ep t io n  o f  represen t a t ion as  propo r t ional i t y . However ,  even in 
i t s  own t e rms it is  har d  to say that an HP w i th around for t y  per
cent  o f  the  v o t e  i n  his cons t i tuency represen t s  the  " prepond eran t "  
o p inion , a n d  t h e  mor e  s u c h  MPs t h e r e  are the weake r the l e g i t imacy 
of  the sys tem.  I t  should also  b e  said , of  course , that  in cons t i tu-
t ional ma t t e r s  l eg i t imacy is , in the end , a s  l e g i t imacy does . To 
the extent  that the barrage of propaganda in favor of propor t iona l i ty 
a s  the  c r i t e r ion o f  represen t a t ion is successful , the  case for  do ing 
some thing becomes inevi tably  s t ronge r .  
I b e l ieve that  the  b e s t  ou tcome would  b e  a r e t u r n  t o  a sys t em
o f  two b road pa r t ie s  co l l e c t ing eighty- f ive p e r  cen t o r  mo r e  o f  the  
v o t e s  b e tween t hem a nd ga in in g c l e a r  ma j o r i t i e s  i n  mo s t  c o n s t i t u e nc i e s . 
Z03 
But , a s  I have po in t ed o u t , there i s  no warrant  for suppo s in g  tha t 
the p lurali t y  elec toral s ys t em has the  power to b ring this  abo u t  b y  
some automa t ic " squeez ing" p rocess . (This could s t il l  happen , b u t  
i t  would  be  imprudent to coun t on i t . )  H i s t o r ical  exp e r ience  
sugge s t s  that the par t i e s  themselves have to a c t . The obv ious move  
he r e  would b e  for  t h e  Soc i a l  Demo c r a t s  to j o in the  Cons e rva t iv e  
Party , wi th who s e "we t" or  non-Tha t cher w i n g  they a l ready have 
a lmo s t  eve rything in common . I have to say , t hough , that  I do no t 
expec t this  to happen . 
I f  the d e c i s ion is taken to a ccommoda t e  the  p r e s e n t  t r i-
par t i t e  sys t em , the obj e c t  should b e  to avo id the cap r ic io u s  
operat ion o f  t h e  p lura l i ty sys t em when three  closely-ma tched par t ie s  
t r y  to  
comp e t e  f o r  a s.eat  bu t a t  the same t ime�ensure tha t elec t ions
try to 
d e t e rmine t he compo s i t ion o f  t he governme n t  andAc ramp the s ty l e  o f
sma l l  ext r emis t  par t i e s . Th i s  imp l ies , I th ink , r e t a i n ing t h e  
s y s t em o f  s ingl e-memb er cons t i tuenc i e s  b u t  changing t he vo t i ng
procedure . But how? 
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The a l ternat ive vo t e ,  as we have s e e n , is guarant eed to c r ea t e  
a maj or i ty i n  each cons t i tuency b y  t h e  c ru d e  b u t  s imp l e  exped i e n t  
of  e l imina t ing cand id a t e s  a u t o ma t ic a l l y  u n t i l  t h e  r e s u l t is a c h i eved . 
I t s  very  automa t i c i ty , howeve r ,  condenms i t . Le t me reca l l  my d i s -
cuss ion i n  s e c t ion V o f  th e p ro ced u r e f o r  e l ec t ing Oxb r idge Head s 
o f  Hou ses . I argued ther e  that the  requireme n t  o f  making no elec t ion 
un t i l  a cand ida t e  r e c e i v ed maj o r i t y  suppor t wa s p r e fe rab l e  to any 
p ro c ed ure f o r  guaran t e e ing an o u t come f rom any s e t  o f  vo t e s , howeve r
randomly scat t ered over d i f f er e n t  cand id a t es they  m i g h t  be . The
fac t that  it requ ired a r gumen t  and nego t ia t ion was in i t s e l f  to  the
of par l i ament ar y e l e c t ions
good . The pra c t ical  adap t a t ionAo f  t he s ys t em o f  succ es s ive bal l o t s
unt i l  a cand i d a t e  h a s  a ma j o r i t y i s  t h e  two-ba l l o t  sys t em i n  wh ich ,
i f  no cand ida t e ge t s a maj o r i t y in a cons t i tuency in t h e  f i r s t 
r ound , a second elec t ion is he ld in w h i c h t h e  c a n d i d a t e  w i t h  t h e  
large s t  numb e r  o f  vo t e s  wins  t h e  s e a t .  Obv i o u s l y ,  in a na t iona l 
el ec t ion , unlike a co l l ege , t h e  ne go t i a t ion ha s  t o  t a ke p l a c e  among 
zos 
the par t y  lead ers , t hough the argument s  can b e  add r e s s ed to the
voters  b e tween the two el ec t o ral round s . 
I t  would , o f  course , subver t t he o pen-end ednes s o f  t h e  s i t u a -
t ion  i f  a l l  excep t the t w o  l eading cand ida t e s  i n  a c o n s t i t u ency w e r e 
for  s t aying in a t  the s econd
e l imina ted or i f  the propor t ion of vo t e s  on the f ir s t  round requ� 
we re so high as to create  the same or a l mo s t  the same r e s u l t .  S u c h  
a sys t em (and some two-ba l l o t  p roc edures  h a v e  t aken t h i s  f o rm )  wou l d  
have f ew advan tages over t h e  al terna t ive  vo t e ,  a nd i f  t h e r e  wer e
many c and ida tes  t he v io l a t ion o f  mono toni c i t y  that  i s  po s s ib l e  w i t h  
even 
any e l imina t ion sys t em might  bJ...wors e .  The h i g he s t  m i n imum f o r  a
cand ida t e ' s  s taying in that  would r e t a in enough f lexib i l i t y  would , 
I think , be that  now used for  the f o rf e i ture  o f  d e po s i t s : one-
e ighth  o f  the votes . Th is  also happens to have b e e n  the f igure 
used in  the last two double-ba l l o t  e lec t ions i n  t h e  F i f t y  Republ i c . 
(the f i gure  was s e t  a t  f ive  pe r cent  in 1 9 5 8  and ten p e r  c e n t  in 1 9 6 6 .f' 5 
As we saw in t h e  ana l y s i s  o f  the so-cal l ed "wa s t ed vo t e" u n d e r  
p l ur a l i ty vo t in g ,  we canno t  s a y  t ha t  t h e  suppo r t e rs o f  t h e  p a r t y  
:z.o� 
wi t h  the f ewes t vo tes in a th ree-cornered f igh t ·was t ea their  
vo t e s . With  certain  p r e f erenc e  orderings i t  could be that  those  who 
vo ted for the c and ida t e  who came second ·wa s t ed '  them ( in the sense o f  
a s t e , 1 1 
related to s t rategic  vo t ing , that is relevant here ) . So , the member  
of  an all iance that  is s t ronger in a c e r t a i n  cons t i tu.ency may w i th-
d r aw e i ther  as  par t  o f  a d ea l o r  in recogn i t ion tha t t he voters '
p r e f erences p r event i t  from winning even i f  the o t,her  party  w i thd raws .
None o f  these  r e f inemen t s  are available  i f  only t he top two cand i­
al t e rna t ive vo t e . )
dates  go f o rward . (No r , o f  course , can t hey be  accommoda ted by theA 
There  is a good d e a l  g f  exp e r ience with  the two-ba llot  sys t em ,  
though almo s t  a l l  o f  i t  i s  q u i t e  old  o u t s id e  Franc e . A number  o f  
continen tal  European coun tr �e s  emp loyed i t  before  they swi t ched to
party l i s t  PR. These  include Bel g ium un til 1900 , and I ta l y , Germany ,
Aus t r ia ,  Norway and the Ne ther lands unt i l a f t e r  the F i r s t Wor l d  War .
I t  was in use  in France d u r ing mos t  o f  the Third  Republ ic . Unt i l  
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s p i t e  o f  this  and the mul t ip l i c i ty o f  par t ies , the  pressure towards  
a two-cand ida t e  f ight  in the  second round s t il l  opera t ed remarka b l y  
wr ites , 
e f f e c t ively . As Campbell/.. in his  s tandard work on the s ubj ect :
a t  t he f i r s t  bal l o t  e l ec tors would freely  vo t e  f o r  the man they 
mos t  f avoured ; a t  the second bal l o t  electors  and cand ida t e s  a l ike  
d i s c i p l ined themselves to bar the road  to ' r eac t ion ' in the  case  
o f  l e f t-wing voters  and cand ida tes and to ' revo l u t ion ' o r  ' a the i sm '
i n  the case o f  right-wing vo ters and cand idates . A t  the second 
ballot the less  successful  cand ida tes of each s id e  would usua l ly 
w i thdraw and the elec tors  o f  each s i d e  would ral ly  to the cand ida t e 
who had led a t  the f irst  ballo t .  On the Lef t  this  process  was 
called " republican discipl ine ' and tended to be appl ied more  
tho roughly t han i t  was  on the  Righ t . Some t imes the mino r cand i-
d a t e s  persis ted  a t  the second ballo t ,  but  if  they  d id so t he i r  
1 9 1 9  no t only c o u l d  everyon� who was in t h e  f i r s t  b a l l o t  s t a y  in  I suppor t e r s  t e nded to d e s e r t  them.  
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f o r  the second bu t anyone could f reely  enter the second round . I n  
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The tendency for  t he second round to come down to a con t e s t
b e tween the  s tandard-bearers o f  two all iances i s  wel l-es tab l i s hed 
emp i r ical l y .  I f  we assume that the sys t em wo rks in this way , we 
can p o i n t  o u t  that  the doubl e-ballo t sys t em , unl ike t he a l t erna t ive 
vo t e ,  will  generally  s a t i s f y  two cond i t ions tha t the a l t erna t ive 
vo t e  f a i l s  to : the requi rement tha t vo t ing for  a party  canno t hur t  
i t s  chances  o f  elect ion ( mono tonic i t y )  a n d  t h e  requ i r emen t t ha t  i t
should no t b e  poss ible to b r ing about  a more  pref  er red ou t come b y
abs t a in ing f rom vo t ing a l together  than by vo t ing sincerel y .  ( L e t  
u s  call  t h i s  second cond i t ion " SVD" for  " s incere vo t ing dom inance . " ) 
On the f i r s t  round , more vo tes  for  the party  you f avor w i l l  
norma l l y  inc rease i t s  chances  o f  be ing t he s tandard-bearer i n  t h e  
second round . ( I t  is hard t o  see how i t  could reduce them . ) And 
on the second b a l lo t , if the r e  are on ly two cand ida tes  it is a 
s tr a i gh t f o rward cho ice  to vo t e  f o r  the  one you p r e f e r . Tha t i s  to
say , there  is  no cont ingency ( d e f ined in  t e rms o f  the  vo tes  of  
o t h e r s )  in wh ich there  could  be  any .,. 7 
2Cf) 
advan tage in do ing any thing excep t vo t ing for  the c and ida t e  o u t  o f  
two whom y o u  p r e fe r .  S ince s traigh t f o rwardness entails  mono tonic i t y  
and SVD , the se requiremen t s  are necessar i l y  me t o n  the second b a l l o t 
long as 
so h a l l  c and ida tes exc e p t  two are e i ther e l imina ted  for  lack  of  
f i rs t- round vo tes  or  withdraw to leave a s t raigh t f ight  be tween t h e
s t andard-bearers  of  two a l l iances . 
I mus t b e  c a r e f u l  here no t to sugge s t  tha t the two-b a l l o t  
sys t em h a s  the property  of p roviding a s t raigh t f o rward 
s t r a tegy on the f i rst  ballot  as wel l . ( No r , o f  course , does i t  on 
the second bal lo t if  there are mor e  than two cand idates . In this  
case  the second ballot  operates  as  a rela t ive maj o r i ty sys t em ,  w i t h  
the cand ida t e  having the mos t  vo tes  winning the  seat . )  Al tho ugh
s t rai ght forwardness enta i l s  mono ton i c i t y  and SVD , the entailment
does no t ho ld  in th e other  d irec t ion .
I t  i s  in f a c t  easy to see how s traigh t f o rwardness may f a i l  o n  
the f i rs t b a l l o t .  Suppose that  there  are  two s e t s  o f  pa r t ies , 
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those  o f  the L e f t and tho s e  o f  the  R i gh t , and tha t the  larger  the 
share of the to tal Le f t  vo t e  a Lef t par ty gets on  the ba l lo t the 
grea t e r  i t s  chances  of b e ing  the  s t andard-bearer  of the  Le f t  in 
the second ballo t .  (The s imp l e s t c as e would , o f  course , b e  f o r
t h e r e  to b e  an agreement  among  the  Le f t  pa r t ie s  t h a t  t h e  o n e  with  
the  mos t  vo t e s  goes  forward . )  Suppo s e  a lso  that  the  same s i tuat ion 
ob tains among the  Right par t ie s . I am as sumin g ,  of cour se , t ha t  the
two a l l ianc e s  are a lready in place  b e f o r e  the f i r s t  ba l l o t  rathe r  
t han b e ing  p u t  together  b e tween round s . 
now 
Conside�t he pos i t ion of someone who s e  f i r s t  p r e f erenc e is
f o r  a pa r t y  o f  the Le f t .  He migh t vo t e  for some p a r t y  other than the  
h e  mos t  prefe rs for
lseveral reasons . Firs t ,  he may vo t e  f o r  ano ther  Lef t  party  rather
than h i s  mos t  p r e f e r r ed one . This  could b e  r a t ional i f  he thinks 
tha t ano t her party  of the Le f t  has a b e t te r  c hance of winning in 
the s econd round t han the cand ida t e  of the p a r t y  he  l ikes bes t and if
above a l l  some 
he is A concerned t h a t  l L e f t  cand ida t e  should be e l e c t ed . 
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He could bel ieve that his  party could make a poor s t andard-bearer 
b e cause more  f i r s t -round Le f t  vo ters  w i l l  pref  e r  t he Right  cand ida t e
o n  the  second round o f  because mor e  f i r s t-round Right  vo ters  wil l
swi t c h  to i t  on the second round i f  they don ' t l ike the  Right  
s t a ndard-bearer .'ifunder some c ircums tances , i t  could  b e  r a t ional
f o r  someone whose f ir s t  preference is  for a Lef t  candidat e  to vo t e  
f o r  a candidate  o f  t h e  Right o n  t h e  f i r s t  round . One reason would  
be  to  make the Righ t  s tandard-beare r  a mor e  d e f ea ta b l e  cand ida t e . 
Ano ther qu i t e  d i f ferent  (almo s t  oppos i t e )  mo t ive would b e  to make 
the Right s t andard-bearer l ess  obnoxious : this  mo t ive  would be  
r e l evan t wh e r e  i t  seemed very l ike l y that  the  candidat e  of  the
Righ t would w in on the second round . ( I t  would s t i l l , o f  cours e , 
b e  pos s ible  to vo t e  aga in s t  the Right cand ida t e  on the  second round . )
to say , 
I t i s , needless � a r t i f i c ial to talk  abo u t  a s ingle  vo ter
changing elec toral  ou tcome s . Bu t I should h e r e  repeat  the  point  
t ha t  w e  can translate  al l such t a l k  i n t o  s t a temen t s  abo u t  vo t ing by 
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l ike-minded blocs  o f  vo t e r s . We do no t there f o r e  have to think in 
t e rms cf. a single French Communi s t  in a cons t i tuency where Conunun i s t s 
outnumber Social i s t s  imagining that  he can s ingl e-hand edly make the
Soc ial i s t  the standa rd-bearer  of t he Le f t  i n  the second round by
vo t ing Soc ial i s t . All h e  has to do is  think of h imse l f  as one o f  
a number o f  Communi s t s  w i th t h e  same p r io r i t ies  as  h imse l f . I f  
enough o f  them vo t e  for  the Social i s t  then  the  Soc i a l i s t  w i l l  be 
the  s t andard-bearer , and t h i s  prov ides  an adequa te  reason for  ou r
ind ividual Commun i. s t  to vo t e  Soc ia l is t .  I should empha s i z e  tha t  
reasoning i n  this  way does  no t invo lve "mag i c a l "  t h inking t o  the 
e f f e c t  t ha t  one ' s  decis ion w i l l  cause o t he r s  t o  dec ide s imilarly . 
I t  is s imply  a sens ib l e  d e c i s ion rule in su ch s i tuat ions to ask
wha t would be  best  i f  o thers  with the same pref erences d id the
same and t o  hope that  t he o thers  are  t h i nking along t he same l ines . 
I t  i s  illumina t ing t o  ask under what cond i t ions s incere  vo t ing  
on the  ballo t would  d e f i n i t e l y  be the be s t s �ra t egy . When , in o t he r  
wo rd s , would s incere  vo t i n g  b e  gua ran t eed t o  p roduce a n  out come 
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as high as poss ible up on e ' s  p r e f erence order ing over all  outcomes 
of the elec t ion ? Le t us  suppose as  before  that there are two pre-
eac h a l l ianc e  
fo rmed all iances and that  w i t h inA a pa r t y ' s  c hances o f  being the
s t andard-bearer in the second round i n c r e a s e  t h e  mo r e  vo tes it  g e t s
on the  f ir s t  round . Cons ide r  a vo t e r  who s e  f i r s t  p r e f e r e nc e is f o r  
a pa r t y which belongs to t he Le f t  all ianc e .  H e  can vo t e  f o r  i t
wi thout  fur ther calcu l a t ion under  these  cond i t ions : 
( 1 )  · The re are  only two Le f t  cand ida t e s  
( 2 )  H e  is  ind i f ferent be tween Right  c and id a t e s  ( i . e .  i f  o n e  
w i n s  he doe s  no t care  which  i t  is ) 
( 3 )  H e  prefers  e i t he r  o f  t h e  Lef t c and ida t e s  to any o f  t h e  
Right  cand ida tes  
( 4 ) The numbe r  o f  vo t e r s  who will  v o t e  for  the cand idate o f  the  
Right  in the  second round does  no t depend on the par ty 
iden t i f i c a t ion o f  e i th e r  t h e  Right or the L e f t cand i d a t e 
( 5 )  The number o f  vo ters  who w i l l  vo t e  f o r  the cand i d a t e  o f  t h e  
Le f t  on the second round does no t d e p end o n  the p a r t y  iden t i -
f ica t ion o f  e i ther  L e f t or Right cand i d a t e .  
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(The easies t way for  cond i t ions (4 ) and ( 5 )  to be  me t would  be  f o r  
a l l  a n d  only t hose  who vo t e · fo r  a Le f t  cand ida t e  on t he f i r s t  round 
t o  vo t e  for  a Lef t  cand ida t e  on the second round and the s ame on 
t h e  Righ t . The more general  s t a tements  a l low f o r  abs t a in ing on the 
f i r s t round b u t  no t the second , or  the second b u t  no t the f i r s t , or 
even  vo t ing Lef t  on one round and Righ t  o n  the o t he r -- bu t only so 
long as  none of these cho ic�s i s  cond i t ional upon the party  iden-
t i t ie s  of the cand ida t e s  in the second round . )
Under these cond i t ions our  voter  canno t possibly  do b e t t e r  
than vo t e  s inc erely  o n  b o t h  t h e  f irs t and s econd round : he should 
vote for his  more  preferred c and ida t e  of the  two Le f t  cand ida t e s
i n  the  f i r s t  round and for  wh ichever cand ida t e  i s  the  Le f t  cand i-
d a t e  in the  s econd round . These  cond i t ions are  s t rong , bu t they 
are no t hopelessly  unrea l i s t ic and may ,  be  app roxima ted a t  some
t imes and p l aces  closely enough to g ive a number  of voters  s t ra igh t -
fo rward s t ra t e g i e s .  I t  is , a t any r a t e , s t r i k i n g  t ha t  i t  sho u l d  
b e  f a i r l y  e a s y  to  s e t  o u t  cond i t ions f o r  a s t ra ight f o rward s t r a t e gy 
w i t h  the doub l e  b a l l o t  sy s t em . 
2.15' 
Every thing said so far  hol d s  only for  the  e l ec t ion within the
cons t i t uency . We have been assuming that out comes of the cons t i-
tuency e l ec t ion can be ranked in t erms o f  preferences f o r  the cand i-
da tes . But  the Ach illes heel o f mul tipa r ty sys t ems is , as we have 
seen , that  i t  is hard to know wha t the e f fe c t s  o f  a p a r ty ' s  winn ing
an extra seat are . Under  cer tain no t too s tr ingent cond i t ions , 
howeve r ,  the po l i t ical  ar rangement s  a r i s ing under  a two-ballo t sys t em 
w i l l  make this  p roblem a good deal  mor e  tractable than i t  is w i thin
o ther  mul t i-pa r t y  sys t ems .
Provided there are two all iances , which are  made  na t iona l l y  
and are  the  same in a l l  (or  t h e  g r e • t  bulk o f )  cons t i tuenc ies , 
there i s  every reason to expect  the a l l iance that wins the mos t  
sea t s  t o  s t ick toge t he r  a f te r  the e l ec t ion t o  form  the governmen t .
In such a case the  requiremen ts o f  mono tonic i t y  and SVD are me t for  
the r e l a t ion b e tween a vote for  a party  and its  chances  o f f o rm ing 
o r  p a r t ic i p a t ing in a governmen t . For such a sy s tem o f  a l l ian c e s
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w i l l  normally  imply  t h a t  mono ton i c i t y  and S VD  ar e sa t i s f ied a t  t he 
cons t ituency i evel . And i t  w i l l  also  b e  the case  that  an e x t r a  
seat  f o r  a pa r t y  canno t reduce  i t s  chanc e s  o f  f o rming or  p a r t ic i -
p a t ing in a governmen t .  
The no tor ious h i s t o r ical  examp l e s  of  col laps ing a l l ianc es 
following two-ballot  elec t ions -- the " reversals  o f  a l l ianc es"  in 
France in the int e rwar period -- are in fac t exc e p t ions tha t  prove 
the rule . For wha t on a couple o f  occas ion s und erm ined the cohes ion 
of t h e  coa l i t ion formed af ter  the e l ec t ion and led to a gove rnmen t 
o f  t h e  oppo s i t e  t endency hal f way t h rough the  s e s s ion  was t he
equivocal posit ion o f  the Rad ical  Soc ial is t s .  Mor e  a parl iamen-
tary group than a d i s c ipl ined par t y , their  members  ran as s tandard-
bearers o f  the left  in some cons t i tuencies  on the s econd bal l o t  
and as  s tandard-bearers  o f  t h e  r ight in o thers . S ince the Rad ical 
Soc ial i s t s  and other loo se-kn i t  gro up s oc cup ied a p ivo t a l po s i t ion
in the A s s emb l y  ( t h a t  is t o  say , t h e y  c o n t a ined t h e  med ian D e pu t y  
on t he l e f t - r i g h t  c on t inu um ) i t  i s  e a s y  t o  s e e  h o w  e l e c t o r a l
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dynamics and pa r l iamentary a r i t hme t ic cons p i r ed t o g e t h e r  to p r o d u c e  
government  instab il i ty .  
W i t h  coherent par t ies  making na t iona l a l l ianc e s , w e  can p r e-
d ie t  with  some conf idence  t ha t  a do ubl e -bal l o t s y s t em would wo r k  in 
a way no t too unl ike the c la s s ical  two - pa r t y mod e l . ( T h e  O p e/" a t io n
o f  the  sys t em under t he F i f t h  Repub l ic i s  s i gnif ican t  i n  t h i s  con-
t ex t . ) I t  is scarcely wo r th speculat ing ex t ens ive ly abo u t  t he 
longer-t erm dynamics  o f  a p a r t y  sys t em o f  two e l e c t o r a l  and p a r l i a -
men tary  all iances in B r i t ain . Bu t it i s  p e r h a p s  r e levan t to p o i n t  
ou t that  sus tained electoral  coopera t ion b e tween p a r t ies h a s  un t i l 
now invariably  led t o  amal gama t io n .  O n  the l e f t,  t h e  me r ge r  o f  t h e
ILP into  the Labour Par t y  is  a n  examp le ; o n  t h e  r ight , t h e  Con-
serva t ives haye absorbed a numbe r  of par t ies  w i t h  wh i c h they had
elec toral  pac t s , f rom the  Liberal U n ionis t s  o n . One mi gh t t h e r e -
fore  en t e r t a in the poss ib il i ty -- though  i t  i s  no mo re t han t h a t - -
of  the even tual result  o f  a two -ba l lo t s y s t em p r o d u c i n g  a r e v ived
zn 
two-pa r t y  system.  T h i s  would requ i r e  as  a minimwn cond i t ion that 
the same all iances persis t ed through a numbe r  o f  elec toral per iods . 
Even t hen we shou ld b e  caut ious abou t extrapo l a t ing f rom the
exper ience of long- t e rm  e l e c toral  pac t s  b e tween pa r t ies to s t and 
down in favor of one ano ther ' s cand ida t e s . For it may be that  such 
pac t s  have d i f f erent e f f ec t s  in a p l u ra l i t y  sys t em f rom those to 
be  exp ec ted in a two-ba l l o t  sys t em when the pac t comes into e f f e c t
only on the second ballo t .  
I have to admi t tha t t h i s  proposal  o f  a two-ba l l o t  system does 
no t h ing to mee t  Dumme t t ' s  comp l a i n t  that members  of  rac i a l  mino r i-
ties  are  no t ge t t ing e l e c t ed , and , a l t hough I have argued agains t
the f allacy o f  " d es c r i p t ive represen t a t ion , "  I think that the lack
o f  Wes t  Ind ian and As ian MP s i s  indeed symptoma t ic o f  a neg l ec t of
their  in teres ts .  However , t he introd uc t ion o f  a sy s t em for  rep re -
sent ing mino r i t ies in mul t i-membe r  d i s t r ic t s  wou l d , i f  I am r ight , 
carry w i t h  i t  a dange r  o f ou t comes o f a kind Dunnne t t  would  d e p lo r e  
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mor e  than anyone . Amer ican exper ience sugges t s  tha t there i s  a 
part ial so l u t ion within the s ingle-member-d i s t r i c t  sys t em .  The 
p r es c r i p t ion is tha t the Boundary Commi ss ion should engage in racial 
ger rymand e r ing  to  p roduce some p r edominant ly non-whi t e  cons t ituenc i e s . 
Br i t a in does no t ,  o f  cour se , have the huge ghe t toes o f  maj o r  Am e r i-
can c i t ies  ( f o r  which one should b e  thankful ) ,  and  this  makes the  
j ob more  d if f icul t . On the o the r hand , there is an  o f f s e t t ing
factor in tha t there is f a r more tolerance o f  unequally-s ized
cons t i t uenc ies in B r i tain . (In  the U SA the cou r t s  have b ecome so 
f anat ical that they have s tar ted inva l id a t ing boundar ies  that  
dev i a t e  by one per  cent from an equal d iv i s ion within a s t a t e . ) 
But to talk abou t the drawing o f  cons t i tuency boundaries  i s  to  
stir  a ho rne t ' s nes t and  I have already sent enough o f  the
creatures  bu�z ing , so I shall s to p  here . 
izo 
NOTES 
1 .  John Rawl s , A Theory o f  J u s t ic e  ( C ambr id ge , Mas s . :  Ha rvard  
Unive r s i t y  Press , 1 9 7 1 ) , espec ially  pp . 134 - 3 5 n.  1 0 .  
2 .  Kenne th J ,  Arrow , So c ia l  Cho i c e  and Ind iv i d u a l  V a l u e s  (New 
Haven : Yale Univers i t y  Press , 195 1 ) . Fo r an exc e l l e n t  d i scu s s ion
of  Arrow ' s theorem and its  l i terature , see  Rus s e l l  Ha rd in ' s
I n t roduc t ion t o  Pa r t  I I  o f  Br ian Ba rry and Ru s s e l l  Ha rd in (ed s . ) ,
Ra t iona l Man and I r ra t iona l  Soc i e t v ?  An I n t rod u c t ion and 
Sourcebook ( Beverly Hil l s , Ca l . : Sage  Pu b l i c a t io ns ,  1 96 2 ) , PP • 2 1 3- 2 7 . 
3 .  Al lan G ibbard , "Manipulat ion o f  Vo t ing Sc heme s : A General  
Resul t , " Econome trica  4 1 ( 1 9 7 3 ) : 5 8 7-94 ; r e p r in t ed i n  B a r r y  and
Har d i n  (ed s . ) , p p . 358-66 . 
4 .  Michae l Dunnne t t , Vo t ing Proc e� u r e s  (Ox f o rd : C l a rendon P r e s s , 
1984 ) .  Subsequent page r e f e r e n c e s  in t h e  t e x t  a r e  to t h i s  book . 
5 .  Michael  DUJ1DDe t t and Rob in Fa rq uhar so n , " S t ab i l i t y in Va t i n g , "
Ec onome t r i c a  2 9  ( 1 9 6 1 ) : 3 3 -4 3 .  
2.2. I 
6 .  Pe te r  Bowb r i c k ,  "The Economics  o f  S u p e r s t ar s : Co11U11e n t , 1 1 
Ame r ican Economic Review 73 ( 1 9 8 3 ) : 4 5 9 - 5 0 . 
7 .  Ke i th Michael Bake r , Condo rc e t : From N a t u r a l  P h i l o s ophv t o  S o c i a l
Ma thema t ics  (Chicago : Unive rs i ty o f  Chi cago P r e s s , 1 9 7 5 ) , 
Pi> · 2 2 8 , 2 30 .
8 .  I b id . , p .  2 3 9 . 
9 .  See ibi d . , e spe c ia l l y  p .  2 3 8 . 
10 . Duncan Blac k ,  The The o r v  o f  Connni t t e e s  and E l e c t i o n s  
(Camb r idge : Camb r idge Un ive r s i t y  P r e s s , 1 9 6 3 ) , p .  1 6 3 . 
11 . Baker , p .  238 . 
1 2 . Fo r ano ther examp l e  see my "Lady Cha t t e r l ey ' s Love r  and Do c t o r  
Fischer ' s  Bomb Party : Libera l i s m ,  P a r e t o  Op t ima l i ty ,  and the P ro b l em 
o f  Obj e c t ionab l e  P r e f e rences"  in Jon E l s t e r  and Aanund Hy l l and ( e d s . ) , 
Found a t ions o f  Soc ial  Cho i c e  The o ry ( Camb r id g e : Camb r i d g e  U n i v e r s i t y 
Press , 1986) , 
z z :z.. 
. Oxfo rd Eng l i s h  D i c t ionarv , "Me d io c r i ty , "  5 .
I •  S e e  f o r  a d eve lo pmen t o f  t h is p o in t my a r t ic l e " I s 
!mo c r ac y  Spec ia l  7 "  in Pe t e r La s l e s s  a nd Jame s F i s hkin ( e d s . ) ,
ii lo s ophv , Po l i t i c s !  a nd Soc i e t v ,  S c h  s e r i e s (Oxf o rd : Ba s i l
L a c kw e ll , 1 9 7 9 ) , p p .  1 5 5- 9 6 . 
5 .  Mi ch ae l S t e e d , "The E'Jo l u t io n  o f  t h e  B r i t i s h  E l e{: � o r a l  Sy s t e m "
n S .  E. F ine r ( ed . ) , Adv e r sa r v  P o l i c i e s  and E l e c t o r a l  Rc f a r� 
London : An thony \b i g ram , 19 7 5 ) , p p . 3 5 - 5 3 , a t  p p . 4 6 , 4 9 ·. 
6 .  Arend Lij pha r t  and B e r n a r d  G r o fman ( e d s . ) ,  Choo s i ng an E l e c t o r a l
ys t em :  I s s ue s and Al t e r na t ives (New Yo r k :  P ra e g e r , 1 9 84 ) . 
7 .  C .  G .  Hoag a nd G ,  U .  Ha l le t t , P r o po r t i o n a l  Repr e s e n t a t io n  
New York : Macmi l lan , 1 9 2 6 ) . 
8 .  S t eve n J .  B r ams and P e t e r  C .  F i s hb u r n ,  " S ome Lo g i c a l  D e f e c t s
, f  t h e  S ing l e  T r ans f er ab l e Vo t e "  in L i j p ha r t  a n d  G r- o fman ( e d s . ) , 
> p . 1 4 7 - 5 1  a t  p .  1 5 1 . 
ZZ3 
1 9 . Ibid . 
20 . G e o r g e  H .  Halle t t , Jr . , " P r o p o r t ional Rep r e s e n t a t io n  w i t h  t he 
S in g l e  T r ans f e rab l e  Vo te : A Ba s i c  Re qu ir emen t f o r  Le g i s l a t iv e
E l e c t ions" in L i j phar t and Gr o foan ( e d s . ) ,  p p . 1 1 3 - 2 5  a t  p .  1 1 9 . 
2 1 .  B r ams and F i s h b u r n , p .  1 5 0 . 
2 2 . Ro b in Fa rqu ha r so n , The Theorv o f  Vo t ing ( � ew Hav e n : Y a l e
Lnive r s i ty P r e s s , 1969 ) . 
2 3 . W i l l iam P .  I rv ine , '" Add i t ional-Memb e r ' E l e c to r- a l Sys  t erns " i n  
Lij pha r t  a n d  G ro fman ( e d s . ) , p p . 1 6 5 - 7 4  a t  p .  1 6 6 . 
24 . Ibid . 
24A.  John S tuart Mill , " Rec e nt Wr i t e r s  on Re f o rm" in E s s a v s  o n
Po l i t ic s  a n d  S o c i e tv , ed . by J .  M .  Ro b s o n , Vo l .  X I X  in t h e
Co l l ec t e d Wo rks (To ro n t o : Unive r s ity of To ron to P r e s s , 1 9 7 7 ) , 
p p . 3 4 3 - 7 0  a t  p .  360 . 
2 5 . Ha l l e t t , p .  1 1 9 . 
zz � ii� 
2 6 . Enid Lakeman , "Th e  Case for  Propo r t ional Rep resentat ion" in 3 3 .  Ib i d . , pp . 1 4 3-4 . 
Lij p ha r t  and Gro fman (ed s . ) ,  p p . 4 1 - 5 1  a t  p .  4 1 . 
34 . I b id . , p p . 1 4 9 - 5 0 . 
2 7 . I b i d . 
3 5 . R .  W .  Johnson , " Pro po r t ional R e p r e s en t a t io n  C a s t s  a Shadow 
2 8 .  R. J .  Jo hnson , " S e a t s , Vo t e s , Red i s t r i c t i n g , and t he Al l o c a - Ove r  F ra nc e , " London R e v i ew o f  Books , 2 3  January 1 9 8 6 , p p . 3 , 5 ,  6 
t io n  o f  Powe r in E l e c t o r a l  Sys tems " in 1.ij pha r t and G ro f ma n  ( e d s . ) , a t  p .  3 .  
p p . 5 9 - 6 9  a t p .  6 3 ,  i ta l ic s in o r i g i na l . 
3 6 . S e e  fo r a compa c t ac c o u n t  A .  H .  B i rc h ,  Rep r es e n t a t ion ( Londo n : 
� (lJI..�\,._ 
29 . For a d is c u s s ion o f  d ec i s iv e ne s s , s e e  J." I s I t  B e t t e r  to Be Pall Ha l l , 1 9 7 1 ) , pp . 2 2 - 2 9 , e s p e c i a l l y  p .  2 8 .
Powe r f u l  o r  Lucky ? "  Po l i t i ca l S t ud i e s  2 8  ( 1 9 8 0 ) : P a r t I :  1 8 3 - 1 9 4 ; 
3 7 . H a l l e t t ,  p .  1 1 4 . 
P a r t I I :  3 3 8 - 5 7, 
3 8 . D ie t e r N o h l e n , "Two Incomp a t i b l e  P r in c ip l es o f  R e p r e s e n t ;i t ion " 
3 0 . Hal le t t , p .  1 2 0 . 
in L i j p ha r t  and G r o fman ( ed s . ) , p p . 8 3 - 8 9  a t p .  8 5 . 
3 1 . Thomas Hobbes ', Lev iathan , ed i t ed and w i t h  an in t roduc t io n by
3 9 . I b id . , p .  8 9  no t e  1 .  
C .  B .  Macp her son (Harmondswo r t h : P enguin Books , 1 9 8 2 ) , p .  2 2 1 . 
4 0 .  I b id . , p .  8 7 . 
3 2 . Jenn i f e r L .  Hochschild ,  The New Ame r ic an D i l emma : L ib e r a l
4 1 .  I b id . , p .  3 6 . 
D emo cracy and Schoo l D e s e gr e ga t ion (New Haven and London : Y a l e 
Unive r s i ty Press , 1 9 84 ) , p .  1 4 3 .  4 2 .  I b i d . ,  p .  8 6 . 
z u,  
4 3 . See D i e t e r  Nohlen , "Changes and Cho ice s i n  El e c t o r a l  Sys t ems" 
in Lij pha r t  and G r o fman (ed s . ) ,  p p . 2 1 7 - 2 9 , e s p e c i a l l y  p p . 2 2 2 - 3 . 
4 3a .  John S tuar t Mil l , " Cons ide r a t ions o n  Rep r e s e n t a t iv e
ove r ruue n t "  in E s s a v s  o n  P o l i t ic s and S o c i e t v ,  p p . 4 3 5- 5 i 7  a t
• 44 9 .
4 .  Richard Rose , " El e c t o r a l  S y s t ems : A Qu e s t io n  o f  Degree  o r  o f
' r inc i p l e ? "  in  L i j phar t and G r o fman ( ed s . ) , p p . 7 3 - 8 1  a t  p .  74 . 
, 4 a .  Hil l ,  "Cons i d e r a t ions on Re p r e s e n t a t iv e  Gov e r nmen t , "  
, 4 b . Ibid . 
4 c . lbd . 
p . 4 50 .  
5 .  S e e  Ro nald Rogowski , "Representa t io n  i n  Po l i t ical Theory and 
- in Law , "  � 91 ( 1 9 8 1 ) : 3 9 5-4 3 0  at p .  4 1 9 .  The quo t a t ions are  
· e s p e c t ively f rom the s imul taneo u s l y  de c id �d c a s e s  of  Reyno l d s  v .
"ims 3 7 7  U . S . 5 3 3  ( 1 9 6 4 ) a t  565 ;md Luca s  v .  C o l o rado General  As s emb l y
, 7 7  U . S .  7 1 3  ( 1964 ) a t  7 3 6 . 
ii1 
4 6 .  U n i t e d  Jewish Organizat ions o f  Will iamsburg Inc . •  v. Carey 
430 U . S .  14 4 .  
4 7 . Ro gowski , p .  4 2 4 . 
4 8 .  Ib id • 
4 9 .  See  B i r c h , pp . 5 1 - 2  f o r  t h e  no t io n  o f  v i r t u a l  r e p r e s e n t a t io n . 
The ar gumen t  in t he t ex t  is p resen t ed and c r i t i c i z e d  by Ro gowski , 
P •  4 2 4 . 
e'W..{1; ) Q ,  liehl en "T • we Ineemperi:�i�h�l,e---P-t!�·:ne�.1-e�-:-:---,.!!....-- -e P l' J:nci11 1 c • - - • • •  ' .. I' ·  88 . 
5 1 . Nau r i c e  Duverger , "Which  I s  the  B e s t  E l e c t o r  al S y s t e m ? ' '.  in
Lij phar t and Grofman ( e d s . ) , pp . 31- 3 9  a t  p .  3 5 . 
5 2 . S e e  Ro s e , p .  80 . 
5 3 .  For some remarks on t h e s e  l in e s , s e e  P e t e r  G .  J .  P u l z e r , 
Po l i t ical  Rep r e s en t a t ion and E l e c t ions in Br i t a i n  (London : G e o r g e
Al l e n  a n d  Unwi n , 1 9 67 ) , p p . 5 3-4 . 
1 2 e  
54 . Han s  Daald e r , " Ext r eme Propo r t iona l Re p r e s e n t a t io n -- The 
Du t ch Expe r ience" in Fine r ( ed . ) , p p .  2 2 3 - 4 8  a t  p . 2 4 2 .  
55 . R i ch a rd S .  Ka t z , "The S in g l e  Trans f e r ab l e  Vo t e  and P r o p o r t i o n a l  
Represen t a t ion" i n  L i j p h a r t a n d  G r � fman ( e d s . ) ,  p p . 1 3 5 - 4 5  a t p .  1 4 1 .  
56 . I b id . , p .  1 4 3 .
5 7 . S e e  Hanna P i tk i n , The Concept of Repre s e n t a t ion ( Be r k e l e y  and 
Los Ange l e s : Univ e r s i t y  of C a l i f o r n i a  P r e s s , 1 9 6 7 ) , c h . + . 
5 8 . Corne l ius O ' Leary , " I r e land : The N o r t h  and t he S o u t h "  i n  
Finer ( ed . ) ,  p p . 1 5 3 - 8 3  a t  p . 1 8 0 ; s e e a l s o  Ka t z , p . 1 4 1 . 
5 9 . R .  W .  Johnson , p . J .  
6 0 . Ib id . , p . 5 .  
6 1 . Dav i d  E .  Bu t l e r , " Re f l ec t io ns o n  the E l e c t o r a l  D e b a t e  i n
Br i t a in" in L ij p h a r t  a n d  G r o fman ( e d s . ) , pp . 2 2 5- 2 9  a t p .  2 2 6 . 
6 2 . F ine r , p .  x i .  
2.2.'} 
6 3 . Nevil Jo hns on , "Adve rsary Po l i t ic s  and E l e c t o ral Re f o rm : Ne ed 
We Be Af r a id ? "  in Finer ( ed . ) ,  pp . 7 1  - 9 5  a t  p .  7 7 . 
64 . P e t e r J .  T a y lo r , "The Case f o r  P ro p o r t io n a l  Tenur e :  A D e f e n s e  
o f  t he B r i t i s h  E l e c t o r a l  S y s t em" in Lij p ha r t  and G r o fman ( ed s . ) ,  
p p . 5 3 - 5 8  a t  p .  5 3 , c i t i ng The Repo r t o f  t h e  Hans a r d  S o c i e t v  Com-
m i s s ion o n  E l e c t o r a l  R e f o rm  (Londo n :  Han s a r d  S o c i e t y  f o r  P a r l iame n -
t a r y  Governmen t ,  1 9 7 6 ) , p .  2 . 
6 5 . Dome n i c o  F i s iche l l a , " The Dou b l e - Ba l l o t  S y s t em as a Weapon 
against  An t i-Sys t em Par t i es" in L i j p har t and G ro f man ( ed s . ) , 
p p . 1 8 1 - 8 9  a t  p .  1 8 9  no t e  2 .  
6 6 . P e t e r  Campb e l l , F r e n c h  E l e c t o r a l  S v s t ems a n d  E l e c t i o n s  S i n c e
l i 8 9  (London : F a b e r  a n d  F a b e r , 1 9 5 8 ) , p .  8 7 . 
